





# FIRST AND SECOND GENERATION MIGRANT RELIGIOSITY IN EUROPE

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# Introduction

The religiosity of immigrants has been the center of growing public attention over the past few years. One of the most important triggers to this rising attention in Europe has been Islamist violence across the globe and possible involvement of Muslim minority groups in the West. Recent attacks on the Canadian parliament and the satirical 'Charlie Hebdo' journal in Paris by Islamist inspired individuals have once again increased concerns about religious beliefs among first and later generation migrants in the Western world. Moreover, recent reports have alarmed public opinion about immigrant youth who leave Western countries to join violent extremist groups in Syria and Iraq (Public Safety Canada 2014; Pew Research Center 2014). These concerns arise amidst a unfriendly climate towards religion and immigration among the European population. In 2006, 46% of individuals in Europe agreed to the statement that the role of religion in society is too important. At the same time, only 40% thought that immigrants contribute a lot to the country they live in (Eurobarometer 2006). In 2011, 6% of all Europeans thought that religious extremism is the most important security challenge for their country, while this proportion reaches as high as 15% in some Western European countries (Eurobarometer 2011). It is in any case safe to say that large-scale immigration to Europe has drastically altered both the ethnic and religious landscape of Europe. Therefore, a thorough study of ethnic minority religion in Europe is clearly relevant for public policy.

These public concerns were not mirrored in academic research, however. Academic research into ethnic minorities in Europe focused predominantly on socio-economic topics. This resulted in limited knowledge of religiosity among immigrants. In addition, given that most research was confined to case studies focusing on specific local immigrant and religious groups, the limited knowledge there is, is also somewhat fragmented (Ebaugh 2003). In their literature review on immigrant religiosity, Cadge and Ecklund (2007: 360) conclude that this focus on individual case studies has resulted in 'a lack of systematic analytic comparison and synthesis'. For future research, they argue that 'more research about individuals based on systematic survey data is needed to understand how independent variables like demographics, immigration status, geographic contexts of exit and reception, and the presence or absence of coethnics shape immigrants' religious beliefs' (Cadage and Ecklund 2007: 372). Helen Ebaugh launched a similar plea, calling for 'discerning patterns of religious adaptation' to 'develop generalizations that go beyond endless descriptions of specific cases and arrive at conclusions that are testable' (Ebaugh 2003: 237-238). The importance of transcending case studies is even more relevant in

Europe, which is characterized by a wide variation in religious contexts. Little is known about how migrant religiosity develops in more religious countries such as in Eastern Europe, versus relatively less religious countries such as in Western Europe. Therefore, there is a need for more sociological research into individual and contextual influences on migrant religiosity.

One of the main reasons for this gap in the literature was a lack of systematic survey data including questions on religion and containing a substantial number of immigrant cases (Cadge and Ecklund 2007). The availability of large-scale datasets like the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) in the US and the European Social Survey in Europe (ESS) at the beginning of this millennium has altered the possibilities for the types of large-scale comparable research which can propose testable conclusions. Moreover, during the last decade, many of the national and local surveys that collected information on ethnic munities complemented their survey with a section on religiosity.

With this dissertation we want to offer a systematic, comparative analysis of immigrant religiosity in Europe. We want to improve upon previous research by testing generalizable theories on immigrants from virtually all over the world across more than 25 European countries. Our goal is to go beyond previous case studies of specific immigrant groups in specific contexts. Therefore, we want to perform an analysis of religiosity among a wide variety of ethnic and religious groups in the diverse European context. We look at how immigrants' religiosity is determined by individual characteristics, by characteristics of the country they migrated from and by characteristics of the country they migrated to.

This dissertation is structured as follows. In the following parts of this introduction, we will first determine the basic concepts of our dissertation. In Chapter 2, we present a short overview of the current state of the research and which gaps we want to address in this dissertation. We also introduce the main sociological theories which we use to try to fill these gaps in the literature and define the research questions. In Chapter 3, we discuss the applied methodology. We give an overview of our research sample and how we have analyzed that sample. Chapters 4 to 8 entail the empirical analyses. In each of these chapter we try to formulate answers to the proposed research questions. Finally, in Chapter 9, we discuss the general conclusions we derive from this dissertation and make recommendations for future research.

## Main concepts

### What is religion?

Before we are able to analyze how religion differs among immigrants, we need to delineate what it constitutes specifically. Although this is the central concept of this dissertation, it is difficult to define. With an increasing diversity in religion across the world, the question remains how



a definition can be both sufficiently specific and generic (Blasi 1998). Definitions run the risk of being too specific on the one hand, affecting the analysis and determining conclusions from the onset by a too narrow view on the subject, or being too general on the other hand, hardly capable of delineating religious systems of meaning from any other social system (Dobbelaere and Lauwers 1973).

Among theorists of religiosity, two traditions of defining religiosity exist: substantive or functional definitions. The former defines religion by the meaning of the contents of certain phenomena, the latter by the function it fulfills for society (Berger 1974). The distinction between both definitions goes back to two founding fathers of sociology Weber, who applied a substantive perspective to religion, and Durkheim, who used a functional definition (Davie 2003). According to Weber, the crucial aspect of religion is the 'sacred' meaning it has for individuals, which is different from the 'profane'. The former is the realm of the 'uncanny', the 'otherness', while the latter is the domain of everyday reality (Berger 1974). Therefore, substantive approaches stress the difference between religious ideas, values and beliefs and non-religious ideas, values and beliefs. Individuals' interpretation of the distinction between the profane and the sacred determines the boundary between religious and non-religious phenomena. According to substantive definitions, the sociologist of religion should follow the 'Verstehen'-idea to understand from within the meaning individuals attribute to religion, and how they think religion is different from the rest of society (Swatos, Kivisto and Gustafson 1998).

The functional definition goes back to the work of Durkheim (1912), who defined religion as 'a solidary system of beliefs and practices related to the sacral, i.e. separate and forbidden things, which unites all adherents in a moral community, called a church.' Although the distinction between the sacred and the profane is a substantive element in Durkheim's definition (Davie 2003), religion is approached by the function it has for a certain society. In his view, religions are moral communities whose collective actions help to unite its members. These social actions of religion are therefore sociologically more important than the contents of these actions, according to functionalist interpretations of religion. Contrary to substantive approaches, the focus in functionalist analyses is devoted to analyzing the function religion has for a society or for individuals, rather than analyzing the meaning systems.

One of the main differences between substantive and functional definitions of religion is the specificity they ascribe to religion. Substantive definitions take a distinction between the sacred and the profane as point of departure: religion only entails those meanings that refer to transcendent or metaphysical entities (Berger 1974). These definitions hence stress the difference between religious ideas, values and beliefs and non-religious ideas, values and beliefs. Moreover, they argue that different types of beliefs and meaning systems have different outcomes (Davie 2003). Functional definitions reduce religion to a social system which has a certain function for societies, putting religion on a level with other social systems. In the functional approach,

more focus is devoted to commonalities between different religions or between religious social systems and other social systems within a society. But what makes certain social subsystems 'religious' and others not? Most functional definitions of religiosity deem social subsystems as religious when they have a function of explaining existential questions and/or alleviate possible frustrations deriving from uncertainty and uncontrollable events, through certain beliefs and practices (Berger 1974). Yinger (1957: 9), for instance, describes religion as an answer to the struggle with 'ultimate problems of human life. It is the refusal to capitulate to death, to give up in the face of frustration, to allow hostility to tear apart one's human associations'.

Most empirical studies of religion do not give a formal definition of religion. The distinction between both views has therefore been called an 'old and sterile debate' (Chaves 1994: 756). In the end, however, the sociologist of religion has to choose a specific type of analysis strategy to assess the topic he wants to study. The sociologist of religion needs to decide whether the research question entails looking at differences in meaning systems as in the substantive approach, or looking at religion as a social system as in the functional approach.

During the mid-twentieth century, the functionalism of Parsons became the dominant paradigm in the sociology of religion (Beckford 1989; Davie 2003). Since then, religion has often been approached by the function it has. One of the most studied functions is the one Durkheim identified, the integrating effect of religion. Through collective behavior in moral communities, religions provide social support, which is for instance associated with positive effects on mental and physical health (Ellison and Levin 1998). According to other scholars, religion produces conformity to norms and values in society and can therefore reduce delinquency or substance use (Stark 1996; Van Tubergen and Poortman 2009). One of the best examples of functionalist analyses is functional differentiation theory (Norris and Inglehart 2004). According to functional differentiation theory, societies in the Western World secularized due to the fact that in modernized societies religions and religious institutions lost their function, given that welfare states and other social institutions took over the role of religion. Specialized professionals, and organizations devoted to healthcare, education and welfare fulfilled the needs of individuals which were traditionally fulfilled by religious institutions. In this functionalist interpretation, religions lost their social function and are hence no longer needed.

The functionalist view on religion has resulted in a tendency towards research which stresses the positive effects religiosity can have on a wide variety of social topics (Smilde and May 2010). This tendency is also present in the literature on migrant religiosity (Foner and Alba 2008). Scholars have stressed two dimensions of benefits for immigrants: psychosocial and socio-economic. The psychological benefits of religiosity for immigrants were already a theme in the seminal work of Herberg (1960). One of the general psychological benefits of religion is offering a stronghold to individuals by answering existential questions. The migration process itself, can increase the need for this religious stronghold, however. Migration can thus be a 'theologizing

experience', as Smith (1978) has argued. The process of going through long-distance traveling and often hard early adaptation to the new host society can be a traumatizing phase in a human life. In this case, religion can offer guidance and consolation. Therefore, the process of migration is often approached as a factor which may induce religiosity (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003). Recent quantitative studies, however, found that religious participation after migration decreased substantially, thus supporting previous qualitative research (Connor 2008, 2009). Religious habits are often disrupted due to migration and the availability of certain denominations in the place of settlement might cause drops in religious behaviors. Nonetheless, most scholars agree that the psychosocial benefits associated with religion can help immigrants to adapt to the new host society (Hirschman 2004). Through offering existential security and social support, religion might give immigrants guidance and support in adapting to the new society (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003). Religion has therefore been described as a 'balm for the soul' for immigrants during the adaptation process to the new host society (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003; Connor 2010b). Even among later migrant generations, who did not migrate themselves, religion can serve as a more stable identity for ethnic minorities who feel discriminated (Foner and Alba 2008). Indeed, the social support people experience through religious communities benefits immigrants' well-being and mental health more than other forms of group involvement (Connor 2010b).

This social aspect of religion does not only benefit immigrants' mental well-being, but also provides social capital and opportunities for socio-economic mobility (Hirschman 2004). Almost all studies of immigrant religion in the U.S. stress the opportunities they provide for their adherents: from offering English classes to providing information about job openings (Foner and Alba 2008). Quantitative studies indeed found that religious participation in the U.S. is associated with a higher occupational attainment (Connor and Koenig 2013), although the relationship seems to be the strongest among non-Protestant immigrants (Connor 2011).

In this dissertation, we follow a functionalist approach to immigrant religion. We study differences in religiosity across different groups and in different contexts. The point of departure is that religion has certain functionalities for either individuals or social groups and that several aspects might either reinforce or weaken the need for these functions to be fulfilled. Such functions could be for instance social integration, identity formation or psychosocial effects. We focus on how individual experiences of religion among ethnic minorities are affected by individual characteristics, interactions with other individuals, social groups and social institutions and characteristics of the social context in which immigrants live. This means that we do not study religion as a factor contributing to the psychological and social adaptation of immigrants to their new environment, but rather as a consequence of these adaptation processes.

By choosing this approach, we do not imply that substantive approaches to immigrant religiosity are less valuable to the scientific knowledge of immigrant religiosity. To the contrary, a better understanding of interpretations, meanings and beliefs from the point of view of immigrants

themselves is needed to fully grasp the everyday lived religious realities of ethnic minorities. Our goal, to provide a comparative analysis of what makes migrants across host societies and from different origin societies more or less religious, calls for a certain level of generalization. We therefore assume that behind every different expression of religion and different meaning system across different denominations, there is a general shared component of religiosity, or how religious people are. We are interested in why some migrants are more religious than others, across religious meaning systems. How religions, and differences between the meaning systems of religions, affect behavior is not the main question we try to answer in this dissertation. The question at hand is how religiosity varies according to immigrants' demographics in different sending and receiving contexts and among different ethnic communities. Therefore, we opt to focus on the general underlying phenomenon of how religious people are, which is more comparable across these different contexts.

## Dimensions of religiosity

One thing most definitions of religion have in common is that these discern different dimensions of religiosity. Durkheim (1912) and Yinger (1957: 9) mention beliefs and practices, while Bellah (1964: 358) and Geertz (1966: 4) use more generic designations in terms of 'systems of symbols'. For an empirical analysis of religiosity, the question remains however, how these systems of symbols can be measured and analyzed. Therefore, we need to delineate the constitutive dimensions of religiosity. An illustration of why researchers distinguish different dimensions in religiosity is the research into the waning role of religion in Western European societies. Several studies have found that this decline of religiosity is apparent in some dimensions of religiosity, but not in all of them: softer forms of religiosity, such as religious beliefs, have persisted, while harder indicators of religiosity, such as ritualistic behavior, have declined dramatically (Davie 1998). Grace Davie (1990) has termed this European pattern 'believing without belonging'. Before examining religion among ethnic minorities we therefore need to distinguish its different dimensions.

One of the first systematic distinctions was presented by Glock (1962). According to Glock, religion has five different dimensions: experiential, ritualistic, ideological, intellectual and consequential. The experiential dimension entails feelings and emotions, the ritualistic concerns religious behavior, the ideological comprises religious beliefs and the intellectual dimension is a form of religious knowledge. The consequential dimension deals with the influence of religiosity on other attitudes, values and behavior and religion is then more an independent variable than a dependent.

Some early criticisms that these dimensions are only underlying characteristics of one latent variable (Clayton and Gladden 1974) were disbanded by empirical studies that confirmed the multidimensional nature of religion (Faulkner and De Jong 1966; King and Hunt 1975; Hall,

Meador and Koenig 2008). The specific dimensions of Glock's scheme were also criticized. The consequential, intellectual and experiential dimension were considered peripheral by some scholars, who found that these dimensions are either antecedents or consequences of religiosity and not indicators (Cornwall et al. 1986). Moreover, the original scheme did not specify clear differences between personal and institutional modes of religion (Roof 1979). An alternative was therefore formulated by Cornwall and colleagues (1986), who derived their dimensions from social psychologists' distinction between cognition (knowing), affect (feeling) and behavior (doing). For each construct respectively, they discern a personal and an institutional variant, leading to six different dimensions of religiosity: (1) traditional orthodoxy, or individual beliefs freed from any religious affiliation, (2) particularistic orthodoxy, or affiliation-specific beliefs, (3) spiritual commitment, or personal relationships with the transcendental, (4) church commitment, or the attachment to the religious community, (5) religious behavior, or personalized religious involvement, and (6) religious participation, or involvement in social religious activities. The authors propose specific indicators for each dimension, based on aspects of Mormon churches, but adaptable to other denominations or contexts. Most measurements in sociological analyses of religiosity can be attributed to each of these six dimensions.

In current-day sociological research into religion, it is conventional to focus on three distinct categories: (1) religious affiliation, (2) religious commitment and (3) religious behavior (Hall, Meador and Koenig 2008; McAndrew and Voas 2011). The first often entails measuring whether individuals feel they belong to a certain denomination or religion. The second is measured by asking how religious individuals feel themselves or how important they think religion is. The third is often divided between personal and social practices, which often entails a distinction between praying and religious service attendance.

The specific measurement of these dimensions of religiosity, however, has been predominantly oriented towards Judeo-Christian specific measurements. The sociology of religion has focused primarily on the Western World in general and Christian religion in particular (Poulson and Campbell 2010; Cadge, Levitt and Smilde 2010), leading to specific interpretations of each dimension in terms of its measurement (Faulkner and De Jong 1966). Religious beliefs have often been measured by asking beliefs in a God or heaven, common concepts in Judeo-Christian denominations, but not necessarily in other, for instance polytheistic religious forms. The same applies to religious behavior which has often been measured by asking individuals' service attendance. Not all religious forms have the same prescriptions concerning the frequency of ritualistic behavior, however, or might have other or more important rituals. Measuring the frequency of religious service attendance, for instance, has been shown to be less reliable for Muslim women, for whom service attendance is less common than men (Meuleman and Billiet 2011). This question of dimensionality and measurement of religiosity is clearly more crucial when the population at study consists of immigrants from virtually all over the world.



In this dissertation, we focus on the three most frequently studied dimensions of religion: (1) religious affiliation, (2) personal religious commitment and (3) religious behavior. We analyze religious affiliation by assessing whether individuals consider themselves belonging to a certain denomination. Personal religious commitment is analyzed by looking at how religious individuals feel themselves. Religious behavior, finally, is examined by assessing the frequency of praying outside of institutional arrangements. By using these dimensions, we traverse the whole spectrum of dimensions of religiosity and examine organizational religiosity, personal beliefs and religious practices, while assuring the comparability for immigrants from across the globe, thus exhibiting a wide diversity in religiosity. We return to the specific measurement of religiosity in Chapter 3, when we discuss the data we use and the methodology we apply.

## Migrants

As with religion, migration and migrants are terms which are used daily, from formal public policy documents to colloquial conversations. Therefore, their meaning seems quite self-explanatory. As social scientists, however, we need to be aware of how these terms include and exclude certain people and phenomena.

Migration means the process of settling oneself in another area than where one was previously settled. This can entail both short-distance and long-distance movement. The difference in forms of migration are often determined by the crossing of certain boundaries. Rural-urban migration, for instance, is the crossing of the boundary between rural and urban areas. Although migration within countries or over relatively short distances are probably more numerous, the most common interpretation of migration is international migration. Migration is hence the movement across national borders. Therefore, we define a migrant as a person who has crossed national borders and settles in a country different from the one in which he or she was born. This migrant status is often tracked over successive generations, by measuring the youngest parental generation in which migrants occur. Second generation migrants are thus individuals who are not migrants themselves, hence born in the country where they live, but who have at least one parent born abroad. Third generation migrants have at least one grandparent born abroad, while their parents and they themselves were born in the country where they live. Scholars often refer to the group of people originating from migration, i.e. all migrants and their offspring across different generations, as ethnic minorities. Although ethnicity and ethnic minorities do not have a strict definition and also entail groups who did not migrate to the country they live in, we use the term to describe the group of people who originate from migration, up until the third generation.

Delineating ethnicity by national origins neglects ethnic differences, in terms of for instance language and culture, within national origin groups. Therefore, we make abstraction of these internal differences within groups and focus on differences in religiosity across national

origin groups. Another exclusion by focusing on migrants is that of internal migrants, i.e. all those individuals who moved within national borders. Sociologically, however, some internal migration flows might in some cases be comparable or even more drastic than international migration flows. More importantly, international migration is a political process of nation-state building (Zolberg 1999). National borders and border-crossing state regulations determine who is considered a migrant and who not. Nation states regulate who may enter and leave the country, how long each individual can stay and whether they become full members of the nation state through citizenship acquisition. Determining who can become a member of society and who not is a form of nation-state and national community building politics (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). International migrants are for nationals the ‘alien other’, by living within the territory of the nation-state but not belonging to the national community. Some theorists have argued that sociologists of migration have largely ignored these nationalistic processes, leading to what they call methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002). Migration research has taken the nation-state as unit of analysis, therefore focusing predominantly on international migration, neglecting internal migration flows, and often limiting research to studying how migrants differ from nation-state nationals. By measuring these differences, social scientists also maintain discourses excluding migrants from the rest of society. With each study into the differences between ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority possible cultural or socio-economic discrepancies get underlined and sometimes confirmed (Schinkel 2013). In this respect, some aspects of migrants, such as migrant religiosity, have been approached as ‘anomalies’, deviating from those of the rest of society. Moreover, by extending sociological research to later migrant generations, being a migrant becomes a hereditary social trait. Discourses such as these not only describe but also shape realities. Therefore, the sociology of migrant integration should be aware of its research strategies and discourses and how this might influence the wider image of ethnic minorities in society.

In this dissertation we also focus on international migration, thus excluding internal migration processes. Although we do recognize the importance of studying religiosity among internal migrants, this is not the subject of this dissertation. Moreover, for this dissertation international migration is an interesting topic since national borders in some cases also coincide with religious borders. Historically, religion in Europe has been organized nationally with regulation if not sponsorship by national governments. A substantial number of European countries are furthermore historically characterized by a quasi-monopoly of one denomination. Therefore, crossing national borders also often entails settling in a different religious environment. At the same time, there are considerable differences within countries as well, on which we focus in Chapter 5. Hence, we believe that looking at migrants coming from a wide variety of national contexts and migrating to different European countries is an interesting sociological topic.





## Theory

In this chapter, we discuss the relevant theories which guided the empirical analyses in our dissertation. First, we give a short overview of previous sociological research into migrant religiosity in Europe. We discuss the remaining questions in the literature, which we want to address in this dissertation. Second, we discuss the specific theories which can guide us towards answering the different research questions. For each theory, we discuss the aim of applying the theory to migrant religiosity and how this contributes to the current debate in the research literature. From these theories we derive specific research questions which we will address in each chapter of the empirical part of the dissertation.

Academic research into migrant religiosity in Europe developed only recently. Although research into immigration and migrant integration has been common since the take-off of large-scale immigration in Western Europe, that research has predominantly focused on socio-economic topics. Immigration into Europe often initiated due to economic reasons in guest worker programs. At a later stage, migration persisted due to the global economic crisis in the seventies of the twentieth century and due to family formation or family reunion of already settled immigrants. Therefore, academic research in Europe initially focused on analyzing the socio-economic attainment (Van Tubergen, Maas and Flap 2004) of ethnic minorities and demographic processes (Beck-Gernsheim 2007). In the U.S., however, research into migrant religiosity developed earlier. Although the U.S. had a longer tradition of being an immigrant society, immigration following the 1965 Immigration Act raised the religious diversity in the U.S. to a new level (Hirschman 2004). As already mentioned, the American sociological study of religion has been dominated by a functionalist approach, stressing the benefits religion can offer to immigrants in the U.S. Hirschman (2004) has summarized these benefits of religion for immigrants in the U.S. as a source of refuge, respectability and resources. Hence, the American literature on migrant religiosity has been dominated by a positive view on the effect of religiosity on the adaptation to and integration into American society (Foner and Alba 2008). Recently, more attention has been devoted to large scale survey research into determinants of immigrant religiosity in the U.S. (Connor 2010c; Alanezi 2008).

The European tradition differs somewhat from the American. First of all, only a small number of case studies were conducted from the nineties of the last century onwards (Lesthaeghe and Neels 2000), the main trigger for systematic academic research in Europe was probably public concern for the religious fervor of Muslim immigrants living in Western Europe after the

terrorist attacks on September 11 in 2001. Therefore, a substantial number of studies addressed religiosity among Muslim immigrants in Europe. These studies show that Muslim immigrants are relatively religious compared to the general European population, mostly because they originate from rural areas of less developed countries and because residential segregation and endogamy maintain religious commitment (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). When confronted with hostility towards their ethnic or religious identity, religiosity among Muslims tends to increase further (Connor 2010; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012). Some studies among Muslim minorities in Western Europe have also examined how religion evolves from immigrants to later generations, showing remarkable intergenerational stability (Roy 2004; Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013).

Unfortunately, the current state of the literature on ethnic minority religiosity in Europe has mostly been limited to a focus on Muslim immigrants and has hence neglected other denominations. Scholars have focused on the relatively stable pattern of religiosity among Muslims, both within and across generations (Maliepaard, Gijsberts and Lubbers 2012; Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013), and on factors contributing to the maintaining of this relatively high level of religiosity, such as segregation and endogamy (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). This focus on Muslims and small scale case studies of ethnic minorities in Europe has led to a too specific theoretical development. First, concerning theories from the sociology of religion, recent theoretical developments have gone unnoticed in the sociology of ethnic minority religion. Second, the study of religiosity among ethnic minorities in Europe has mostly been restricted to the first generation. Although an intergenerational perspective is common among socio-economic studies of ethnic minorities' lives, this approach is virtually absent from the research into ethnic minority religion. Third, it is unclear whether the findings among Muslims are generalizable across different denominations and whether findings in specific contexts are generalizable to other contexts. The effects of for instance segregation might play out differently for Christian ethnic minorities, or other religious minorities. Next to these individual associations, the findings were often based on case studies in specific context, thus neglecting the influence the context can have on these relations. Studies have shown, however, that the context where Muslims and ethnic minorities live might be crucial for their religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012). Migrants who live in a host society where natives are more religious tend to be more religious themselves. Moreover, among Muslims, the accommodation of Islam affects the secularization process among second generation migrants. Therefore, the academic knowledge on migrant religiosity in Europe is at the moment relatively underdeveloped.

In the current these, we formulate three overarching research objectives. First, we want to study ethnic minority religion in Europe across religious groups by applying recent theories from the sociology of religion which explain global differences in religiosity. Second, we intend to examine how ethnic minorities adapt their religious lives to the environment to which they migrate and how religiosity develops among later generations who are confronted with the

religiosity of their first generation parents and that of the host society. Previous research has so far neglected intergenerational process, although the focus on intergenerational differences has a prominent place in the sociology of socio-economic topics among immigrants. Hence, we will secondly assess differences in religiosity according to migrant generations. Furthermore, it is unclear whether findings from previous studies among Muslims are generalizable among other ethnic minorities as well. Therefore, we will thirdly test the role ethnic segregation plays for ethnic minority religiosity in Europe. Such a study should at the same time take into account the contextual setting in which religious lives are negotiated. Therefore, we believe that research should address three crucial gaps in the research literature.

First of all, previous research into migrant religiosity has mostly tested theories on religiosity which have been subject to criticism over the past decades. The sociology of religion has debated for over a century on different theories which explain why people are religious, especially in the light of declining levels of religiosity in Western Europe. Successively, secularization theory and religious market theory have been dominant paradigms in tackling these questions and successively, these have been brought down by empirical evidence against the theories. Nonetheless, most studies have focused on one of these theories to explain differences in migrant religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006; Alanezi and Sherkat 2008). Moreover, secularization theory and religious market theory have been applied at different analytical levels. Secularization theory has been applied to the origin countries of immigrants, as a way of explaining how being born in an environment with a specific level of modernization might influence religiosity, while religious market theory has often been applied to the destination country, as a way of explaining how religious pluralism affects religiosity. Therefore, research into migrant religiosity could be improved by testing more recently developed theories.

Second, although a handful of studies have examined how religiosity evolves from the first to the second generation among Muslims, little is known about how religion evolves from the first to the second generation in general, across different contexts. In general, the sociology of migrant integration has a clear intergenerational perspective: although scholars argue over the exact process and different terms such as assimilation, integration and acculturation, most scholars agree that these processes develop over successive generations (Alba and Nee 1997). Therefore, most studies on socio-economic attainment and integration among ethnic minorities are framed within an intergenerational view on migrant adaptation. This is not the case for the literature on migrant religiosity, however. Indeed, in their review of the literature on migrant religiosity, Cadge and Ecklund (2007) indicate that there is few systematic survey research into religiosity among second generation migrants. There are only a handful of studies that have examined intergenerational differences in religiosity among ethnic minorities (Alanezi and Sherkat 2008; Diehl and Koenig 2009; Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2010). In Europe, these studies have focused on Muslims and show mixed results: a stagnation in religiosity is observed

in Germany, while religiosity among the second generation is lower than among the first in the Netherlands. In the US, on the other hand, religiosity increases across generations. Given these mixed results across diverging contexts, the research on migrant religiosity is clearly in need of a coherent intergenerational perspective which can explain evolutions in religiosity over successive migrant generations across diverging contexts.

Third, little is known about how ethnic segregation might affect religiosity among immigrants. Only a handful of studies have examined the effect of ethnic segregation on migrant religiosity. These have predominantly focused on ethnic residential segregation, however and report mixed effects: although an influence of residential segregation has been reported for Muslims (Voas and Fleischmann 2012), while no differences according to segregation have been found among other groups (Van Tubergen 2006). Less is known about the role of ethnic segregation in other life domains, however. One such important domain is school ethnic segregation. There are two important reasons for studying the impact of ethnic school segregation on ethnic minorities' religiosity. First of all, ethnic school segregation in Europe is widespread, and previous research has documented the effects this has on a wide range of aspects for both ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority (Agirdag, Van Houtte and Van Avermaet 2011). One of these effects it has is limiting interethnic contact. As adolescents spend a substantial part of their waking hours in school, schools have been demonstrated to have an impact upon a wide range of ideas, values and beliefs including pupils' religiosity (Regnerus, Smith and Smith 2004; Barrett et al. 2007). Moreover, due to the smaller scale, interactions within schools might be less voluntary than within residential settings. School segregation might therefore be more determinative of interethnic contact than residential segregation. Second, social psychologists agree that adolescence is a pivotal life phase for the formation of religiosity (King and Boyatzis 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004). As individuals age, they tend to become more independent from the ideas, values and beliefs of their parents (Min, Silverstein and Lendon 2012). Therefore, a better understanding of how religiosity develops among ethnic minorities during adolescence and an assessment of the role of ethnic school segregation is needed.

With this dissertation, we want to offer some insights which might contribute to filling these three gaps in the literature. In short, we first want to apply a recent theory which explains global differences in religiosity to migrants living in different European countries and originating from countries across the globe. Second, we want to study how religion differs across migrant generations in different contexts by applying theories which explain how the context influences individuals ideas, values and beliefs. Third, we assess the development of religiosity among adolescents and the influence of the school context in terms of the ethnic school composition.

The three topics are tackled in five empirical studies. In these studies, we were guided by three important sociological theories. First of all, we start with insecurity theory (Norris and Inglehart 2004). This is the most recent successful theory which explains differences in religiosity

across different contexts. Second, we discuss Durkheim's social integration theory (1897). This theory explains how values, ideas and beliefs differ according to interactions individuals have with others and with certain social groups. This theory has been applied successfully to previous studies among first generation migrants (Van Tubergen 2006) and this might explain diverging intergenerational differences in different contexts. Third, structural opportunities theory (Blau 1977) explains the probability of interaction with certain individuals and social groups, which might explain the influence of school segregation on ethnic minorities' religiosity. In what follows, we discuss each of these theories and argue how they can help us in progressing knowledge on migrant religiosity in Europe.

## Insecurity theory

Since the early days of sociology, scholars have struggled with the question 'why are people religious?'. Over the twentieth century in Europe, this question became more and more inverted to 'why are people not religious?'. Two main theories have been proposed, tested and subsequently deprecated due to a discrepancy between predictions and results. Both theories compared levels of religiosity across countries due to contextual factors. The first attempt at formulating an answer was secularization theory. The theory predicted that increasing modernization lead to increasingly secularized nations. Weber (1946) famously called this process the 'disenchantment' of the world. According to Weber, modernization led to an increasing influence of science and bureaucracy on society. Intellectualization and rationalization replaced the functions of religiosity, by offering calculable solutions for incalculable circumstances. Weber saw in this process also an evolutionary model of societies, comparing the modernized world of Europe to those of 'the savage'. Among the latter, rationalization does not fulfill the same functions in society, thus creating a place for religion. Closely related, functional differentiation theory argued that in industrialized societies other social institutions fulfill needs which were traditionally fulfilled by religion and religious institutions. A considerable body of literature emerged over the previous century examining these theories, which predict a negative relation between economic development and religiosity.

The last decades, however, this first line of research has been subject to scrutiny and subsequent criticism. One of the major flaws in the theory was the inability to explain the relatively high levels of religiosity in the United States. The United States, among the most modernized and economically advanced societies over the previous century, is characterized by a vital religious field. Levels of religious affiliation and religious service attendance are anomalously high when compared to similar industrialized countries. At the same time, secularization theory was also unable to predict religious revival movements across the globe. The emergence of New Age spirituality in Western Europe and evangelical revivals in Latin America contradict



the hypothesized effects of increasing modernity on religion (Berger 1999). Other scholars argued that secularization in Europe cannot be reduced to lower religiosity as such: religious beliefs persisted in Western Europe, but the influence of religious institutions and the religious participation in service attendance declined drastically (Dobbelaere 1981). Stark (1999) concluded that secularization theory should be buried, given that decades and even centuries of empirical research did not corroborate the theory, in a paper he polemically entitled 'Secularization, R.I.P.'.

A second attempt to explain global differences in religiosity came from religious market theory, a combination of rational choice theory and economic market theory. This theory originated specifically from the comparison between the United States and Europe. The theory states that religious pluralism can play a decisive role in shaping levels of religiosity through a supply and demand economic market mechanism (Iannaccone 1991). In this framework, religious demand by individuals is considered constant, while the supply differs according to competition in the religious market to attract individual adherents. The more religious pluralism in a society, the more competition between different denominations. According to economic theories, this should lead to more efforts into creating a better religious product. The antipode is a society with a religious monopoly by one single denomination. In that case, there is no competition to convince individuals to adhere to that denomination and participate actively in religious rituals. Scholars examining these theories thus evaluate possible links between the presence of different competing denominations in a society and levels of religiosity. Despite its original popularity (Sherkat and Ellison 1999), critics argued that this theory performed less well in explaining why religion is still relatively popular in Southern Europe, despite the Catholic monopoly (Verweij, Ester and Nauta 1997). A review of the literature on religious pluralism and religious participation concluded that the results were contradictory and that the religious market pluralism theory is not supported by empirical evidence (Chaves and Gorski 2001). Moreover, the mathematical relationship between the most often applied measure of religious pluralism and religious participation has been questioned, thus undermining virtually the whole body of empirical studies which tested the theory (Voas, Crockett and Olson 2002). Therefore, religious pluralism theory was another fruitless attempt to explain cross-national differences in religious fervor.

Both theories are now generally considered obsolete. Recently, however, insecurity theory has offered a new explanation of global differences in religiosity. Norris and Inglehart (2004) presented insecurity as a refashioned form of secularization theory by focusing again on a functionalist interpretation of religion as a relief for insecurity in individuals' lives. They disagree with the idea of the religious market pluralism theory that demand is constant but suggest that religion might differ in different contexts according to the relative security these contexts offer. Their conceptualization of insecurity deviates from the simplistic modernization scheme of classical secularization theory. Modernization, industrialization and rationalization

do not lead automatically to higher levels of existential security. Although industrialization and modernization has progressed in some countries over the last few decades, socio-economic inequality has persisted, which means that often only a relatively small group of elites reap the rewards in terms of economic benefits. In these countries, insecurities are higher for lower socio-economic classes, but also for the elite, who see the risks of poverty in their own country and fear attacks on their wealth and power by those less well-off. Moreover, in some countries governments have invested more in social security systems, thus reducing existential risks for individuals. In other words, the link between modernization and religion is according to Norris and Inglehart only apparent insofar as modernization increases existential securities for its' inhabitants or not. They test their theory on data from the World Values Survey by assessing the influence of economic inequality and human development measures and find support for their theory. Further analyses corroborate their thesis, both at the national (Fairbrother 2013) and individual level (Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2011).

As already indicated, previous research has mainly tested the two theories which are now generally considered dated (Van Tubergen 2006; Alanezi and Sherkat 2008). The recently developed insecurity theory has not been tested among migrants. Studying the influence of insecurity among immigrants is important in several respects. Immigrants have lived in different contexts, thus experiencing different levels of insecurity. Previous studies have indeed indicated that first generation migrants' religiosity is dependent upon both the context of origin and the context of destination (Van Tubergen 2006). Moreover, insecurity theory stresses the importance of insecurities experienced through childhood. Therefore, studying insecurity theory among first generation migrants not only contributes to a better knowledge of religiosity among immigrants, it can also offer a better test of insecurity theory in itself. As the context of insecurity in childhood differs from that in adulthood, since it is per definition associated with on the one hand the country of origin and on the other hand the country of destination, we can assess whether insecurities during childhood are indeed more important than those during adulthood. Therefore, our first objective is to test this insecurity hypothesis among first generation migrants to contribute to both the development of insecurity theory and the knowledge on migrant religiosity.

## Social integration theory

### Social integration and religion

Apart from applying theories which explain contextual differences in religiosity, scholars of migrant religiosity have also wondered whether ethnic minorities integrate religiously like they do socio-economically. Therefore, they have wondered whether ethnic minorities conform

to levels of religiosity in the host society. These scholars have often applied social integration theory. This theory predicts the dissemination of ideas, values and beliefs among social groups, can offer such an explanation. Among migrants, social integration theory can predict how levels of religiosity in the host society might influence levels of religiosity among ethnic minorities.

The theory on social integration dates back to Durkheim (1897), who thought that social integration had the function of binding people together into social groups. This binding together in certain social groups helped societies to strive for a common goal. According to Durkheim, individuals who were less integrated in social groups risked losing to see the common goal societies have, thus succumbing to egoistic suicide. At the other side of the spectrum, individuals could be integrated too well into social groups as well, making them at risk of perceiving oneself as a burden to society, thus succumbing to altruistic suicide. Social integration is hence a continuum, whereby Durkheim saw an equilibrium somewhere between too little and too much social integration. Individuals integrate into all kinds of social groups, for instance families and voluntary organizations.

The driving force behind social integration is interaction with other individuals. Durkheim provides the example of how religious groups promote social integration. Religion fosters social integration by performing collective rituals in moral communities of like-minded individuals. The more people interact with each other, the more they will share the same ideas, values and beliefs. This means that certain ideas, values and beliefs will be shared more in certain groups which are better integrated socially. The theory therefore predicts that a single individual will share more values, ideas and beliefs with a random member of the nuclear family than with a random inhabitant of the same municipality. Durkheim also signaled the effects of social change on social integration. Modernity, population growth and social change cause interactions to become more numerous and complex. Traditional bonds of family and religion are bound to loosen in modernity, according to the classic author.

Although his study has been subject to major criticisms, most critiques focus on empirical flaws in the book, while the basic theory of social integration theory has remained generally intact (Pescosolido and Georgianna 1989). Even in more recent periods, social integration in religious groups and families is associated with lower suicide rates (Stack 2000; Van Tubergen, te Grotenhuis and Ultee 2005). Moreover, social integration theory has been applied to a multitude of research subjects, by looking at how integration in social groups affects individuals attitudes, beliefs and behavior. Over the years, scholars also examined how social integration affects religious affiliation, behavior and beliefs (Welch and Baltzell 1984; Need and de Graaf 1996; Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2002). Being integrated in less religious groups and having less religious spouses is associated with lower levels of religiosity. Therefore, the religiosity of the social group in which individuals are integrated has an influence on their own level of religiosity.



These applications of social integration theory in the sociology of religion have spurred the use of the theory in the literature on migrant religiosity as well. In this respect, the ethnic community and the host society are considered two different social groups, with two different religious environments. The degree of social integration into the specific social group determines to what extent migrants share their religiosity with that of the ethnic community and/or the host society. Indeed, Van Tubergen (2006) demonstrated that ethnic minorities tend to be more religious in contexts where natives themselves are more religious as well. This means that there occurs a process of conforming to the religious environment of the host society among ethnic minorities. Social integration theory therefore provides an explanation of why some ethnic minority groups tend to be more religious in one society compared to another group with the same ethnic background in a different host society (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012). Given the diverging levels of religiosity in Europe, our study can offer an interesting test of social integration theory by examining whether religiosity among ethnic minority differs according to the religious environment of the host society.

### Social integration and the second generation

For filling in the second gap we identified in the literature, the intergenerational difference in religiosity among ethnic minorities, social integration theory could explain why previous studies found different results in diverging contexts. As already indicated, most scholars agree that processes of immigrant adaptation span different generations. One of the decisive factors which discerns later generations from the first generation is that the primary socialization occurs in the host society (Bisin and Verdier 2000). The primary socialization of second and later generation migrants results in a better mastery of the host society language, higher educational attainment and patterns of social mobility (Rumbaut 2004). These characteristics are also associated with a higher social integration: primary socialization in the destination country is associated with more ethnic majority friendships (Chiswick and Miller 2001; Martinovic, Van Tubergen and Maas 2009). We can thus expect that second generation migrants have more contact with ethnic majority individuals. Social integration theory predicts that they will therefore be influenced more by ideas, values and beliefs among natives than first generation migrants.

In essence, social integration theory of religiosity among immigrants predicts that migrants will adopt the religiosity of the society in which they settle. A better social integration will lead ethnic minorities to take over the dominant religious pattern of the host society in which they live. Second generation migrants will adopt the religiosity of the host society more than first generation migrants. Previous research has shown that this is the case for political and ethical ideas: second generation migrants conform more to the ideas of natives than first generation migrants (Maxwell 2010; Van der Bracht and Van de Putte 2014). The idea of an intergenerational conforming has been proposed by Stark (1997). Stark conducted a study of

religiosity among three generations of German ethnic minorities to the U.S. Although this was initially an attempt to find support for the religious market theory by testing what would happen if secularized ethnic minority groups get exposed to a vital religious market, Stark demonstrated that later generations resembled the religiosity of the rest of American society. Although the first generation was far less religious, by the third generation the German minorities had levels of religiosity comparable to that of other Americans. This finding could be an indication of the intergenerational conforming to religiosity in the host society, due to social integration. Testing this hypothesis in Europe can offer interesting insights into the intergenerational conforming however, given the range of levels in religiosity across different European countries.

### Social integration and exclusion

This process of intergenerational integration into the host society is not a deterministic linear process, however. Scholars have criticized the classical assimilation paradigm for this proposition. Classical assimilation theory predicted a gradual disappearance of differences between ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority across subsequent generations (Gordon 1964). Although this may be true for some groups, studies showed that subsequent migrant generations not always assimilate in an increasing fashion into socio-economically better positions. Therefore, some scholars have proposed adaptations to the theory, which take into account that not all groups progress socio-economically over generations. One of these adaptations has been for instance segmented assimilation theory, which describes three different patterns: classical assimilation, assimilation into the underclass leading to permanent poverty and rapid economic advancement combined with a preservation of the ethnic community's values and solidarity (Portes and Zhou 1993). Although the segmented assimilation theory has been subject to some criticisms (Zhou 1997), most scholars now agree that assimilation or acculturation in a new society is not a linear process across subsequent generations. Later generations can actually identify more with the own ethnic group and dissociate themselves from the ethnic majority. Therefore, we should take into account that second generation migrants not always adopt the religious pattern of the society in which they live.

One of these situations can occur when ethnic minorities perceive discrimination and exclusion. In this case, the ethnic identity is often reinforced. This process is called 'reactive ethnicity' (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Perceived threat and discrimination function as mechanisms which accentuate group differences, thus increasing awareness of ethnic identity boundaries between 'us' and 'them' (Gans 1979). Therefore, more hostile environments towards ethnic minorities increase the identification with the own ethnic group. Previous studies have indeed shown that perceived ethnic discrimination is associated with increased ethnic minority identification (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). This process of reactive ethnicity works differently for different subgroups, however. Better educated ethnic minorities often have less favorable attitudes of the

ethnic majority. This is contrary to what intergroup contact theory would predict. According to this theory, individuals who have more contact with out-group members have less prejudice about the out-group (Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Ethnic minorities who have spent more time in the educational system would therefore have more favorable attitudes towards the ethnic majority. The contradiction between intergroup contact theory and the finding that better educated individuals have less favorable attitudes toward the ethnic majority is the so-called integration paradox: the more people are integrated in a certain society, the more aware and sensitive they become of their acceptance in that society (ten Teije, Coenders and Verkuyten 2013). Higher educated ethnic minorities have higher expectations regarding their job status and can compare more to their better educated ethnic majority counterparts. Therefore, they experience more relative deprivation, perceive more personal discrimination and feel that the host society is in need of change with regards to opportunities for ethnic minority groups (van Doorn, Scheepers and Dagevos 2013; de Vroome, Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014). This effect of relative deprivation is even higher among second generation migrants: higher educated second generation migrants do not identify with the host country more than their lower educated counterparts (Tolsma, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2012). These results reveal that interethnic contact does not automatically mean positive contact and that social integration and interaction with natives can have counterintuitive effects.

Processes similar to reactive ethnicity have been observed when it comes to religiosity, especially among second generation Muslim immigrants in Europe. Contrary to the US, Islam is in Europe often considered a barrier to integration (Foner and Alba 2008). Due to historical reasons, public opinion has a less favorable view on religious identities in the public sphere (Meer and Modood 2009). Moreover, since the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, negative depictions of Islam have dominated the public media (Bail 2012). Therefore, Islam is often adopted as a form of oppositional identity among Muslim minorities in Europe (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). In analogy to reactive ethnicity, this process has been termed 'reactive religiosity'. Among second generation Muslim minorities, this reactive adoption of religiosity can often take a particular direction. Second generation migrants in Europe often feel in-between ethnic groups: not fully accepted in the host society and not fully accepted in the origin society either (Foner and Alba 2008). Therefore, they identify with Islam, although often a specific form of Islam. Given the ethnic connotations of Islamic practices and mosques in European countries, second generation Muslims predominantly identify with a globalized Islam, i.e. detached from the local ethnic and cultural forms of the so-called 'family Islam' of their parents (Foner and Alba 2008; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Second generation Muslims therefore often identify with a culture-less global form of Islam, and often reject certain cultural traditions as non-Islamic (Cesari 2002). Therefore, perceived hostility towards the ethnic and religious identity often reinforce each other in stimulating religiosity among second generation Muslims.

Therefore, an intergenerational perspective on migrant religiosity should take into account how the religiosity of the receiving society influences first and second generation migrants' religiosity through social integration. At the same time, the complex interaction between social integration and perceived hostility should be taken into account. So far, research testing the effects of perceived threat has focused predominantly on Muslims in some Western European countries (Foner and Alba 2008; Cesari 2010; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). It is unclear whether perceived discrimination has the same effect across different ethnic minority groups and in diverging contexts.

### Social integration and the ethnic community

According to social integration theory, second generation migrants will therefore conform more to levels of religiosity among natives in the host society than their first generation counterparts. This means that the theory predicts that they be somewhere on a continuum between origin country religiosity and host country religiosity. This means that we should not limit our study to examining the influences of host society religiosity, but we should also take into account how ethnic communities transfer their religiosity to later generations. Social integration into the own ethnic community might in this way lead to cultural preservation among later generations. Within each social system, there is a certain tendency towards cultural preservation. If cultures do not transfer traits within and across generations, then they will disappear over time (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). If, on the other hand, cultures are replicated exactly, then there is no room for adaptation to changing circumstances, causing cultures to be out of touch with the context in which they live (Boyd and Richerson 1985). Therefore, social systems have to find an equilibrium between cultural preservation and cultural adaptation. Scholars who study the social transmission of cultural traits distinguish three different forms (Berry and Georgas 2008). First, there is vertical transmission, i.e. the influence of parents. Second, there is horizontal transmission, i.e. the influence of peers. Third, there is oblique transmission, i.e. the influence of other individuals and social institutions.

In an immigration context, later generations often experience diverging values from on the one hand the culture of the country of origin and on the other hand that of the destination country (Bisin and Verdier 2000; Vedder et al. 2009). Therefore, the cultural traits within the own ethnic community might stand in contrast to the cultural traits in the host society. Social integration theory predicts that individuals will share the ideas, values and beliefs of a certain social group more the more they interact with that group. Therefore, the religiosity of second generation migrants will be influenced more by ethnic community religiosity the more they interact with the ethnic community. Moreover, social psychologists stress the importance of the quality of the interaction for the successful transmission of cultural traits. The vertical transmission of values is more successful among families with a better paternal relationship

(Taris, Semin and Bok 1998). Moreover, parental styles and the educational resources of parents also increase the successful transmission of cultural traits (Schönpflug 2001; Bisin and Verdier 2000).

The higher level of intra-ethnic contact within ethnic communities has been proposed as an explanation of the relatively high levels of religiosity among Muslims in Europe (Voas and Fleischman 2012; Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2012). This type of research, however, has primarily been conducted from the point of view of the host society by looking how ethnic segregation shields minorities from the influence of the host society (Van Tubergen 2006; Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013). Less is known about which individuals are more susceptible to being influenced by the ethnic community. More interactions with the ethnic community, with a better relationship quality and with co-ethnics with higher resources might lead ethnic minorities to be more influenced by the ethnic community. Therefore, research should take into account the influence of ethnic community interactions as well, next to the influence of the host society.

Combining these different aspects of social integration theory, our second objective is to focus on (1) the influence of the host society religiosity on migrant religiosity, (2) the influence of host society religiosity on intergenerational differences in religiosity, (3) the influence of ethnic community religiosity on later generation migrants' religiosity and (4) the role exclusion of ethnic minorities plays in increasing or decreasing the influence of either the host society or the ethnic community.

## Structural opportunities theory

Filling in the third major gap in the research literature entails looking at how smaller structural settings affect the dissemination of values, ideas and beliefs. Therefore, we look at how ethnic school compositions can affect religiosity among ethnic minority adolescents. These ethnic school compositions affect adolescents' opportunities for having intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic interactions. If no out-group members are present, individuals are not likely to interact with out-group members. If only out-group members are present, individuals are not likely to interact with in-group members. Therefore, opportunities to interact with others might be decisive in influencing the social integration of individuals in certain groups. Structural opportunities theory (Blau 1977) explains how group distributions might affect opportunities for in- or out-group contact.

The structural theory of opportunities has been developed most thoroughly by Blau (1977). According to Blau, heterogeneity in a society determines the opportunities to interact with others across social groups. He assumes that people prefer in-group associations over out-group associations in the first place and prefer associating with out-group member over not associating at all. Therefore, group sizes and proportions determine the probability of intergroup relations.



Members of smaller groups are more likely to associate with members of larger groups than vice versa. When translated to ethnic groups, this means that ethnic minority group members have higher probabilities of interacting with the ethnic majority. At the same time, larger ethnic minority groups will have a lower propensity to interact with the ethnic majority than members of very small ethnic minority groups. This almost self-explanatory relation between group-size and interactions is the most commonly applied part of Blau's structural opportunities theory. Blau also discussed how these differences in interaction relate to heterogeneity and inequality in a given society. More importantly, structural opportunities theory predicts that interactions are less likely when there are strong correlations between structural parameters. If, for instance, socio-economic status and ethnicity are strongly correlated, intergroup interactions become less likely, because the in-group preferences to associate both in terms of ethnicity and socio-economic status reinforce one another (Blau 1977). Therefore, correlated structural parameters increase the propensity to interact within the in-group.

Structural opportunities theory is among ethnic minorities often applied in studies on segregation in different domains. Ethnic segregation is the separation of humans based on ethnicity. It can occur in a wide variety of life domains, such as school segregation, whereby different ethnic groups attend different schools, and residential segregation, whereby different ethnic groups live in different parts of a city or in different cities within a country. Previous research has indicated that ethnic segregation in schools (Joyner and Kao 2000; Van Houtte and Stevens 2009) and residential ethnic segregation (Vervoort, Flap and Dagevos 2010) is indeed associated with intergroup interactions and social integration of individuals.

Concerning ethnic minority religion, previous research has applied structural opportunities theory by looking at how segregation affects rates of religiosity. The idea is that encapsulated ethnic communities shield its members off from interactions with the ethnic majority (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Previous research indeed found that residential segregation is associated with higher rates of religious participation among Muslims (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). In other contexts, however, the role of ethnic segregation and concentration for ethnic minority religiosity has not been examined. Through ethnic concentration in schools, ethnic minorities might have fewer interactions with ethnic majority pupils than in the case of evenly distributed ethnic groups in schools (Van Houtte and Stevens 2009). Adolescents spend a large proportion of their waking hours in schools, meaning that ethnic school concentration can have an important impact upon their interaction with ethnic majority pupils. Having ethnic majority friendships can for instance foster identification with the host society for ethnic minority pupils in ethnic minority dominated schools (Agirdag, Van Houtte and Van Avermaet 2011). This means that structural opportunities indeed affect the social integration of ethnic minorities and their interactions with ethnic majority pupils, which in turn affects the influence of host societies' values and beliefs on ethnic minority pupils. Therefore, it can be expected that ethnic concentration in schools might

affect ethnic minority pupils' religiosity during adolescence. Given the important role adolescence plays in forming ethnic minorities' religiosity, it can be interesting to see whether the influence of the host society religiosity already occurs in schools or whether school segregation shields ethnic minorities from host society influences. Therefore, our third objective is to examine the influence of ethnic school segregation on ethnic minority adolescents' religiosity.


## Research questions

With this dissertation we want to answer three main research questions. First of all, we want to know whether the insecurities first generation migrants experience influence their religiosity. We look at how childhood insecurities, experienced in the country of origin differ from insecurities experienced in the destination country, at the individual and the contextual level. We address this research question in Chapter 4 by applying Norris and Inglehart's insecurity theory (2004).

Second, we want to examine how the religiosity of social groups in a society influences first and second generation migrants' religiosity. We look at how the religiosity of the host society influences migrant religiosity and whether this can explain intergenerational differences in religiosity. We look at how different religious contexts lead to diverging intergenerational differences in religiosity among ethnic minorities. Moreover, we examine how the religiosity of immigrants' ethnic communities influence their religiosity by looking at how interactions within and outside the ethnic community affect the transmission of religiosity within the ethnic community. We also assess whether exclusion of ethnic minorities might lead to a higher influence of either host society religiosity or ethnic community religiosity. This research question is tackled in Chapters 5-8 by applying Durkheim's social integration theory (1897).

Third, we look at how ethnic school segregation affects religiosity among adolescent ethnic minorities. Due to limiting interactions with natives, ethnic school segregation might promote the transfer of religiosity to later generations. We try to formulate an answer to this research question by applying Blau's structural opportunities theory in Chapter 7 (1977).


Our approach also implies discerning different analytical levels. For the first research question, we assess how certain national contexts provide more insecurities for immigrants. Migrants can be influenced by insecurities experienced while growing up in the origin country and after arrival in the destination country. Next to insecurities belonging to the context, migrants can also experience insecurity based on personal aspects. For this research question we therefore focus both on the macro level, in terms of how national contexts influence religiosity, as well as the micro level, in terms of how individual aspects influence religiosity. Figure 2.1 shows the different analytical levels and main independent variables for research question one.

*Figure 2.1: Analytical model for research question 1*


For the second research question, we focus on how the religious context influences first and second generation migrants. The religious context can be conceptualized at both the macro and the meso level. At the macro level, we focus how the national religious context of the destination country affects religiosity among immigrants. At the meso level, we examine the influence of the religiosity of the ethnic community. At the micro or individual level, we study how migrant generation, exclusion and interactions with the ethnic community influence religiosity. Figure 2.2 displays the analytical levels and the corresponding independent variables associated with research question two.




Figure 2. 2: Analytical model for research question 2



For the third research question, we examine how the ethnic school composition contributes to ethnic minority adolescents' religiosity. Therefore, we focus on impacts of the meso level, in this case schools. At the micro level, we assess how this influence of the meso level differs according to migrant generation. Figure 2.3 shows the analytical levels with the main independent variables for research question three.

*Figure 2.3: Analytical model for research question 3*

The full analytical model is presented in figure 2.4. It shows the different analytical levels and the main independent variables. For each variable, the figure in brackets refers to the chapter in which that variable has been studied.

*Figure 2. 4: Full analytical model*



## Data and methodology

To answer these specific research questions, we used quantitative methods on large-scale survey data which allow us to perform comparative research across different countries. We chose to use European data given the wide variety in religiosity across European countries. Previous research has shown that Western Europe has witnessed periods of widespread secularization, leading to vast proportions of religiously unaffiliated individuals (Davie 1990). At the same time, religion has been stable or even rising in some Southern and Eastern European countries (Pérez-Nievas and Cordero 2010). Therefore, data comprising a wide range of European countries are particularly suited to assess how religiosity among ethnic minorities is affected by the religious context.

Since we want to go further than focusing on specific subgroups, the comparative approach urges us to study comparable measures of religiosity. Therefore, as already indicated, we define religiosity as a general underlying component across cultures and contexts. Therefore, we analyze measures which grasp religious affiliation, commitment and behavior, stripped from the cultural expressions attached by each religious denomination. The goal of these choices of data and dependent variables allow us to grasp how different ethnic minority groups adapt their religious lives to different contextual settings. Analyses of specific ethnic or religious subgroups, or denomination-specific religious expressions are not the main questions we try to answer in this dissertation. In this chapter, we subsequently discuss the data we use, the operationalization of the variables and the analysis strategy.

### Data

#### European Social Survey

The main dataset which we use in this dissertation is the European Social Survey (ESS). We use this data in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 8. The ESS is a two-yearly cross-sectional social survey which has collected data in over thirty European countries from 2002 onwards. Currently, six waves of data are publicly available, combining information on 291,686 individuals in 32 countries. The questionnaires are developed by a consortium of European universities and contain questions concerning attitudes towards social and political issues, beliefs and behavior patterns. Each questionnaire contains both a core module, which is repeated each wave, and two rotating modules, which tackle additional topics that are not included in the core questionnaire. For each

wave, the questionnaire is centrally administered and subsequently translated by the national ESS teams. In each country, the respondents were selected using strict probability samples of the resident population, regardless of nationality, living in private households. The data were then gathered by registering the answers to the questionnaire in face-to-face interviews. Response rates of up to 70% are pursued, but the obtained response rates range from 33.5% in Switzerland (ESS-1; 2002) to 81.4% in Bulgaria (ESS-5; 2010). For each country, specific design weights are available to correct for differences in selection probability.

Using this dataset for research into migrant religiosity has three distinctive benefits. Firstly, the ESS has a relatively detailed measurement of individual's religiosity. Respondents were asked whether they belong to a certain religious denomination at present, whether they used to belong to a certain denomination in the past, which denomination they adhered to at both points in time, how religious they feel themselves, how often they pray apart from at religious services and how often they attend religious services except for at special occasions such as weddings and funerals. These questions have been included in all waves and are comparable to similar questions in other large-scale cross-national surveys, such as the World Values Survey/European Values Survey. These questions enable us to focus on the different dimensions of religiosity which we want to study: (1) religious affiliation, (2) personal religious commitment and (3) religious behavior. Second, in the ESS, the resident population is sampled, regardless of nationality. This means that this dataset is particularly suited to examine ethnic minorities originating from migration, given that these often do not have the nationality of the country in which they live. Third, given the sampling strategy of sampling individuals-within-countries, the ESS is also particularly suited for assessing the influence of diverging contexts. In each wave of the ESS, individuals are registered as belonging to a given resident country, as well as to a given sub-national region. These regions comprise sub-national divisions by the statistical office of the European Union, the so-called Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). Therefore, data are not only collected at the individual-within-country level, but also at the individual-within-region-within-country level. The ESS is hence also particularly suited for comparing the influence of the contexts between and within countries.

There are some limitations to the dataset as well. First of all, the dataset is a general social survey, not intended towards ethnic minorities. Therefore, ethnic minorities are not oversampled, but only have a selection probability proportional to their group size. This means that, compared to datasets directed towards ethnic minorities, the amount of ethnic minorities in the data is rather limited. Second, the national ESS teams are instructed to provide a questionnaire in each language which is spoken by at least 5% of the population. This means that ethnic minorities from relatively small minority groups have to sit through the interview in one of the main languages of the country they live in. Again, this is a limitation compared to surveys which are designed towards sampling ethnic minorities. However, given that mastery of the host society

official language is probably related to social integration into host society groups, this means that we test the effect of intergenerational differences due to social integration conservatively.

### Racism and discrimination in secondary schools

To assess religiosity among adolescent ethnic minorities and the influence of ethnic school segregation thereupon, we use data from Racism and Discrimination in Secondary Schools (RaDiSS) (D'hondt et al. 2015). RaDiSS is a survey of Flemish (i.e. the northern, Dutch-speaking, part of Belgium) secondary school pupils conducted during the year 2011-2012 among 4,322 third-grade students (i.e. Grade 9 in U.S. school system terms) from 55 secondary schools. Respondents were selected through multistage sampling. First, four large multi-cultural Flemish districts have been selected: Antwerp, Ghent, Hasselt and Sint-Niklaas. Second, within these districts all secondary schools were listed, from which 104 schools were selected, according to urbanization levels of the school neighborhoods and the ethnic composition of the schools. Given that secondary schools in Flanders are often asked to partake in academic research, schools often apply the principle of 'first come, first served'. This leads to considerable non-response at the school level of 47%, retaining 55 secondary schools from the original 104 sampled. Non-response at the school level was not selective on the ethnic composition of schools. The ethnic composition of the participating schools ranges from 4.2% to 100% ethnic minority pupils. In each school, all third-grade students present were asked to complete a written questionnaire. Given that all students present at school were eligible for sampling, this means that non-response at the individual level is only related to absenteeism at school due to, for instance, illness. This results in a response rate of 92.5% at the individual-within-schools level. Given the selection mechanism, this non-response is only selective insofar the absence of students is selective, for instance due to students ill health. Among the present third-grade students, the written questionnaires were administered in presence of a researcher and one or more teachers.

The main advantage of using this dataset is that, due to the ethnic school composition of the sample, it is particularly suitable to examine religiosity among ethnic minority adolescents and the influence of ethnic school composition thereupon. One of the disadvantages is that the questionnaire was only distributed in Dutch, which could again constitute a problem for ethnic minority students. The questionnaire has been thoroughly tested to ensure intelligibility, however, and the presence of a researcher and one or more school teachers enabled the students to ask questions or extra information regarding the questionnaire.

### General Social Survey

In Chapter 8, we compare intergenerational differences in Europe to the same differences in the US or Canada. Therefore, we selected data for the US and Canada as well. For the US, we use data from the General Social Survey (GSS). Like the ESS, the GSS is a survey among a representative

sample of the resident population in the US, which receive a questionnaire containing both core questions and rotating questions which can occur in one or more of the different GSS waves. The GSS has been conducted from 1972 onwards, yearly from 1972 until 1991 and bi-annual from 1994 onwards. Written questionnaires were gathered during personal face-to-face interviews until 2000. From 2002, data were collected using computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). At the moment of writing, data up until 2012 are available. Response rates are relatively stable over time around the 70%-point. Design weights are available to correct for sampling bias.

As this is a general social survey conducted among a probability sample of the resident, this dataset is subject to the same limitations as the ESS. From 2006 onwards, however, the GSS also has a Spanish version to enable the sampling of non-English speaking households. 98% of the adult US household population is English speaking, and Spanish is the main language among 60-65% of the remaining non-English speaking households. Therefore, the GSS is relatively suitable as a data source to study religiosity among first and second generation migrants.

## Ethnic Diversity Survey

For Canada, we use the Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS), a survey conducted in 2002 which oversampled ethnic minorities in Canada. Based on the 2001 census, all residents of 15 and older were selected as eligible for sampling, according to their answers on the ethnicity questions. The sampling design targeted two main groups: a non-Canadian, non-British or non-French ethnic group on the one hand and a comparable reference group of individuals with a Canadian ethnic background. Strata were further defined based on the migrant generation status of the census respondents. The questionnaires were available in English, French, Mandarin, Cantonese, Italian, Punjabi, Portuguese, Vietnamese and Spanish. The data collection took place using computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI). From a total sample of 57,242 individuals, 42,476 individuals participated in the data collection, resulting in a response rate of 74.0%. Weights are provided to extrapolate results to the general adult population in Canada.


The EDS has the advantage of being a survey directly targeted at ethnic minorities, with questionnaires in specific minority languages. Therefore, this survey is aptly designed to examine religiosity among immigrants. This also means that the same limitations which do apply to the ESS and GSS, do not apply, or to a lesser extent to the EDS. This may result in a higher proportion of ethnic minorities who have a lower social integration in the EDS as compared to the other surveys. We will correct for the possible bias this may cause in the results by controlling for the questionnaire language in the analysis. In this way, we taken into account that individuals who conducted the survey in a non-official language, i.e. not in English or French in the EDS and not in English in the GSS, might have a lower social integration and are hence less influenced by contextual religiosity.



## Operationalization of dependent variables

As already indicated, we assess three dimensions of religiosity: (1) religious affiliation, (2) religious commitment and (3) religious behavior. For each dimension, we operationalize at least one indicator. Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the different indicators. For each dimension we show the corresponding indicators with the number of the chapter in which it is used between brackets.

Figure 3.1: Dependent variables



### *Religious affiliation*

*Religious affiliation* is an indicator of organizational forms of religiosity. Individuals were asked whether they consider themselves to belonging to a particular religious denomination, and if so, which one. This leads to a dichotomous variable which indicates whether individuals feel affiliated to a certain religious denomination or not. This variable has been calculated from the ESS, GSS and EDS. We examine this indicator of affiliation to religious organizations in Chapters 5 and 8.

### Religious commitment

*Subjective religiosity* is a metric indicator of how religious individuals feel themselves. Respondents were asked how religious they feel themselves, regardless from their religious affiliation, on an 11-point scale ranging from 'Not at all religious' (0) to 'Very religious' (10). A higher score on this variable means that individuals feel more religious. We calculated this variable from the ESS and examine this indicator of religiosity in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this dissertation.

*Religious salience* is a metric indicator of the importance individuals attribute to religiosity. In RaDiSS, adolescents were asked 'How important is religion to you?' Answers to this question were recorded on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from 'Not at all important' (1) to 'Very important' (5). A higher score means that individuals attribute more importance to religiosity. This indicator is examined in Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

## Religious behavior

*Frequency of praying* is an indicator of how often individuals pray. Respondents were asked how often they pray, apart from at religious services. In the ESS, responses were recorded on a 7-point scale ranging from 'Every day' (1) to 'Never' (7). A higher score thus means less frequent praying. This indicator is used as a metric indicator in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. In Chapters 4-6 and 8 we use a dichotomous variant, by recoding the 7-point scale to a variable which indicates whether respondents pray at least once a week or more often. In Chapter 8, we add the frequency of praying indicator from the GSS and EDS questionnaire as well.

Although religious service attendance has been widely used in previous research, the measurement of the service attendance indicator in the ESS might not be a valid indicator of religiosity. According to Meuleman and Billiet (2011), the measurement of religious service attendance is inequivalent due to the fact that the indicator does not function for Muslim women, for whom service attendance is less common. Given that we focus on ethnic minorities in Europe, a substantial part of which are Muslim, we decided not to include this dependent variable in the analyses.

## Methods

Given the research question and the sampling strategy, our approach asks for a specific quantitative methodology. First of all, some of the research questions relate to the influence of the context. Basically, we need a quantitative method which allows us to grasp how individuals in different environments have different levels of religiosity. Moreover, we want to know which characteristics of that environment are related to these different levels of religiosity. Second, the multistage sampling procedure applied in all datasets requires that we take into account the clustering of individuals within certain contexts. This is a direct consequence of social integration in contexts: the more people have interactions with each other, the more they share ideas, values and beliefs. Therefore, we need to take into account that individuals' ideas, values and beliefs could be more similar within contexts than across contexts.

Multilevel modelling is a quantitative method which has been designed specifically to solve these problems. With this method, variation in religiosity can be decomposed into an individual component and a contextual component. In this way, the outcome variable, religiosity, is a product of the mean level of religiosity in individuals' contexts and their own individual deviation from that contextual mean. This decomposition addresses the two problems which we identified earlier. First of all, by decomposing differences between individuals into an individual and a contextual level, we can calculate how similar individuals within contexts actually are and how important contextual factors are in explaining religiosity among individuals. Moreover, the decomposition of the variance allows us to introduce characteristics at the respective levels

and infer the effects to the population at each level. The alternative, single level regression or contextual level regression, would entail respectively overestimating the number of contexts by considering these contexts an individual characteristic or neglecting individual differences by reducing them to differences between the contextual means. Therefore, multilevel models allow for an inference of characteristics from the sample to the appropriate level of the population. In the RaDiSS-data for instance, this means that we can infer the effect of school characteristics such as school size from the sampled schools to the population of secondary schools in Flanders and pupils' characteristics from the sampled pupils to the population of secondary school pupils in Flanders. Multilevel models thus enable us to correctly estimate and infer the effects of individual and contextual characteristics simultaneously on migrant religiosity.

Second, with classical regression techniques, the similarity of individuals who share the same context is disregarded. This means that classical single-level regression is not only problematic for contextual characteristics but also for individual characteristics. In classical regression analysis, the belief we have that an effect we found in the sample does also apply to the population could be biased due to individuals being more similar within certain contexts. The belief scholars have in the inference to the population could be inflated because there is less individual variance if the contextual similarity is neglected. In the sample, the similarity is not due to the effect of the characteristic one wants to infer, but due to the sampling strategy. In the ESS-data for instance, our belief in the effect of discrimination on religiosity in a classical regression could be false due to discrimination being very similar within countries, which is neglected. Multilevel models enable us to correct for the effect of clustering on the belief we have in individual and contextual characteristics to infer our results to the population.

We test our research questions by applying multilevel models to the data sources we use. Multilevel models were specifically designed to answer these kinds of research questions: how do individuals differ in diverging contexts or how does the context influence individuals. Moreover, we can examine whether individual-level characteristics have different effects in different contexts and how characteristics of the individual and the context combined influence migrants religiosity. Therefore, multilevel models could be considered a core technique for answering research questions in sociology. To solve the first problem, assessing the influence of the context, the scholar needs to identify the theoretically important contexts which group people and which may influence them. This need is strengthened by the second problem, the relationship between the similarity of individuals and inference, which means that neglecting each form of clustering might lead to biased inferences. This means that it is important to take into account all forms of clustering in the data. Therefore, where possible we try to identify all relevant contexts for the questions at hand.

The basic multilevel model is a two-level model, in which observational units, for instance individuals, are clustered, or nested, within aggregated groups, for instance schools. This model

can be extended by adding more levels. In the case more than two levels, we can discern two different forms of multilevel models: hierarchical and non-hierarchical. The former means for three level models that all lowest level unit, for instance pupils, who belong to one higher level unit, for instance a class, belong to only one highest level unit, for instance a school. In most school systems, all individuals in one class attend the same school, as classes and students are generally not dispersed over schools. A non-hierarchical three-level model is when not all lowest level units, for instance migrants, from one higher level unit, for instance origin countries, are not nested in the same group in the other higher level, for instance destination countries. When using the ESS, all migrants from for instance Turkey do not live together in the same destination country. The other way round, not all migrants in for instance Germany come from only one origin country. This example of a non-hierarchical model is a specific case of multilevel models, i.e. cross-classified multilevel models. Contrary to hierarchical models, where levels are always subdivisions of higher levels, levels in cross-classified models can be juxtaposed: lower level units belong to two or more higher level units which are not vertically related, but rather horizontally equal. Other non-hierarchical models exist, such as for instance multiple membership models, but these are not relevant for answering the research questions at hand.

# The worst of both worlds?

## Origin and destination effects on migrant religiosity

Van der Bracht, K., Van de Putte, B. & Van de Velde, S.

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*Insecurity theory states that religiosity is predominantly affected by insecurities experienced during childhood, instead of present insecurities. The empirical research of these aspects, however, has been hampered by the difficulty to disentangle past and present contextual effects. In this respect, first generation migrants offer an interesting case study which allows us to discern (1) contextual effects experienced during childhood, i.e. associated with the origin country, (2) contextual effects experienced during later life, i.e. associated with the destination country and (3) individual effects experienced during later life in the destination country. We test hypotheses using the European Social Survey (ESS) in cross-classified multilevel analyses on 5,900 individuals within on the one hand 25 destination countries and on the other 146 origin countries. While insecurity theory offers interesting prospects of explaining origin country variance, the applicability of insecurity theory to migrants at the individual and destination level is questioned by the results.*

### Introduction

In Europe, public discourse has been influenced by the presupposition that migrant religiosity is an obstacle to integration, a feeling which is incited by Islamophobia and fear of radicalization of Muslim immigrants. Hence, the religiosity of European immigrants has been of considerable interest to both scholars and policy makers. While the most attention has been devoted to studying Muslim migrants (Diehl and Koenig 2009; Fleischmann and Phalet 2011), the last decade has seen an increase in large-scale cross-national studies comprising all ethnic groups and religions (Van Tubergen 2006; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013).

The available cross-national research, however, has some weaknesses. Cross-national variation in migrant religiosity has mostly been studied at the destination-side. However, only accounting for the destination in religiosity of migrants neglects the important variance in

religiosity in origin countries, although large differences in cross-national religiosity throughout the world have been long established. Furthermore, qualitative research has brought the notion of religious transnationalism to the limelight (Levitt 1998; Van der Veer 2002). Levitt (1998: 76) argues “that to understand some immigrants’ religious lives, we must understand them in their countries of origin, countries of destination, and the continuous, reciprocal interaction between the two”. Notwithstanding this call to attention of studying migrant religiosity in a transnational frame, only one seminal study, by Van Tubergen (2006), addresses both origin and destination context. It demonstrates that religiosity in first generation migrants is substantially influenced by both the country of birth and the country where they’ve migrated to. However, the article lacked a theoretical framework comparing the effects of origin and destination. Moreover, It explained migrant religiosity as a consequence of the degree of modernization in the country of origin, making it a late remnant of classical secularization theory (Weber 1946 [1920]; Berger 1967). Furthermore, the data only comprised eight destination countries, hence it was limited in variation between destination countries.

Studies tackling the contextual impact on migrant religiosity in Europe, have relied most often on social integration theory (Durkheim 1986 [1897]) and religious market theory (Iannaccone 1991). While social integration theory has been applied successfully at the contextual level, demonstrating that migrant religiosity is influenced by levels of religiosity in the host society (Van Tubergen 2006; Van der Bracht et al. 2013), results for religious market theory have been mixed and indeed, the relation between religious diversity and levels of religiosity has been questioned (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Voas, Crockett and Olson 2002). When fully accounting for destination and origin effects, however, the research is in need of a theoretical framework to explain variation in both origin and destination countries, and while social integration theory seems plausible for destination countries, it is less so for origin countries. Approaching variation in migrant religiosity as a consequence of general levels of religiosity in the country of origin doesn’t explain why certain origin countries are more religious than others in the first place. Cross-national studies of migrant religiosity would benefit greatly from a theoretical framework to apply at different levels.

We believe that insecurity theory (Norris and Inglehart 2004) is perfectly suited for this role. The theory states that the more insecure people feel, the more they will become religious. People who are confronted with anxieties from insecure living conditions look for a supernatural explanation to attenuate their anxieties. Although the authors acknowledge the influence of current insecurities, they stress the importance of insecurities experienced during childhood: the need for predictability stemming from religion is first and foremost a consequence of anxieties faced during the formative period. The further development of the theory at the contextual level has been hampered, however, by the empirical problem of untangling past and present contextual insecurities for people of different ages living in the same country. When



first generation migrants are concerned, however, we have the possibility to discern different contexts, associated with different points in time: (1) insecurities experienced during childhood in the origin country and (2) insecurities experienced after migrating to the destination country.

In the current study, we aim to examine to what extent migrant religiosity is associated with characteristics of the destination country, as well as the origin country, using the theoretical framework of insecurity theory. We make use of the European Social Survey (ESS) and analyze two dimensions of religiosity: subjective religiosity and frequency of praying. The data allow us to fully account for origin, destination and individual influences. We apply cross-classified multilevel analyses to migrants coming from 146 origin countries and living in 25 destination countries.

## Theory and hypotheses

According to Vail (1999) insecurity contains three aspects: (1) a sense or state of precariousness (2) a feeling of hopelessness and (3) a feeling of uncertainty about the future. The author identifies different forms of insecurity: social, economic, personal and political insecurity. Social insecurity is a lack of minimum protection offered by the state for people whose personal security can be threatened, for instance due to economic inequality or a low human development. Economic insecurity can occur for instance due to job or financial insecurity. Personal insecurity is a lack of minimal conditions of a dignified life, for instance having a bad health or feeling unsafe in one's neighborhood. Political insecurity, finally, is a lack of civil liberties and democratic rights, for instance due to discrimination. Social insecurity, in the meaning of general levels of insecurity within countries, is considered here as a contextual aspect of insecurity, offered by origin and destination countries, and economic, personal and political insecurity are considered aspects of individual differences in insecurities.

Migrants in general have one insecurity in common: the migration process itself and the unknown future in a to them hitherto new environment. For some of them, the motivation to migrate to another country may even be spurred by feeling insecure in the origin country. Next to this general cause we examine the contextual insecurities due to economic inequality and human development and the individual insecurities due to job insecurity, financial insecurity, having bad health, feeling unsafe in one's neighborhood and discrimination. These are associated with different points in time: (1) contextual insecurities exposed to during childhood in the origin country, (2) contextual insecurities exposed to after childhood in the destination country and (3) individual insecurities exposed to after childhood in the destination country. We follow this chronology and start with the childhood contextual causes and later life contextual causes, followed by individual causes of insecurity. Although these effects may apply to second generation migrants as well, through the socialization by their first generation parents, first

generation migrants are have lived in two different contexts, origin and destination, associated with two different points in time, childhood and later life. Therefore, we limit our analysis to first generation migrants.

### Explaining cross-origin and cross-destination variation in migrant religiosity

The focus on childhood insecurities in insecurity theory is based upon the assessment that changes in security take a generation to take effect: although increases in security in some countries have emerged, religiosity has been quite stable, except for the younger generations (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Surprisingly, Van Tubergen (2006) found that there was indeed more variation between origin than destination countries in affiliation to religions but that the opposite was true for service attendance. However, it seems that this variation was largely due to survey effects, and the cross-national reliability of the measure of service attendance can be a problem (Meuleman and Billiet 2011). Therefore, we hypothesize that at the contextual level migrants are predominantly influenced by insecurities experienced in the origin country. We therefore propose our first hypothesis: *migrants' religiosity is determined more by the context of origin than by the context of destination (H1)*.

Which social insecurities affect migrant religiosity in both contexts? Nations differ in the security they offer to their inhabitants. Looking at the overall economic development and degree of modernization of countries, like classical secularization theory did, does not fully capture individual conditions and insecurities related to these conditions. Socioeconomic inequalities can remain substantial, regardless of mean national level of development. While a number of developing countries gained economic wealth from oil revenues over the past decades, living conditions for the whole population didn't always develop accordingly. Economic inequality, can be approached as indicating to what extent well-off and less well-off people live together in one country. This creates insecurities as a consequence of relative deprivation: lower classes evaluate their conditions as more insecure, compared to those of higher classes. However, economic inequality may also create insecurities for the well-off: "even the affluent professional classes living in secure, gated communities (...) cannot insulate themselves and their families entirely from the risks of crime, the threat of violence and the problems of political instability endemic in society" (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 71). Although the influence of inequality has been attested for natives (Ruiter and Van Tubergen 2009), it seems that destination level inequality does not lead to higher religiosity for migrants (Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). We confront the effect of origin level inequality with destination level inequality and therefore hypothesize that *migrants coming from countries with higher inequality are more religious (H2a), migrants who live in countries with higher inequality are more religious (H2b) and the influence on migrant religiosity of inequality in the origin countries is greater than the influence in the destination countries (H2c)*.



Next to the influence of economic inequality, there are considerable differences in the extent to which countries mitigate insecurity for their inhabitants, by the availability of decent health care and education for instance. Norris and Inglehart (2004) demonstrated that the human development is an important predictor of cross-national differences in religious behavior. Although human development has shown to have an effect on depression (Cifuentes et al. 2008), life satisfaction (Bonini 2008) and general wellbeing (Veenhoven 2005), the effects on religiosity have not been studied so far. We test the influence of the human development of both the countries of destination and of origin, but expect a larger impact of the development in the origin countries and therefore hypothesize that: *migrants coming from countries with lower human development are more religious (H3a), migrants who live in countries with lower human development are more religious (H3b) and the effect of human development on migrant religiosity in the origin countries is greater than the effect of human development in the destination countries (H3c).*

### Explaining individual variation in migrant religiosity

At the individual level we subsequently examine economic insecurity, as indicated by job insecurity and financial household insecurity, personal insecurity, as indicated by migrants' health and their feelings of unsafety in the neighborhood, and finally political insecurity, as indicated by perceived discrimination. We discuss the effects of each of these aspects and subsequently derive a general individual hypothesis.

Economic insecurity has been one of the originally posited, and best documented, sources of insecurities affecting religiosity, although the effect on migrant religiosity is far from clear (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). Job insecurity, the fear of losing one's job, has negative consequences for the mental health of employees (Sverke, Hellgren and Näswall 2002). Employment status has a similar effect on feelings of security, attenuating anxieties about an unpredictable future as a consequence of having a stable job and income, thus lowering the need for an alternative, e.g. religious form of reassurance. Indeed, having a stable employment, for instance a full-time job with an unlimited contract, lowers natives' religiosity (Ruiter and Van Tubergen 2009; Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2011). Given that migrants in Europe differ in their integration into the labor market (Van Tubergen, Maas and Flap 2004), economic insecurity as a consequence of the employment status becomes more salient for them. Over and above this job insecurity, there is also the aspect of financial insecurity: the ability to manage financially is an important factor in feeling secure and creating predictability. Previous research indicated that lower income is associated with a lower mental health (Belle 1990) and that migrants have a lower income compared to native peers throughout the whole of Europe (Albertinelli et al. 2011).

Apart from these economic insecurities, personal insecurities affect people's anxieties as well. Having a bad physical health can be approached as inciting existential anxieties, thus

increasing religiosity (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Studies have already shown that suffering from health problems increases religiosity in natives in Europe (Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2011). Less is known about European immigrants' health in general, but immigrants do exhibit higher mortality rates for several conditions (Mladovsky 2007). Another source of personal insecurity can be a feeling of unsafety: an individual's perception of the risk, or estimate of personal vulnerability, of being involved or becoming victim of an aggression (Roché 1996; Zani, Cicognani and Albanesi 2001). This feeling of unsafety is, however, not necessarily related to actual victimization and indeed, research has shown that there is no direct association with crime rates (Perkins and Taylor 1996). Feelings of unsafety are rather mediated by integration in the community and especially informal ties within the community have shown to be important in buffering fear (Ross and Jang 2000). Although both natives and migrants are equally prone to suffer from anxieties for victimization, we assume that feelings of unsafety form another source of insecurities for migrants who are being confronted with a neighborhood which is different from the one they grew up in, while less-integrated migrants are even more susceptible to this kind of anxieties.

Next to these general effects of insecurity, migrants experience political insecurities specific to their migrant status, for instance discrimination. Discrimination is a main determinant of acculturative stress, which occurs when adaptation to the new environment does not run smoothly (Berry 1970; Berry et al. 2006). These adaptation problems might lead to insecurities about the future in their new environment. Studies have indeed shown increased religiosity for migrants confronted with discrimination (Fleischmann 2010; Van der Bracht et al. 2013). Therefore, we hypothesize in our fourth and last hypothesis that migrants who find themselves in a vulnerable economic, personal and political position in their destination country are more religious and therefore we hypothesize that *migrants who have a less stable employment status, are unable to cope financially, have a bad health, feel unsafe in their neighborhood and feel discriminated are more religious (H4)*.

## Data and variables

The European Social Survey is a two-yearly cross-sectional survey, which includes over 30 countries. The questionnaire is designed and organized centrally and is subsequently translated to the official languages of the participating countries. Response rates vary between countries and waves but in general a response rate of 70% is pursued per country and wave. We use data from waves 2-4 (2004-2008) and include the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,

Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Some countries which are generally not considered as part of geographical Europe, e.g. Israel, have been excluded from the analysis.

The population contains all residents of 15 years or older, regardless nationality. This dataset is therefore particularly suited for research on European migrants. We've included only first generation migrants, meaning respondents being born abroad whose parents are both born abroad too and who arrived in the country where the questionnaire is being taken at age 15 or older. This selection, and the listwise deletion resulted in an eventual unweighted dataset of 5,900 cases.

A second advantage of using the data we've selected is the fact that we are able to discern different relevant contexts. The origin of migrants is determined by the country of birth and the destination by the country where the survey is being taken.

A disadvantage of the dataset is, however, that the surveys were conducted using the official languages of the country where they were being taken. This means that less integrated, often meaning less educated, migrants who do not fully master an official language of the country where they live are not or less likely to be interviewed. Since there is an effect of structural and cultural integration of migrants on their religiosity (Van der Bracht et al. 2013), this means we deal with less religious migrants, meaning we estimate the effects conservatively.

## Dependent variables

We examine two dimensions of religion in our analyses: (1) subjective religiosity and (2) frequency of praying. Although religious service attendance has been widely used in religiosity research, the measurement of the service attendance indicator has, contrary to the other indicators we use, proven to be cross-nationally inequivalent (Meuleman and Billiet 2011). Since the inequivalence is due to the fact that the indicator does not function for Muslim women, this is an issue which can't be disregarded for migrant religion research.

*Subjective religiosity* is a metric variable, calculated using the 11-point scale answers to the question "Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?". The scale has a range of going from 'Not at all religious' (0) to 'Very religious' (10).

*Praying* is based on the question "Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?". Answers varied in a 7-point scale ranging from 'Every day' (1) to 'Never' (7). Scores were dichotomized by grouping scores 1 to 3 to create the category 'Once a week or more' (1) and 4 to 7 for 'Less than once a week' (0).

## Contextual variables

Origin's *GINI-coefficient* is a measure of income inequality. It is calculated using the net disposable household income and indicates the mean level of socio-economic inequality on a scale of 0 (meaning perfect equality) to 100 (meaning perfect inequality). We have calculated the mean

of all available information from data provided by the United Nations University (UNU) (WIID 2008). Even then, information on some countries was lacking from the data provided by the UNU. In that case we took information from, in this order, either the CIA (US's Central Intelligence Agency) (The World Factbook) or GPI (Global Peace Index).

Origin's *HDI* (Human Development Index) is a composite index indicating the general human development of countries based on the life expectancy at birth, the adult literacy rate and the natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita at purchasing power parity. We used the HDI of 2002 for all origin countries (HDR 2002). Exceptions here are in the case of 'historical countries' which ceased to exist before 2002 but which were indicated by respondents as origin, e.g. USSR. In that case we used the HDI from the last available year before the dissolution of that country.

Destination's *GINI-coefficient* is analogous to the origin's GINI-coefficient. We calculated the mean of the period during which the surveys were conducted (2004-2008) from data provided by the United Nations University (UNU) (WIID 2008).

Destination's *HDI* is also analogous to origin's HDI: we used the HDI of 2002 for all destination countries (HDR 2002).

## Independent variables

*Employment status* is a categorical variable based on the main activity during the last seven days previous to the day when the questionnaire is being taken and on the type of contract they indicated if they were employed. The answers were recoded into five categories: 'Employed with unlimited contract' (0), 'Employed with limited contract' (1), 'Unemployed' (2), 'Student' (3), 'Inactive' (4). The inactive category contains all respondents who are unemployed but not looking for a job.

*Budget* is a categorical variable based on the answer to the question how respondents feel about the households income. The 4-point scale answers range from 'Living comfortably on present income' (1) to 'Very difficult on present income' (4).

*Health* is a dichotomous variable based on respondents' assessments of their health. The 5-point scale answers were recoded into two categories: 'Bad' (0), containing original categories 'Bad' (4) and 'Very bad' (5), and 'Good' (1), containing original categories 'Very good' (1), 'Good' (2) and 'Fair' (3).

*Feeling unsafe* is a dichotomous variable based on the answers to the question "How safe do you – or would you – feel walking alone in this area after dark?". The 4-point scale answers were recoded into two categories: 'Safe' (0), containing original categories 'Very safe' (1) and 'Safe' (2), and 'Unsafe' (1), containing original categories 'Unsafe' (3) and 'Very unsafe' (4).


*Discrimination* is based on the question "Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?". Respondents answering 'yes' to

this question were asked to indicate on which grounds they feel discriminated. Research has indicated that there is a clear migrant-dimension within this measurement of different grounds of discrimination (André, Dronkers and Fleischmann 2009). Accordingly, we constructed a dichotomous variable with value 1 for all migrants who indicated that they belong to a group which is discriminated based on language, race, nationality, ethnicity or religion. Migrants who did not feel discriminated or who did but ticked none of these five groups were given a score of 0.

### Control variables

We control for *sex*, *age*, *education* and survey *wave*. *Sex* is a dichotomous variable with categories 'Male' (0) and 'Female' (1). *Age* is a metric variable in full years. *Education* is a metric variable measuring the years of full-time education the respondents have completed. *Wave* is a categorical variable with three categories, one for each wave of the ESS.

Figure 4.1: Analyses strategy



### Method

We discern four different levels in our analyses. Given the structure of the data, where individuals are nested in both hierarchical and non-hierarchical levels, we use cross-classified random intercept multilevel models (Rasbash and Goldstein 1994). Figure 4.1 illustrates our analyses strategy: on the one hand, (1) individuals ( $N_i = 5,900$ ) are nested within (2) periods of childhood ( $N_j = 515$ ), which are nested within (3) origin countries ( $N_k = 146$ ). On the other hand, individuals are nested within (4) destination countries ( $N_l = 25$ ). Migrants are assigned to the period of childhood according to the year of birth in 5 birth cohorts of 14 years ranging from 1921 to 1990, 14 years being the period of childhood as designated by our selection of first generation migrants. In this way we can untangle on the one hand origin from destination country and on the other the specific period spent in the origin countries. The smallest groups,

childhood periods, have an average group size of 11.46, well above the minimum of 5 to obtain reliable estimates (Clarke 2008).

We introduce economic inequality and human development at the two country levels. Adding the predictor for past contextual effects at the period of childhood level would be more appropriate, but there are no reliable numbers for both indicators for most of the timespan, which would strongly reduce the number of childhood periods and origin countries, giving more weight to countries of origin with relatively young migrants. Therefore, we limited the period of childhood level to only allow variation, while not adding predictors at that level.

We use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation procedures provided by the statistical software package MLwiN (version 2.24) (Browne 2011). Cases are weighted at the individual level. We estimate a linear model for the effects on subjective religiosity and a binary logistic model for the effects on praying. All metric variables have been standardized. Because of multicollinearity restrictions GINI and HDI are introduced in different models.

*Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics*

	Range	N (%)			Range	N (%)	
		Ave.	(Std.)			Ave.	(Std.)
Dependent				Budget			
Subjective religiosity	0-10	5.44	(3.07)	Living comfortably	0/1	1630	(27.5%)
Praying				Coping	0/1	2480	(41.8%)
Less than once a week	0/1	3183	(53.6%)	Difficult	0/1	1373	(23.1%)
Once a week or more often	0/1	2754	(46.4%)	Very difficult	0/1	454	(7.6%)
Contextual variables				Health			
Origin				Good	0/1	5425	(91.4%)
GINI	0-100	36.03	(8.41)	Bad	0/1	512	(8.6%)
HDI	0-1	0.81	(0.13)	Feeling unsafe			
Destination				Safe	0/1	4368	(73.6%)
GINI	0-100	29.62	(3.73)	Unsafe	0/1	1569	(26.4%)
HDI	0-1	0.92	(0.03)	Discrimination			
Individual				No	0/1	4904	(82.6%)
Employment status				Yes	0/1	1033	(17.4%)
Employed, unlimited contract	0/1	2,509	(42.5%)	Control variables			
Employed, limited contract	0/1	752	(12.7%)	Sex			
Unemployed	0/1	302	(5.1%)	Male	0/1	2723	(45.9%)
Student	0/1	158	(2.7%)	Female	0/1	3214	(54.1%)
Inactive	0/1	2,179	(36.9%)	Age			
				Education	0-56	12.43	4.62
				Wave			
				2 (2004)	0/1	2093	(35.3%)
				3 (2006)	0/1	1873	(31.5%)
				4 (2008)	0/1	1971	(33.2%)



Table 4. 2: Cross-classified logistic and linear multilevel models

	Subjective religiosity				Praying			
	Model 1: GINI		Model 2: HDI		Model 1: GINI		Model 2: HDI	
	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)
Intercept	-0.240 *	(0.082)	-0.254 **	(0.083)	-0.671 ***	(0.199)	-0.706 ***	(0.204)
<b>Individual variables</b>								
Female	0.246 ***	(0.026)	0.253 ***	(0.026)	0.796 ***	(0.063)	0.819 ***	(0.064)
Age	0.058 **	(0.017)	0.062 ***	(0.017)	0.211 ***	(0.041)	0.223 ***	(0.041)
Education	-0.088 ***	(0.014)	-0.086 ***	(0.014)	-0.085 *	(0.034)	-0.079 *	(0.034)
Wave								
2 (2004)	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
3 (2006)	-0.052	(0.032)	-0.051	(0.032)	-0.149 +	(0.078)	-0.148 +	(0.078)
4 (2008)	-0.037	(0.033)	-0.038	(0.033)	-0.119	(0.079)	-0.124	(0.078)
Employment status								
Employed, unlimited contract	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Employed, limited contract	0.042	(0.041)	0.041	(0.041)	0.038	(0.099)	0.032	(0.099)
Unemployed	0.030	(0.058)	0.019	(0.058)	-0.031	(0.141)	-0.07	(0.142)
Student	0.114	(0.079)	0.095	(0.079)	0.027	(0.190)	-0.035	(0.191)
Inactive	0.083 *	(0.033)	0.080 *	(0.033)	0.150 +	(0.078)	0.138 "	(0.078)
Budget								
Living comfortably	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Coping	0.091 *	(0.032)	0.090 **	(0.032)	0.184 *	(0.076)	0.184 *	(0.076)
Difficult	0.141 **	(0.039)	0.137 ***	(0.039)	0.238 *	(0.093)	0.226 *	(0.093)
Very difficult	0.229 ***	(0.055)	0.221 ***	(0.055)	0.429 **	(0.132)	0.406 **	(0.133)
Health	0.052	(0.046)	0.048	(0.046)	0.038	(0.111)	0.024	(0.112)
Feeling unsafe	0.043	(0.030)	0.043	(0.03)	0.185 **	(0.071)	0.188 **	(0.072)
Discrimination	0.081 *	(0.035)	0.078 *	(0.035)	0.105	(0.085)	0.097	(0.085)
<b>Contextual variables</b>								
<b>Destination</b>								
GINI	0.028	(0.050)			0.183	(0.125)		
HDI			0.041	(0.042)			0.129	(0.104)
<b>Origin</b>								
GINI	0.139 ***	(0.027)			0.459 ***	(0.066)		
HDI			-0.156 ***	(0.023)			-0.469 ***	(0.057)
<b>Variance</b>								
Individual	0.841	(0.016)	0.841	(0.016)	3.290		3.290	
Childhood	0.012	(0.006)	0.012	(0.006)	0.053	(0.033)	0.050	(0.030)
Origin	0.061	(0.014)	0.048	(0.012)	0.333	(0.083)	0.275	(0.074)
Destination	0.057	(0.022)	0.057	(0.022)	0.329	(0.129)	0.355	(0.138)
<b>DIC</b>	15871.94		15866.13		7171.66		7163.49	
<b>Null-model Variance</b>								
Individual	0.871	(0.017)			3.290			
Childhood	0.025	(0.008)			0.149	(0.045)		
Origin	0.081	(0.014)			0.454	(0.108)		
Destination	0.061	(0.022)			0.322	(0.122)		

+ p < 0.01; \* p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001 (two-sided); N<sub>i</sub> = 5,900; N<sub>j</sub> = 515; N<sub>k</sub> = 146; N<sub>l</sub> = 25. Cases weighted.

## Results

Table 4.1 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics. We notice that first generation migrants are, compared to native Europeans, relatively religious, with a subjective religiosity of 5.44 and almost half of first generation migrants in our dataset pray once a week or more often.

Table 4.2 depicts the results of the analyses and the variance components of the different models. First, from the null-model variance decomposition, we notice that a large part of individual levels of migrant religiosity is determined by their childhood period, origin and destination: 16.1% (i.e. the proportion of contextual variance to the total variance) of the variance in subjective religiosity and 21.9% of frequency of praying is a result of the combination of the three different contexts. The frequency of praying of two migrants growing up in the same period in the origin country and moving to the same destination country is 21.9% correlated. Second, controlling for variance of the period of childhood is useful to disentangle the effects of time and origin countries of migrants, however, after controlling for individual effects, the remaining variance at the childhood period level is negligible: only slightly more than 1%. Therefore, we can assume that having no parameter included at the childhood period level does not affect a reliable estimation of the effects of the time spent in origin countries.

Third, we look at the variance decomposition to test our first hypothesis, which stated that migrant religiosity is more determined by the context of origin than by the destination (H1). When we look at the model containing only the intercept we notice that there is more variance at the origin level than at the destination level: migrants living in the same destination country but coming from different origin countries, are 5.9% correlated for subjective religiosity, while migrants growing up in the same period and origin country but moving to different destination countries have a higher correlation: 10.2%. As already indicated, overall, correlations are higher for frequency of praying and the same conclusions hold: with a correlation of 7.6% at the destination level and 14.3% at the childhood and origin level combined, migrant religiosity is substantively more determined by the childhood spent in the origin country than later life in the destination country, thus supporting our first hypothesis.

Our second hypothesis consists of three parts: (1) a positive effect of origin-inequality on migrant religiosity (H2a) and (2) destination inequality (H2b) and (3) the prediction that the effect of the origin is higher than that of the destination (H2c). Our results do not support the destination-effect of inequality: the GINI-coefficient of the destination-country has no effect on the subjective religiosity, nor the frequency of praying of migrants. There is, however, a positive effect of inequality on both dependent variables at the origin level: the higher the inequality in the country of origin where first generation migrants spent their childhood, the higher the subjective religiosity and frequency of praying. The fact that the effect of economic inequality is only significant at the origin level is also supported by the explained variance at the origin level.



Therefore we conclude that there is a positive effect of economic inequality in the country of origin on migrant religiosity but not in the destination country. The proposition that the effect of the origin is higher than that of the destination is indirectly supported by these results.

The third hypothesis is analogous to our second, but in this case regarding the negative effect of human development. The second part of the hypothesis, that there is a negative effect of inequality in the destination country on migrant religiosity (H3b), is, again, not supported by the evidence: there is no effect of human development on either subjective religiosity or praying. The first part, which predicted a negative effect at the origin level (H3a), is, on the contrary, backed by our results: there is a strong negative effect of human development on migrant religiosity in Europe. Migrants living in Europe who grew up in a country with a lower human development have a higher subjective religiosity (0.156 standard deviations higher for each standard deviation of human development lower) and higher odds of praying once a week or more often (odds are 0.469 times lower for each standard deviation of HDI higher). Our conclusions are analogous to those for economic inequality: there is no significant effect at the destination level, but there is one at the origin level. Therefore, we find support for the thesis that the effect of human development is higher at the origin than at the destination level.

With our fourth hypothesis we predicted that migrants in an insecure position, as indicated by an insecure employment status, financial insecurities, a bad health, feeling unsafe and feeling discriminated, are more religious (H4). From our results we notice that only some of these insecurities affect migrant religiosity. In fact, only for financial insecurity we notice a positive association between insecurity and religion. For both dependent variables, we notice a more or less linearly increasing effect of financial insecurity on migrant religiosity. The other indicators of insecurity, however, demonstrate no clear pattern of association. First of all only the inactive, comprising those who are unemployed and not looking for a job, have a significantly higher level of subjective religiosity, while the difference in odds ratios for praying for the same category is only marginally significant ( $p < 0.10$ ). We conclude that there is no general association between job insecurity and religion. Second, having a bad health seems not to increase migrant religiosity. On the contrary, we see a positive effect of good health on migrant religiosity, although it is not significant. Third, the results for feelings of unsafety are mixed. There is a significant effect of feeling safe when walking alone in the dark in one's area on frequency of praying, but not on subjective religiosity ( $p = 0.110$ ). Fourth, and final, the results for our last individual predictor also offer mixed findings. Although there is an effect of discrimination on subjective religiosity, there is no significant effect on frequency of praying. Based on these findings we conclude that the results for individual insecurities experienced in the destination countries are mixed and therefore conclude that we have to reject our fourth hypothesis.

When we evaluate our models, by looking at the variance decomposition in table 4.3, we notice that our model only performs well at the childhood and origin level. Our insecurity factors

only succeed in explaining small parts of the variance at the individual and destination level, indicating that the insecurities we've studied only effect migrant religiosity for a small part. The opposite is true for the childhood and origin levels, however. At the origin level taking economic inequality and human development in account reduces the correlations between people coming from the same origin countries by proportions ranging from 23.5% to 40.7%. The highest drop in contextual variance is attributable to human development: once we take into account the human development in the origin country, migrants are more affected by aspects of destination countries than origin countries.

## Conclusion and discussion

With this article we want to extend insecurity theory to migrant religiosity in order to contribute both to the theoretical development of insecurity theory and the empirical knowledge of migrant religiosity. By studying migrant religiosity, we have an interesting case study which allows us to separate out past and present contextual effects. We applied cross-classified multilevel analyses to 5,900 first generation migrants from 515 periods of childhood within 146 origin countries and within 25 destination countries. We draw three major conclusions from this analysis.

First, compared to the application of insecurity theory at the individual level on natives (Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2011), and to the application of other frameworks on migrant religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011), individual feelings of insecurity, experienced in the destination country, poorly predict migrant religiosity. Although there is an effect of financial insecurity on both subjective religiosity and frequency of praying and a feeling of unsafety on frequency of praying, other theories, like social integration theory, have been more successful in explaining migrant religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006). Apparently, the insecurities which affect native religiosity do not affect migrant religiosity in the same way. It is possible that migrants evaluate their economic or existential situation more favorably than natives do (Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011) and for other influences this can be explained by selection effects, for instance the effect that particularly fit people tend to migrate transnationally (Mladovsky 2007). Relating again to past insecurities, it is possible that migrants evaluate the situation in the destination country relative to their former situation in the origin country, or that the insecurities faced in the destination country do not add up to the general insecurity caused by the process of migration and integration itself. In any case, this calls for an alternative explanation of migrant religiosity at that level.

Second, at the contextual level, however, both distinguishing between effects of the origin and destination countries and applying insecurity theory offers interesting prospects of explaining variance in migrant religiosity: it indicates that aspects of the origin countries are more important than destination countries' aspects. This urges for a need to take both contexts into account

instead of only considering destination countries and/or controlling for origin, which have been the most widely used approaches so far (Connor 2010a; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). At the same time, however, applying insecurity theory only explains differences in migrant religiosity at the origin level. Again, this could be associated with a different way in which migrants evaluate their situation in the destination country and, moreover, other indicators, especially levels of native religiosity, have proven to explain variance in destination countries successfully (Van Tubergen 2006; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011).

Third, for the theoretical development of insecurity theory this means that contextual insecurities experienced during childhood are indeed more decisive for religiosity than insecurity experienced thereafter. Although both past and present effects have been studied, it was until now impossible to disentangle both from each other. The observation that religiosity is associated more with contextual effects of the childhood than that of the years thereafter, supports the original proposition of Norris and Inglehart (2004) and can shift the focus of future research again to past insecurities.

There are some limitations to this study as well. First of all, as always with cross-sectional data, it is difficult to untangle cause and effect. Reverse causations, for instance a higher feeling of unsafety for Muslims due to their higher religiosity in an environment characterized by Islamophobia, are possible but for most of the relations unlikely. For instance, regarding this association we notice that in our dataset Muslims feel less often unsafe than non-religious migrants. Future research could however contribute by using longitudinal data.

Second, although we've termed the individual effects as present effects, we acknowledge that there is a possible spill-over of past insecurities to present ones. Where the relationship between present sources of insecurity and current migrant religiosity is concerned, however, we believe that the experienced insecurity at present affects current insecurity, over and above possible spill-over effects.

Finally, due to the lack of reliable indicators of economic inequality and human development for the most part of the twentieth century, we were not able to estimate the effect of both over time. Resorting to a general mean as we did, it was no longer possible to explicitly assess the influence of inequality and development during the specific childhood period. However, after controlling for childhood-period and age there was no substantial childhood period-variation, indicating that the influence at the origin level have been relatively stable throughout time for migrant religiosity. This supports our model selection and choice for one, time-fixed, measure of both indicators at the origin level.

For future research to migrant religiosity we would strongly advice to (1) include contextual effects of both the destination and origin country and (2) to combine insecurity theory at the origin level with other frameworks, like social integration theory, at both the individual and destination level. Future cross-national migrant religiosity research should apply a cross-

classified analysis while combining insecurity theory with other existing frameworks which are more applicable to migrant religiosity at both the individual and contextual level, and which have proven to be applicable in hierarchical models.

# God bless our children?

## The role of generation, discrimination and religious context for migrants in Europe

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*This paper deals with individual and contextual effects on the religiosity of first and second generation migrants in Europe. Determining that little attention has been directed towards intergenerational transmission of religion in processes of integration, we argue for an intergenerational perspective on immigrant religiosity. Social integration theory is used to derive the hypothesis that second generation immigrants are less religious than the first generation. Perceived discrimination is introduced in the immigrant-religion research to account for the stress buffering capacities of religion. On the contextual level we suppose a positive effect of native religiosity. Three aspects of religiosity are examined: (1) religious affiliation, (2) subjective religiosity and (3) praying. We use four waves (2002-2008) of the European Social Survey (ESS) in a 3-level random intercept multilevel model with 19,567 individuals, 235 regions and 26 countries. All three aspects point to the same conclusions. Among others, the most interesting results are that (1) second generation immigrants are less religious than their first generation counterparts, (2) perceived discrimination has a positive effect on immigrant religiosity and the effect is greater for the second generation, (3) native religiosity has a positive effect on immigrant religiosity with a greater effect on the second generation too and (4) the influence on migrant religiosity is more salient at the regional than at the national level.*

## Introduction

In Europe, religion is generally considered as an obstacle to the integration of ethnic minorities. A populist statement in the public debate is the presupposition that Muslims have failed to integrate in the European society because Islamic and Western cultures are irreconcilable (Lucassen 2005). In any case, there is no doubt that religion is an important factor for both migration and integration (Hirschman 2004).

Although considerable disagreement remains concerning the terms integration and acculturation, a point of agreement is that both integration and acculturation are processes that span different generations (Alba and Nee 1997; Birman and Trickett 2001). Although integration scholars have dealt extensively with intergenerational processes (Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 1997), intergenerational differences in religion have been disregarded (Cadge and Ecklund 2007). Scholars have either not accounted for intergenerational differences (Van Tubergen 2006) or have only included first generation migrants (Connor 2010a; Smits, Ruiter and Van Tubergen 2010; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). The few intergenerational studies report inconsistent results: rising religiosity is reported in the US (Stark 1997; Min and Kim 2005; Alanezi and Sherkat 2008), stagnation in Germany (Diehl and Koenig 2009) and a decline in the Netherlands (Phalet and Ter Wal 2004; Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2010). Therefore, more research is needed on intergenerational religious processes from a cross-comparative (European) perspective.

Integration is, however, even across generations not a linear process (Vermeulen 2010). It can be subject to lapses as a consequence of, for instance, discrimination, which has shown to increase ethnic group identification (Verkuyten 2008). Religion can suppress or buffer the effects of stress on well-being (Ellison 1991). Research on the positive effects of religion for migrants has, however, for the most part only dealt with social and material benefits (Hirschman 2004; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000) and only recently touched upon psychological benefits (Connor 2010b).

Migrating and integrating also means coming into contact with new religious contexts. In general, Europe is considered as more secular than the rest of the world (Davie 2000). Research has, however, paid insufficient attention to large-scale analysis and contextual effects. Studies have been focusing on either one ethnic group (Hurh and Kim 1990), one religion (Connor 2010a), one country of origin (Van Tubergen 2007) or a combination of all these domains (Smits, Ruiter and Van Tubergen 2010). The recent increase in availability of large scale survey-data with the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) in the US and the European Social Survey (ESS) in Europe has led to an increase in studies focusing on individual and contextual effects (Van Tubergen 2006; Alanezi and Sherkat 2008; Higgins, Massey and Jasso 2009; Connor 2010a; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). However, the empirical puzzle whether which area exerts most influence has been neglected. Moreover, the effects of generation and discrimination have not been tested in combination with a cross-national comparative analysis.

With this article we would like to extend previous research by focusing on the combination of four under elaborated aspects: (1) intergenerational differences in religiosity, (2) the influence of discrimination, (3) the influence of the religious context and (4) the question which level exerts more influence on migrant religion: the region or the country. The central proposition is that through the process of intergenerational integration, second generation migrants' religion will resemble natives' religion more than first generation migrants. Since Europe is less religious than the rest of the world, this means that the second generation will be less religious than the



first generation. The effect of discrimination may, however, mitigate these effects. We analyse three aspects of religiosity: (1) being affiliated to a certain denomination, (2) subjective religiosity and (3) frequency of praying. A three-level multilevel-analysis is conducted using the European Social Survey, with 19,567 respondents, 235 regions and 26 countries.

## Theory and hypotheses

### Social integration and religious context

Social integration theory states that the more people are integrated in a social group, the more they will conform to the norms of that group (Durkheim 1986 [1897]; Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001). Integration is understood here as the way in which people find their way in society (Lucassen 2005). Applied to migrant religion, we expect that the more a person is integrated in the receiving society, the more his religiosity will resemble the religiosity of the receiving society. It is assumed that the primary socialization is a decisive element: the difference between the first and second generation in terms of integration is in the first place a consequence of experiencing the socialization in the receiving society. For instance, concerning the political trust the second generation resembles natives more than the first generation does (Maxwell 2010). Although there are considerable differences based on country of origin and destination, in general, we assume that the second generation is culturally more integrated than the first (Crul and Vermeulen 2003).

European religiosity is hard to discern. In general, despite some countries where secularization is stagnating or where religion is on the rise (Pérez-Nievas and Cordero 2010), religiosity in Europe is lower than in the rest of the world (Davie 2000). We assume that second generation migrants, who are more integrated, adjust their religiosity more to the receiving society than the first generation, and this European religiosity is lower than the rest of the world's religiosity. This has been reported for second generation Muslims in the Netherlands (Phalet and Ter Wal 2004; Maliepaard et al. 2010), whereas a stagnation is reported in Germany (Diehl and Koenig 2009). Therefore we predict that *second generation migrant religiosity is lower than first generation migrant religiosity (H1)*.

Although social integration theory is applicable to contextual effects as well, surprisingly little contextual research has been conducted (Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001; Van Tubergen 2006). Since first and second generation migrants conform to the religiosity of the receiving society we suppose an effect of native religiosity on migrant religiosity. Studies indeed report an effect of native religiosity on migrant religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). Therefore, our second hypothesis is as follows: *the lower receiving societies' religiosity, the lower migrant religiosity (H2)*.

Considering integration as an intergenerational process means that the second generation will conform more to native religiosity than the first generation. On top of the effect of the receiving society we assume a greater effect on the second than on the first generation. We predict that *the association between receiving societies' religiosity and migrant religiosity is higher for the second than for the first generation (H3)*.

Most previous research has focused on contextual effects at the national level. Some scholars claim a more local influence on migrant religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006). Indeed, according to social integration theory migrants conform to the religiosity of the community in which they are integrated and even within countries differences in religiosity or religious practices can be relatively large. We suppose that the influence of native religiosity, as expressed in H2 and H3, is regional rather than national: it is first and foremost the religiosity of the close environment which is of greatest influence according to the social integration theory (Van Tubergen 2006). Therefore our fourth hypothesis is: *the association between native religiosity and migrant religiosity is higher at the local than at the national level (H4)*.

## Discrimination

Discrimination is a main determinant of acculturative stress, which occurs when adaptation does not run smoothly (Berry et al. 2006). Scholars have pointed to the attenuating capabilities of religion for buffering or suppressing stress (Wheaton 1985; Krause and Van Tran 1989). Religious explanations create an existential security that reduces stress coming from financial and labor market problems (Ellison et al. 2001) and traumas (Ellison 1991).

This effect of discrimination is not irreconcilable with the integration thesis. Research on Muslims in Europe has indicated that a feeling of rejection of the ethnical and/or religious group to which one belongs causes an increased ethnical identification with the group and higher rates of religious orthodoxy (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007, 2010; Verkuyten 2008; Connor 2010a; Fleischmann, Phalet and Klein, 2011). Fleischmann (2010) has demonstrated the positive effect of discrimination on the religious identification of Turks in Amsterdam and Berlin. Our fifth hypothesis predicts that perceived discrimination is associated with a higher migrant religiosity (H5).

Discrimination can, however, affect second generation migrants in a different way than the first. Second-generation non-western migrants are often considered as an in-between group: not fully accepted as Europeans and not fully accepted as members of the sending society of their parents (Foner and Alba 2008: 14; Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Individuals can react in diverse ways to discrimination, one being creating an alternative identity (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Although at the same time negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims abound in Europe (Allen and Nielsen 2002), rejection-identification theory states that in case of discrimination, group members will increase their commitment to attenuate the consequences



of discrimination (Fleischmann, Phalet and Klein 2011). Religion can play the role of a more certain, stable and accepted identity which is often transnational and trans ethnic. Hence, and given the positive psychological effects of religion, our sixth and last hypothesis predicts that discrimination has a higher association with migrant religiosity for the second than for the first generation (H6).

## Data and variables

The European Social Survey is a two-yearly cross-sectional survey among more than 30 European countries. The questionnaire is designed and organized centrally and is subsequently translated to the official languages of the participating countries. Response rates vary between countries and waves, but in general a response rate of 70% is pursued per country and wave. The survey has been conducted since 2002 and at this moment there are four waves available (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008), resulting in a total of 184,988 cases.

The population contains all residents who are 15 or older, regardless nationality. These data are, therefore, particularly suitable for research on migrants in Europe. The selection of migrants, and the deletion of missing cases on the variables in our analysis resulted in a final dataset of 19,567 cases.

The ESS is aptly designed to use for research on contextual effects since respondents are assigned to both the region and the country they live in. The number of regions per country varies from only one (Luxemburg) to 26 (Ukraine). After recoding we retained a total of 235 regions with at least one migrant. These 235 regions are subdivisions of 26 European countries, after exclusion of Israel, Russia and Turkey.

A disadvantage of the data is, however, that the surveys were conducted using the official languages. This means that migrants that do not fully master an official language of the country of region where they live are not or less likely to be interviewed, resulting in a sample bias towards higher educated and an overrepresentation of intra-European migrants. We will reduce the effects of this bias by weighing the data and controlling for education, employment status and origin. Moreover, findings about migrant religiosity based on the ESS are comparable to other cross-national data which were intended to target migrant populations (Van Tubergen 2006; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). For generational differences in religiosity, however, this implies we compare the more integrated groups of both generations, meaning we estimate the effect conservatively.

## Dependent variables

Table 5.1 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics. We include three different aspects of religiosity in our analysis. These are (1) affiliation to a certain denomination, (2) subjective

religiosity and (3) praying. Although religious service attendance has been widely used in religiosity research, the measurement of the service attendance indicator has, contrary to the other indicators we use, proven to be cross-nationally inequivalent (Meuleman & Billiet, 2011). Since the inequivalence is due to the fact that the indicator does not function for Muslim women, this is an issue which can't be disregarded for migrant religion research in Europe. Therefore, we decided not to include it as a dependent variable in the analysis.

*Affiliation* is a dichotomous variable based on the question "Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?". Respondents answering 'yes' received a score of 1, 'no' a score of 0.

*Subjective religiosity* is calculated using the 11-point scale answers to the question "Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?". The scale has a range going from 'Not at all religious' (0) to 'Very religious' (10).

*Praying* is based on the question "Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?". Answers varied in a 7-point scale ranging from 'Every day' (1) to 'Never' (7). Scores were dichotomized by grouping scores 1 to 3 to create the category 'Once a week or more' (1) and 4 to 7 for 'Less than once a week' (0).

## Independent variables

*Generation* is a dichotomous variable with categories 'First generation' (0) and 'Second generation' (1). First generation migrants include respondents being born abroad whose parents are both born abroad too. Second generation migrants are respondents born in the country where the questionnaire is being taken and who at least have one parent born abroad.

*Discrimination* is based on the question "Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?". The three possible answers, 'No', 'Yes' and 'I do not know' are recoded into two categories: 'Not discriminated' (0) and 'Discriminated' (1). We assume that if people do not know whether they belong to a group being discriminated against, this is due to the fact that they are not being discriminated. The variable includes discrimination based on any ground, not only ethnicity. We presume, however, that the reason for being discriminated is irrelevant for trying to explain the effect of discrimination on religion and generation differences between the effect.

## Control variables

We control for *sex*, *age*, *origin*, *employment status*, *educational level* and *survey wave*. *Sex* is a dichotomous variable with categories 'Male' (0) and 'Female' (1). *Age* is a metric variable in full years. *Origin* is a categorical variable with the six inhabited continents as categories: Europe, Africa, Asia, North-America, South-America and Oceania. First generation migrants were assigned to the continent where they were born. For the second generation migrants with

only one parent born abroad we used the continent of birth of that parent, if both were born abroad the continent of birth of the father is used as origin. A narrower breakdown, e.g. by country or region, is not possible, given that in the first wave only continents were recorded for respondents' parents. Unlike Russia, which for a large part lies within the European continent, Israel and Turkey are in this study not considered European countries. *Educational level* is a categorical variable with seven educational levels and one rest category. The level is determined by the highest level achieved. National and regional diplomas were recoded to the international ES-ISCED-scale, a European adaptation to the Unesco-standard for educational levels. The seven levels run from 'less than lower secondary' to 'Master'. Missing values and diplomas that are not possible to harmonize into ES-ISCED were assigned to the rest group. *Employment status* is a dichotomous variable with categories 'Unemployed or inactive' (0) and 'Employed' (1). Respondents were asked to indicate their main activity the last 7 days with categories like 'Paid work', 'Education' and 'Unemployed'. Every respondent that did not answer 'Paid work' was given a score of 0. Wave is a categorical variable with four categories, one for each wave of the ESS.

## Contextual variables

As indicated before, we take into account two contextual levels: regions and countries. For each dependent variable we aggregate a corresponding regional and national metric variable. Variables are calculated retaining all non-migrant respondents of the four waves, i.e. 148,180 cases.

*Affiliation* is the percentage of inhabitants, without migrants, considering themselves as belonging to a certain religion or denomination. As indicated we calculate two variables: one with the percentage per region and one with the percentage per country. We maintain this logic for the other two dependent variables.

*Subjective religiosity* is the mean religiosity of non-migrants for each region.

*Praying* is the percentage inhabitants, without migrants, that pray once a week or more, apart from religious services.

## Method

We use multilevel-models with three levels: (1) individual migrants ( $N_i = 19,567$ ), (2) regions ( $N_j = 235$ ) and (3) countries ( $N_k = 26$ ). Cases are weighted at the individual level. The analyses are conducted using multilevel models. Individual cases per region vary from 2 to 1,344 with a mean of 318.38 migrants per region and countries have a range of 60 to 2,196 individuals. By breaking down migrants per region we retain some regions with few cases. For the sake of accuracy in multilevel-modeling, however, the number of cases at the second level is of higher importance than the number of cases at the first level (Hox 2002). Moreover, simulations have indicated that estimates are reliable starting from an average of 5 cases per group (Clarke 2008).

Religiosity is introduced as a metric variable in a linear multilevel model. The two other dependent variables are tested in a logistic multilevel-model. In the first step, we test at which level native religiosity succeeds best in explaining migrant religiosity (table 5.2). Therefore, we introduce each independent variable corresponding to the dependent variable, for instance native subjective religiosity in the analysis with subjective religiosity as the dependent variable, first at the regional level and then at the national level. In the second step, we succeed with the most successful model and present results of two models for each dependent variable (tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5). In model 1, we introduce the individual and appropriate contextual variables. In model 2 we add two interaction effects, testing whether the effects of discrimination and the contextual variable at the regional or national level differ between generations. All models are estimated using the software program MLwiN. All metric independent and dependent variables were standardized.

Since different denominations maintain special regulations about the frequency of praying, we have tested for this effect by adding the denominations to model 2 of praying. The differences between the full model and this test model were negligible, except for a general steep decline in magnitude of the effects of the other independent variables, due to the fact that we then control for non-affiliated respondents.

## Results

Table 5.2 presents the variance and explained variance of three different models: (1) the null-model containing only the intercept, (2) a model containing all individual variables and native religiosity at the regional level and (3) a model containing all individual variables and native religiosity at the national level. For each step we display the amount of variance at the individual, regional and national level and, if any, the proportion of variance explained at each level. From the decomposition of variance we learn that there is reasonable contextual variance: the combined intra-class correlations of both second and third level variance ranges from 10% for subjective religiosity to 15.6% for frequency of praying and 23.6% for affiliation. This means that the correlation between two migrants living in the same region is 23.6% for affiliation, individual differences only accounting for 76.4% of the variance. This amount of variance is quite high and indeed higher than documented for migrants by two-level analyses (Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011).

When we look at the decomposition between the two higher levels, regional and national, we notice that there is a substantively higher variance at the national level, compared to the regional: ranging from 7.9% to 20.1% for the national level versus 2.1% to 3.5% for the regional level. However, adding native religiosity at the regional level to the model results in a high proportion of explained variance at both the regional and contextual level: ranging from 47% at

the regional and 60% at the national level for affiliation to 58.7% at the regional and 87.7% at the national level for frequency of praying. Adding native religiosity at the highest level obviously only reduces variance at that level. The explained variance is only some percentages higher in this model. However, if we compare the total explained variance at the higher levels, meaning regional and national combined, results are better for the regional-level than for the national-level variable: 58.1% versus 56.7% for affiliation, 76.7% versus 70.9% for subjective religiosity and 82.5% versus 67.7% for praying. The model fit of the only linear multilevel model leads to the same conclusion: the -2 LogLikelihood of subjective religiosity is 67.084 ( $\chi^2$ ; df=1;  $p<0.001$ ) lower if the regional variable is used versus the national variable. Based on this comparison we found it most optimal to proceed with native religiosity as an independent variable at the regional level.

An overview of the final models is presented in tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. We predicted lower religiosity for second generation migrants. From the first model in the tables we find support for this generation hypothesis (H1). The chance of being affiliated to a certain denomination is lower for second generation migrants, they report a lower subjective religiosity and they pray less often than first generation migrants. This means that we can accept the first hypothesis: second generation migrants in Europe tend to have a lower religiosity than first generation migrants.

At the regional level we predicted that higher natives' religiosity is associated with higher migrant religiosity (H2). For all three dependent variables there is a positive effect of the corresponding regional religiosity variable. The effect is the lowest for subjective religiosity and highest for affiliation, where an increase of one standard deviation in the percentage of regional natives' affiliation means an increase in odds of affiliation for migrants with 107.5% ( $e^{0.730}-1$ ). We attribute the low effect for subjective religiosity to the fact that of all indicators of religiosity, this is the least salient: while the level of religious behaviour of natives, such as praying, is quite easily observable, the subjective religiosity of natives is not that visible to migrants, and thus, of all three dependent variables, least subject to social influence.

Next to this main effect we expected an interaction between second generation and the regional effect, because through more integration the second generation experiences the regional effect more (H3). The effect on the second generation is higher than on the first, as indicated by the positive interaction effects, the highest effect being the interaction with affiliation and the lowest subjective religiosity, replicating the effect of salience of religious behaviour. We conclude that second generation migrants experience the influence of regional religiosity more than the first generation.

Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics

	Range	N (%) Ave. (Std.)		Range	N (%) Ave. (Std.)
<b>Individual</b>			<b>Employed</b>		
<b>Dependent</b>			Unemployed and inactive	0/1	9352 (47.8%)
Affiliation			Employed	0/1	10215 (52.2%)
No	0/1	8089 (41.3%)	<b>Education</b>		
Yes	0/1	11478 (58.7%)	Lower than lower secondary	0/1	1412 (7.2%)
Subjective religiosity	0-10	4.90 (3.09)	Lower secondary	0/1	2592 (13.2%)
Praying			Upper vocational secondary	0/1	2884 (14.7%)
Less than once a week	0/1	12217 (62.4%)	Upper general secondary	0/1	2529 (12.9%)
Once a week or more	0/1	7350 (37.6%)	Advanced vocational	0/1	1202 (6.1%)
<b>Independent</b>			Bachelor	0/1	1222 (6.2%)
Generation			Master	0/1	1353 (6.9%)
First generation	0/1	9590 (49.0%)	Other	0/1	6373 (32.6%)
Second generation	0/1	9977 (51.0%)	<b>Wave</b>		
Discrimination			1 (2002)	0/1	4418 (22.6%)
No	0/1	16945 (86.6%)	2 (2004)	0/1	5413 (27.7%)
Yes	0/1	2622 (13.2%)	3 (2006)	0/1	4624 (23.6%)
<b>Control</b>			4 (2008)	0/1	5112 (26.1%)
Sex			<b>Contextual</b>		
Male	0/1	9075 (46.4%)	<b>Region</b>		
Female	0/1	10492 (53.6%)	Affiliation	0-100	57.04 (21.75)
Age	15-98	44.66 (17.44)	Subjective religiosity	0-10	4.53 (1.07)
Origin			Praying	0-100	32.57 (18.44)
Europe	0/1	14541 (74.3%)	<b>Country</b>		
Africa	0/1	1547 (7.9%)	Affiliation	0-100	57.43 (21.26)
Asia	0/1	2305 (11.8%)	Subjective religiosity	0-10	4.55 (1.03)
N.-America	0/1	336 (1.7%)	Praying	0-100	33.30 (18.05)
S.-America	0/1	773 (4.0%)			
Oceania	0/1	65 (0.3%)			

Table 5.2: variance decomposition

	Affiliation			Subjective religiosity			Praying		
	Variance	ICC	Explained Variance	Variance	ICC	Explained Variance	Variance	ICC	Explained Variance
Model 0	Individual	3.290	76.4%	-	0.922 (0.032)	90.0%	-	3.290	84.4%
	Regional	0.151 (0.275)	3.5%	-	0.022 (0.008)	2.1%	-	0.109 (0.047)	2.8%
	Destination	0.867 (0.275)	20.1%	-	0.081 (0.027)	7.9%	-	0.497 (0.147)	12.8%
	-2 LL.				55936.038	-			
Region	Individual	3.290	88.5%	-	0.849 (0.027)	97.3%	-	3.290	96.9%
	Regional	0.080 (0.031)	2.2%	47.0%	0.011 (0.005)	1.3%	50.0%	0.045 (0.015)	1.3%
	Destination	0.347 (0.103)	9.3%	60.0%	0.013 (0.004)	1.5%	84.0%	0.061 (0.018)	1.8%
	-2 LL.				54225.088	-1710.95			
Country	Individual	3.290	88.2%	-	0.850 (0.027)	96.6%	-	3.290	94.4%
	Regional	0.170 (0.066)	4.6%	-	0.020 (0.008)	2.3%	-	0.139 (0.078)	4.1%
	Destination	0.271 (0.071)	7.3%	68.7%	0.010 (0.004)	1.1%	87.7%	0.057 (0.022)	1.7%
	-2 LL.				54292.172	-1643.87			



Table 5. 3: Logistic multilevel models of being affiliated

	Affiliation			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)
<b>Intercept</b>	1.218 ***	(0.151)	1.241 ***	(0.318)
<b>Independent variables</b>				
<b>Control variables</b>				
Female	0.292 ***	(0.032)	0.297 ***	(0.063)
Age	0.200 ***	(0.018)	0.185 ***	(0.036)
Origin				
Europe	Ref.		Ref.	
Africa	0.906 ***	(0.072)	0.887 ***	(0.134)
Asia	0.656 ***	(0.057)	0.640 ***	(0.106)
N.-America	0.140	(0.119)	0.120	(0.151)
S.-America	0.229 *	(0.091)	0.228 **	(0.074)
Oceania	-0.722 *	(0.298)	-0.701 +	(0.411)
Employed	-0.164 ***	(0.034)	-0.157 **	(0.054)
Education				
Lower than lower secondary	Ref.		Ref.	
Lower secondary	-0.289 ***	(0.079)	-0.298 ***	(0.079)
Upper vocational secondary	-0.311 ***	(0.079)	-0.323 ***	(0.079)
Upper general secondary	-0.527 ***	(0.080)	-0.531 ***	(0.080)
Advanced vocational	-0.582 ***	(0.093)	-0.601 ***	(0.093)
Bachelor	-0.769 ***	(0.092)	-0.774 ***	(0.092)
Master	-0.691 ***	(0.090)	-0.697 ***	(0.090)
Other	-1.402 ***	(0.125)	-1.418 ***	(0.125)
Wave				
1 (2002)	Ref.		Ref.	
2 (2004)	-0.172 ***	(0.047)	-0.175	(0.125)
3 (2006)	-0.039	(0.050)	-0.034	(0.144)
4 (2008)	0.063	(0.049)	0.076	(0.066)
<b>Independent</b>				
Second generation	-0.342 ***	(0.034)	-0.330 ***	(0.064)
Discriminated	0.246 ***	(0.049)	0.191 **	(0.059)
<b>Contextual variables</b>				
<b>Region</b>				
Natives' affiliation	0.753 ***	(0.063)	0.576 ***	(0.097)
<b>Interaction</b>				
Second generation * Discriminated			0.156 *	(0.069)
Second generation * Regional var.			0.308 ***	(0.074)

+ p &lt; 0,1; \* p &lt; 0,05; \*\* p &lt; 0,01; \*\*\* p &lt; 0,001 (two-sided)

N<sub>i</sub> = 19,567; N<sub>j</sub> = 235; N<sub>k</sub> = 26; Cases weighted



Table 5. 4: Linear multilevel models of subjective religiosity

	Subjective religiosity			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)
<b>Intercept</b>	0.259***	(0.062)	0.264***	(0.062)
<b>Independent variables</b>				
<b>Control variables</b>				
Female	0.239***	(0.020)	0.239***	(0.020)
Age	0.082***	(0.013)	0.079***	(0.013)
Origin				
Europe	Ref.		Ref.	
Africa	0.421***	(0.065)	0.414***	(0.066)
Asia	0.288***	(0.037)	0.275***	(0.036)
N.-America	0.120 <sup>+</sup>	(0.063)	0.115 <sup>+</sup>	(0.063)
S.-America	0.262***	(0.051)	0.259***	(0.053)
Oceania	-0.257**	(0.092)	-0.263**	(0.091)
Employed	-0.079***	(0.020)	-0.077***	(0.020)
Education				
Lower than lower secondary	Ref.		Ref.	
Lower secondary	-0.181***	(0.046)	-0.181***	(0.046)
Upper vocational secondary	-0.272***	(0.038)	-0.271***	(0.038)
Upper general secondary	-0.322***	(0.047)	-0.322***	(0.046)
Advanced vocational	-0.314***	(0.052)	-0.317***	(0.051)
Bachelor	-0.421***	(0.053)	-0.422***	(0.052)
Master	-0.473***	(0.045)	-0.472***	(0.045)
Other	-0.489***	(0.111)	-0.483***	(0.109)
Wave				
1 (2002)	Ref.		Ref.	
2 (2004)	-0.036	(0.036)	-0.034	(0.036)
3 (2006)	-0.020	(0.037)	-0.019	(0.037)
4 (2008)	-0.003	(0.034)	0.001	(0.034)
<b>Independent</b>				
Second generation	-0.189***	(0.032)	-0.201***	(0.030)
Discriminated	0.124***	(0.019)	0.092***	(0.024)
<b>Contextual variables</b>				
<b>Region</b>				
Natives' subjective religiosity	0.245***	(0.023)	0.205***	(0.026)
<b>Interaction</b>				
Second generation * Discriminated			0.089**	(0.033)
Second generation * Regional var.			0.066**	(0.021)

<sup>+</sup> p < 0,1; \* p < 0,05; \*\* p < 0,01; \*\*\* p < 0,001 (two-sided)

N<sub>i</sub> = 19,567; N<sub>j</sub> = 235; N<sub>k</sub> = 26; Cases weighted

Table 5.5: Logistic multilevel models of praying

	Praying			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)
<b>Intercept</b>	-0.387***	(0.100)	-0.386***	(0.098)
<b>Independent variables</b>				
<b>Control variables</b>				
Female	0.678***	(0.034)	0.679***	(0.034)
Age	0.330***	(0.018)	0.319***	(0.018)
Origin				
Europe	Ref.		Ref.	
Africa	1.111***	(0.067)	1.083***	(0.067)
Asia	0.718***	(0.053)	0.672***	(0.054)
N.-America	0.165	(0.124)	0.142	(0.125)
S.-America	0.850***	(0.088)	0.842***	(0.088)
Oceania	-0.924*	(0.359)	-0.959**	(0.361)
Employed	-0.187***	(0.034)	-0.178***	(0.034)
Education				
Lower than lower secondary	Ref.		Ref.	
Lower secondary	-0.303***	(0.075)	-0.298***	(0.075)
Upper vocational secondary	-0.468***	(0.076)	-0.459***	(0.076)
Upper general secondary	-0.487***	(0.077)	-0.486***	(0.077)
Advanced vocational	-0.522***	(0.093)	-0.524***	(0.093)
Bachelor	-0.494***	(0.092)	-0.496***	(0.092)
Master	-0.665***	(0.088)	-0.654***	(0.088)
Other	-0.649***	(0.102)	-0.615***	(0.100)
Wave				
1 (2002)	Ref.		Ref.	
2 (2004)	-0.043	(0.047)	-0.038	(0.047)
3 (2006)	0.004	(0.050)	0.009	(0.050)
4 (2008)	-0.060	(0.049)	-0.043	(0.049)
<b>Independent</b>				
Second generation	-0.432***	(0.035)	-0.494***	(0.038)
Discriminated	0.315***	(0.048)	0.238***	(0.059)
<b>Contextual variables</b>				
<b>Region</b>				
Natives' praying	0.670***	(0.042)	0.529***	(0.044)
<b>Interaction</b>				
Second generation * Discriminated			0.256**	(0.097)
Second generation * Regional var.			0.291***	(0.036)

<sup>+</sup> p < 0,1; \* p < 0,05; \*\* p < 0,01; \*\*\* p < 0,001 (two-sided)

N<sub>i</sub> = 19,567; N<sub>j</sub> = 235; N<sub>k</sub> = 26; Cases weighted

Next to this main effect we expected an interaction between second generation and the regional effect, because through more integration the second generation experiences the regional effect more (H3). The effect on the second generation is higher than on the first, as indicated by the positive interaction effects, the highest effect being the interaction with affiliation and the lowest subjective religiosity, replicating the effect of salience of religious behaviour. We conclude that second generation migrants experience the influence of regional religiosity more than the first generation.

Our fourth hypothesis, that regional native religiosity explains more variance than national native religiosity (H4), is again supported by the results. Regional religiosity explains more higher-level variance. Although there is higher variance at the national level, this turns out to be a composition effect of the regions. Adding native religiosity at the regional level results in a better model fit for the linear model of subjective religiosity which again supports our hypothesis.

According to our fifth hypothesis discrimination has a positive effect on religiosity (H5). Our results clearly indicate support: there is a positive effect of discrimination on migrant religiosity for all three dependent variables. Migrants who feel discriminated are more often affiliated to a religion, they feel more religious and pray more often. Next, we predicted in our sixth and final hypothesis that the effect of discrimination is higher for the second generation than for the first (H6). We remark a positive significant interaction effect in the second model in tables 3, 4 and 5, meaning that the effect on second generation is greater than on first generation migrants. We conclude that we find support for both hypotheses: discrimination leads to higher religiosity (H5) and the second generation experiences this effect more than the first (H6).

Subsequent analyses demonstrate, however, that the interactions of generation and discrimination and of generation and regional native religiosity operate differently according to origin. Although the main effects of discrimination hold for European, African and Asian migrants separately, the results for the interactions are somewhat mixed. Among second generation European migrants there is a significant interaction effect of discrimination on praying, but only a marginally significant effect on subjective religiosity and no effect on affiliation. Among Asian migrants, however, the interactions between generation and discrimination are in line with the general analyses, but the main effects turn insignificant, indicating that discrimination only affects second generation migrant religiosity and not first generation's. Results are more complicated among African migrants: while there is no effect of discrimination on praying among both generations, there is an effect among the second generation, but not among the first, on subjective religiosity and there is no interaction effect on affiliation. These mixed findings seem to indicate, again, some support for our in-betweens hypothesis: discrimination is of greater concern among second generation non-European migrants than among their first generation, or second generation European, counterparts.

While the main effects of native religiosity hold among European, African and Asian migrants, the interaction effect with generation is again less common. The interaction effect occurs among European but less clear among African and Asian migrants: the interaction effect is only significant on praying for Asian migrants and on subjective religiosity and praying for African migrants. This could indicate that the second generation non-European migrants indeed do conform more to native religiosity, but only for religious behaviour, such as praying, while they are not less often affiliated than their first generation counterparts.

## Conclusion and discussion

This article makes a contribution to migrants' religion research, by studying migrants' religion from an intergenerational perspective. Moreover, we addressed the influence of discrimination and regional contextual effects on migrant religion in large-scale research in different countries, for different denominations and ethnical backgrounds.

Firstly, our results indicate that second generation migrants in Europe are less religious than first generation migrants. They have lower odds of being affiliated to a certain religion, feel less religious and they pray less often. These results extend the findings from the Netherlands (Phalet and Ter Wal 2004; Maliepaard et al. 2010) to the rest of Europe and supports our plea for an intergenerational perspective in migrant religion research: different generations need to be studied in order to fully capture trends in religiosity among migrants. Although it is at the moment, given migration history, not yet possible to include the third generation in the research, there are certainly possibilities in the US to do this, as Stark (1977) has shown.

Secondly, we found that discrimination has a positive influence on religiosity. The effects of both perceived discrimination (Fleischmann 2010) and immigrant receptivity (Connor 2010a) have been attested for Muslims in particular and we have indications that migrants in general are susceptible to the effect of discrimination. It is possible that the religion offers migrants psychological advantages if they are being confronted with acculturative stress. It is remarkable that discrimination has a higher impact on second generation migrants' religiosity than on first generations' religiosity, especially for non-European migrants. We conclude that we have indications of support for the in-betweens hypothesis: religion creates a hold for second generation migrants experiencing discrimination and a threatened ethnic identity.

Thirdly, we found some confirmation for the contextual influence of the region: the influence of native religiosity on migrant religiosity is higher at the regional level than at the national level. The regional effects replicate findings at the national level (Van Tubergen 2006; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011) and encourage a more local approach to migrant religiosity. In concordance with our central proposition that migrants conform religiously to non-migrants in an intergenerational process of integration, we notice that the regional effect is greater for

second than first generation migrants. Surprisingly, this effect operates differently for non-European migrants: for them the intergenerational reduction due to the influence of native religiosity is limited to religious behaviour. Although we utilize a cross-sectional survey and longitudinal studies are needed, our results may indicate that migrants adjust their religiosity to that of the receiving society from one generation to another. Stark's (1977) research on the religion of German migrants in the US points in the same direction: notwithstanding the lower religiosity of the first generation, the third generation had caught up and reported the same levels of religiosity as the rest of the US. Where immigration of less religious migrants in the US in the 20th century means an intergenerational increase in religiosity, in current Europe religiosity decreases in subsequent generations. Further research can move the working area to test these hypotheses in other religious contexts and periods. We discern four major limitations of this research. Firstly, there is a selection effect, resulting in a loss of first generation migrants who do not master the local language enough to participate in the survey. We are convinced, however, that this means that we have estimated the effect conservatively and that intergenerational differences would be even higher if less integrated first generation migrants were included.

Secondly, the strong effect of regional, non-migrant religiosity points to the fact that the influence is most salient at lower levels, where migrants themselves can experience religiosity of the direct environment. The data do not allow a more local breakdown but it is reasonable that if we could have used an even smaller context we would have found greater contextual effects on migrant religiosity.

Thirdly, there is the causal link between discrimination and religion: we cannot test for the reverse effect, that people are being discriminated for being religious, given the cross-sectional data. Berry et al. (2006), however, conclude that limited integration and a bad adaptation are consequences of discrimination and not the other way round. Of the respondents in our dataset, only 2.2% indicate religion as the reason for their discrimination and 60% of those are first generation migrants. The fact that second generation migrants perceive less discrimination because of religion makes the reverse causation seem unlikely.

Fourthly, given the cross-sectional nature of our data, we are unable to make causal statements. Moreover, there could be selection effects at work as well. This problem is particularly of interest concerning the contextual effects: migrants do not choose their destination countries or regions randomly and an effect of regional religiosity could be due to a selection effect rather than a causal one. However, most of the non-Western, and even part of intra-European, immigration streams are caused by economic or political motives and less by religious motives (Fassmann and Münz 1992). This reduces the possibility of migrants selecting less religious regions because they themselves are less religious or vice versa. The fact that the effects hold for different origin groups illustrates this effect. Moreover, especially regarding our main variable of interest, generation, selection effects are limited: second generation migrants, by definition, did not select

their destination country. Policy implications of this research are in fact limited to restricting or reducing discrimination and the effects of discrimination, since intervening in religiosity is not considered as a part of public policy in liberal societies. However, in times of fear for presence of fundamentalist and religiously extreme migrants in Europe, this research indicates that religiosity is declining across generations. An exception, however, is the effect of discrimination: if one would want to counter extremism, blaming migrants themselves or their religiosity could prove to be counterproductive. If convergence towards national averages, or an attenuation of radicalism, is wanted then discrimination has to be tackled first and foremost.

# The role of the ethnic community

## for second generation migrants' religiosity: an interactive model

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*In this paper, we examine the influence of the religiosity of the ethnic community on second generation migrants. Theories on cultural transmission are applied to assess the influence of interactions within and outside the ethnic community. We apply cross-classified multilevel analyses to data on 7,887 second generation migrants from four waves of the European Social Survey and examine subjective religiosity and the frequency of praying. There is a strong impact of ethnic community religiosity: second generation migrants tend to be more religious in more religious ethnic communities. The influence is higher when second generation migrants grew up in traditional family structures, have spent less time in educational institutions and when they belong to a religious minority in the destination country. Our research also shows that the influence is higher on praying than it is on subjective religiosity, which could indicate the preservation of religious behavior, while religious beliefs might wane.*

### Introduction

Since the second World War, the ethnic diversity of most European countries has been altered extensively. In most countries, this alteration has gone hand in hand with an increase in religious diversity. At least in Western Europe, traditionally Christian European countries have witnessed the arrival of non-Christian immigrant groups. In the long run, the perpetuation of this growing religious diversity is dependent on the preservation of religiosity within the ethnic community. If ethnic minority communities are successful in transferring religiosity to new generations, new migrant denominations and religious traditions will be established more firmly in the destination societies and form the foundations of subsequent transfer processes. If, on the other hand, the transfer is limited and the acculturating influence of the host society is high, migrant religions are more likely to disappear. Contrary to the US, where religious institutions often produce opportunities for socio-economic and cultural integration, the increased religious



diversity has in Europe been associated with perceptions of increased ethnic tensions (Foner and Alba 2008). Therefore, a better understanding of the evolution of ethnic minority religiosity within ethnic communities and across migrant generations is needed.

The scholarly interest into migrant religiosity has been increasing in both the US and Europe over the last few decades (Van Tubergen 2006; Alanezi and Sherkat 2008; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Although the research has long been hampered by a lack of systematic survey data (Cadge and Ecklund 2007), recently studies have focused on the religiosity of the first (Van Tubergen 2006) and second generation (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012) and on intergenerational differences in religiosity (Alanezi and Sherkat 2008; McAndrew and Voas 2013; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Results on the evolution of religious fervor across subsequent generations are mixed, however. Some scholars report intergenerational stability (Diehl and Koenig 2009), others a decline (Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2010; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013) while even other studies report an increase among second generation Muslim migrants (Roy 2004). Hence, there is no clear image of whether ethnic communities successfully transfer religiosity to second and later generations.

In an immigration context, children of immigrants often experience diverging values from on the one hand the culture of the country of origin and on the other hand that of the destination country (Vedder et al. 2009). The preservation of ethnic minority religiosity is hence dependent upon the successful transfer within the ethnic community in contrast to destination country religious patterns. Interactions of second generation migrants with either the ethnic community or the host society therefore determine their susceptibility to either culture. A main source of religiosity transfer within the ethnic community are parents. According to previous research among natives, religiosity is to a large part dependent upon inheritance through interactions with parents (Myers 1996): higher parental religiosity is associated with higher religiosity among their children. The quality of the parental relationship and the family structure influence this relationship: good parent-child relations and a traditional family structure aid religiosity inheritance (Myers 1996; Schönpflug 2001). This parental influence is, at the same time, not constant, however, but dependent upon the religious context. In relatively religious nations, the national context exerts a stronger influence than parental religiosity and vice versa (Kelly and De Graaf 1997). Apparently, parental influence is tightened if religious parents are surrounded by less religious contexts or relaxed when their religiosity conforms to that of the context. With regards to migrants, previous research already demonstrated the influence of host society religiosity on second generation migrants: second generation migrants seem to conform to the level of religiosity among natives (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Hence, second generation migrant religiosity is not only influenced by the religiosity of the own ethnic community, but also by the religiosity of and interactions with individuals and social institutions from the host society. So far, previous research has focused predominantly on Muslim migrants



and has not addressed the transfer of religiosity within the ethnic community from an interactive perspective.

In this paper, we address the importance of the ethnic community for the religiosity of the second generation. More specifically, we focus on how religious transmission within the ethnic community process is influenced by (1) socialization within the family, (2) interactions with peers, (3) interactions with social institutions and (4) the religiosity of the context in which it takes place. We apply cross-classified multilevel analysis of the influence of levels of religiosity among first generation co-ethnics on second generation migrants' subjective religiosity and frequency of praying. Data from four different waves (2-5; 2004-2010) of the European Social Survey (ESS) are used, comprising 7,887 second generation migrants from 106 different origin countries and living in 26 European destination countries.

## Theory and hypotheses

The social transfer of cultural traits is crucial for cultural persistence: cultures disappear if people do not transmit existing traits to others (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). On the other hand, exact replication of cultures is problematic as well, since it limits the ability of societies to respond to new situations (Boyd and Richerson 1985). Scholars who study the social transmission of cultures distinguish three different forms (Berry and Georgas 2008). First, there is vertical transmission, through the influence of parents. Second, individuals are influenced by peers, which is called horizontal transmission. The third source of influences comprise other individuals as well as social institutions, so-called oblique transmission. Schönpflug (2001) introduced the concept of 'transmission belts': conditions which enhance the cultural transmission in specific contexts. In an immigration context, however, children of immigrants often experience conflicting values from the culture of the country of origin and that of the destination country (Vedder et al. 2009). This means that for migrants, cultural persistence is dependent upon transfer within the own ethnic community, through parental influence or through contacts with co-ethnics, whereas contacts with natives or social institutions of the destination country represent influences weakening cultural persistence, while the religious context impacts upon this relationship. Therefore, we need to take into account the influence of family structures, social integration, social institutions and the religiosity of the context to unravel the process of ethnic community religiosity transfers among migrants. In what follows, we develop hypotheses on how vertical, horizontal and oblique interactions influence the transfer within the ethnic community.

### Vertical interactions: family socialization

In all cultures, parents transfer their values and practices to their children. Among immigrant families, this often means transferring values which differ from the society in which their

children grow up (Vedder et al. 2009). Therefore, socialization within the family, and interactions with parents play a pivotal role for successfully transferring religiosity within the own ethnic community. Previous research already found that parents are crucial for religiosity transfer processes: parental religiosity is the main determinant of religious fervor among their offspring (Myers 1996; Martin, White and Perlman 2003; Storm and Voas 2012). While raising their children, parents indoctrinate them with their own religious beliefs. After a certain age, however, the influence of parents is often challenged by other influences, causing some to dissociate themselves from the beliefs of their parents (Need and De Graaf 1996; Min, Silverstein and Lendon 2012). The crucial role of parents is at the same time also subject to variation due to the quality of the interactions between parents and their offspring. 'The family structure and parents' resources determine the level of success in transferring values from parent to child (Schönpflug 2001; Friedlmeier and Trommsdorff 2011; Min, Silverstein and Lendon 2012). Parental influence on religiosity is higher among families with a traditional family structure and with resourceful parents (Myers 1996): being raised in a single-breadwinner family with a higher-educated father increases the influence of parental religiosity on offspring adult religiosity. The family structure and the educational resources of the father during socialization are thus instrumental in determining levels of religiosity during adulthood. Therefore, we hypothesize that: *respondents who grew up in more traditional family structures, i.e. in families with an unemployed and lower educated mother, and in families with more paternal resources, i.e. with a higher educated father, will experience a higher influence of ethnic community religiosity (H1).*

### Horizontal interactions: discrimination

Values and attitudes are transformed through interactions with others (Mead 1934). The more people are socially integrated into a certain group and hence interact with members of that group, the more they conform to the norms and values of that group (Durkheim 1986 [1897]). The effects of structural integration on religiosity have in European research repeatedly been found among both natives (Need and De Graaf 1996; Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001) and migrants (Van Tubergen 2006; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013): the more integrated, the lower the religiosity. Second generation migrants can, on the other hand also experience feelings of rejection, for instance in the case of discrimination. Perceived discrimination can have widespread negative effects for ethnic minorities, such as a weaker physical health and higher levels of depressive symptoms (Missinne and Bracke 2012; Pascoe and Richman 2009). With regards to ethnic and religious identity formation, perceived discrimination is associated with respectively reactive ethnicity (Portes and Rumbaut 2001) and reactive religiosity (Voas and Fleischmann 2012): an increased identification with the own ethnic and religious group (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007, 2010). Confronted with feelings of rejection in the destination country, migrants rally to other identities which are less challenged. They might find solace in

identifying more with the own ethnic community and/or the own religious group. This lowered social integration into the destination society often coincides with a higher similarity in human values within ethnic communities (Hadjar et al. 2012). In this respect, perceived discrimination is associated with higher levels of religiosity among ethnic minorities (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). The higher stress on ethnic and religious identification leads to our second hypothesis, which predicts that *perceived discrimination is associated with a higher influence of ethnic community religiosity (H2)*.

### Oblique interactions: social institutions

According to social transmission theory, interactions with social institutions of the destination country affect the impact of the ethnic community on the transfer of cultural traits to the second generation. These are called oblique interactions. If second generation migrants get confronted more often with social institutions and other influences of the destination country, they become less susceptible to the influence of co-ethnics. We focus on two important social institutions influencing second generation migrants' worldviews: the educational system and mass media. Through education in the destination society, second generation migrants have more salient experiences of the destination society than their first generation counterparts (Vedder et al. 2009). Adolescents spend most of their waking hours in schools, meaning that ethnic minority adolescents get more often exposed to ethnic majority peers and ethnic majority educational programs through their education in the host society (Vedder et al. 2009). According to scholars who follow the scientific worldview-paradigm, education is associated with lower levels of religiosity, as the scientific approach to the world of the former contradicts the traditional religious explanations (Bruce 1999). As people age, the influence of parental religiosity tends to decrease (Francis and Brown 1991). Education could have the same emancipating effect. Among immigrant families, parental stress on collectivism is loosened for higher educated offspring (Phalet and Schönplflug 2001), indicating that education might alter the transmission of values. Higher-educated migrants tend to be less religious (Van Tubergen 2006; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013) but it has not yet been examined how education might alter the transfer of religiosity within the ethnic community.

Mass media may be another social institution of the destination country exerting a major influence on various aspects of human life, such as attitudes towards the death penalty (Sotirovic 2001) or even eating disorders (Abramson and Valene 1991). Among migrants, media use can have an integrating effect, since higher rates of integration are associated with higher levels of media consumption (Peeters and d'Haenens 2005). Hence, consuming media has an integrative effect on migrants. So far, the association between media use and religiosity has mainly been studied by communication scientists, exploring the effects of religiosity on media use. These studies report a lower use of several different media, such as internet and television (Hamilton and

Rubin 1992; Armfield et al. 2003), among more religious individuals. Among Chinese migrants in the US, using media increases information and knowledge of the host society, thus supporting acculturation in the US (Hwang and He 1991). Given the integrating effect of media use and education for migrants, we can thus conclude that *exposure to and contact with social institutions in the destination country are associated with a lower influence of ethnic community migrants' religiosity (H3)*.

## The religious context

Traditionally, the influence of the religious context on migrant religiosity has been explained by applying social integration theory: migrants conform to levels of religiosity in the social group in which they integrate (Van Tubergen 2006). Results confirm that migrants are more religious in more religious backgrounds and vice versa and the influence of contextual religiosity is even higher for second than first generation migrants (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). The contextual religiosity also influences the ability to transfer religiosity, however. As Kelley and De Graaf (1997) have demonstrated, intergenerational transmission of religiosity is affected by the national context in which it takes place. Parental influence is either reinforced or relaxed, in national contexts with respectively low and high levels of religiosity: parents protect their offspring from the supposed noxious effects of a secularized environment. Therefore we hypothesize that *the influence of ethnic religiosity will be higher in countries with lower levels of religiosity (H4)*.

Next to the effect of living in a secularized environment, adhering to a minority religion in the destination country might also be associated with a higher influence of the religiosity of co-ethnics. Previous research already indicated that value similarity within groups is higher among groups whose values differ most from the general societal values (Boehnke, Hadjar and Baier 2007). Groups who differ more from the general societal values devote more attention to transferring values to their offspring. This effect is not exclusive to religiosity, however: Schwartz (1992) found that parents put in more effort to transfer values which are less common in a given society. Therefore, we hypothesize that *the influence of ethnic religiosity will be higher for individuals who adhere to a minority denomination in their destination country (H5)*.

## Data and variables

We use data from four different waves (2-5; 2004-2010) of the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a two-yearly cross-sectional survey which started in 2002 and is still ongoing. At the moment of writing, we have information on over 30 countries and over 230,000 individuals. The central organizing team of the European Social Survey develops the questionnaire, which is subsequently translated to the official languages of the participating countries. Data is then

gathered during face-to-face interviews among the resident population aged 15 years or older. Although response rates of at least 70% are pursued, there is some variation in response rates by countries and waves: from 43.6% in France in 2004 to 81.4% in Bulgaria in 2010. The complete dataset of waves two to five contains 194,894 cases. For the analyses, we only select second generation migrants, meaning respondents born in the country where they are surveyed with at least one parent being born abroad. Moreover, we can only calculate first generation religiosity, our main variable of interest, for second generation migrants who come from origin countries with sufficient first generation migrants in the data to calculate mean levels of religiosity for the community. Therefore, we decided to exclude migrants from countries with less than five first generation migrants in the ESS data. After the selection of migrants and the listwise deletion of missing cases on the variables in the analyses, we retain 7,887 second generation migrants.

## Dependent variables

We examine two dimensions of religion: (1) subjective religiosity and (2) frequency of praying. Although religious service attendance has been widely used in previous research, the measurement of the service attendance indicator in the ESS might not be a valid indicator of religiosity. According to Meuleman and Billiet (2011), the measurement of religious service attendance is inequivalent due to the fact that the indicator does not function for Muslim women, for whom service attendance is less common. Given that we focus on ethnic minorities in Europe, a substantial part of which are Muslim, we decided not to include this dependent variable in the analyses.

*Subjective religiosity* is a metric variable, calculated using the 11-point scale answers to the question “Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?”. The scale goes from ‘Not at all religious’ (0) to ‘Very religious’ (10).

*Praying* is a metric variable based on the question “Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?”. Answers varied in a 7-point scale ranging from ‘Every day’ (1) to ‘Never’ (7). This variable has been reverse-coded, meaning that a higher score indicates a higher frequency of praying. In this way, both dependent variables are coded in the same direction.

## Independent variables

*Working mother* is a dichotomous variable indicating whether respondents’ mother had a job at the age of 14. Respondents who indicated that their mother had no job at the age of 14 were given code 0 and all other answers were recoded into code 1. In our sample, 37.1% of second generation migrants grew up in a family with a job-less mother when they were 14 years old.

*Educational level mother* is introduced as a metric variable in the models. The variable measures the highest level of education of respondents’ mothers. The educational level is recorded in a



variable with five categories, based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) by UNESCO: less than lower secondary education, lower secondary education completed, upper secondary education completed, post-secondary non-tertiary education completed and tertiary education completed. On average, second generation migrants' mothers have not completed secondary education.

*Educational level father* is also introduced as a metric variable in the models and based on the same categorical recording. On average, fathers are somewhat higher educated than the mothers in our sample, although they too have not completed secondary education.

*Discrimination* is a dichotomous variable indicating whether respondents feel they belong to a group which is being discriminated in the country where they live based on color, nationality, religion, language or ethnicity. If respondents indicated that they perceived group discrimination, they were given a list of group memberships which could lead to discrimination and asked whether they could indicate on which grounds they perceive group discrimination. If second generation migrants indicated discrimination based on color, nationality, religion, language or ethnicity, they received a score of 1. If they did not perceive discrimination or only discrimination based on other grounds than the ones mentioned, they received a score of 0. 6.3% of second generation migrants feel discriminated based on color, nationality, religion, language or ethnicity.

*Years of full-time education* is a metric variable indicating the amount of years respondents have spent on full-time education. Outliers which were more than three standard deviations removed from the average have been removed from the analyses. On average, our respondents have studied for 12.6 years in full-time education.

*Media use* is a metric variable which measures the total time spent on watching TV, listening to the radio or reading newspapers on an average weekday, in hours. On average, second generation migrants use these media for 4.2 hours a day.

*Religious minority* is a categorical variable with four categories. The variable indicates whether respondents adhere to a minority religious denomination in their destination country. Minority religions are defined by calculating the most common religious denomination for each destination country in the dataset. If none of the religious denominations has at least 40% adherents, that country is considered religiously diverse. This variable is constructed by taking into account the self-categorization of individuals who were asked whether they belong to a certain denomination. This variable had 8 categories: 'Roman Catholic', 'Protestant', 'Eastern Orthodox', 'Other Christian', 'Jew', 'Muslim', 'Eastern Religion' and 'Other non-Christian'. Subsequently, we categorized religious minorities as those individuals who adhere to another denomination than the majority in the destination country. Given that most European countries have a Christian tradition and have experienced widespread trends of religious disaffiliation, we make a distinction between non-affiliated, Christian and other minorities. The four resulting

categories are: 'majority', 'non-affiliated minority', 'Christian minority' and 'other minorities'. The latter category consists mainly of Muslim minorities.

At the contextual level, we introduce the influence of levels of religiosity of first generation migrants of the same origin country and of natives in the destination country. For each dependent variable, we calculated corresponding contextual variables, i.e. for instance subjective religiosity of natives for the analysis of subjective religiosity and the frequency of praying of natives for the analyses of frequency of praying among second generation migrants.

*Ethnic community subjective religiosity* is the mean level of subjective religiosity among all first generation migrants in the last four waves of the ESS for each origin country separately. To be able to calculate reliable levels of religiosity among the first generation, we only retained origin countries for which at least five respondents were surveyed.

*Ethnic community frequency of praying* is the mean frequency of praying of first generation co-ethnics, for each origin country separately.

*Native subjective religiosity* is the mean level of subjective religiosity among all natives for each destination country in the last four waves of the ESS. Religiosity is clearly lower among natives, with an average of 6.1, than among co-ethnics, with an average of 4.5.

*Native praying* is the mean frequency of praying among natives, for each origin country separately. Natives pray less frequently, with an average of 3.2, compared to the ethnic community, who have an average of 3.7.

## Control variables

We control for *sex*, *age* and *ESS wave*. *Female* is a dichotomous variable indicating whether respondents are male (0), i.e. the reference category, or female (1). *Age* is a metric variable indicating the age in full years of respondents at the time of the survey. *Wave* is a metric variable indicating the wave of the European Social Survey. As the ESS is a two-yearly survey, each increase of wave corresponds with two years, starting from 2004 (i.e. the second wave) onwards. The effect of wave could hence indicate possible trends in religiosity among second generation migrants during the period under study.

## Method

Given that our second generation migrants are nested in the non-hierarchical levels of origin and destination countries, we apply cross-classified random intercept multilevel models (Rasbash and Goldstein 1994). We discern three different levels: (1) 7,887 individuals come from (2) 106 different origin countries and live in (3) 26 different destination countries. Given the cross-classified structure of the data, we apply Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation procedures provided by the statistical software package MLwiN (version 2.28) (Browne 2011). Analyses were performed in R, using the R2MLwiN package (Zhang et al. 2013). This algorithm

has also proved to provide more robust and conservative statistical tests (Stegmueller 2013). We estimate linear models for the effects on subjective religiosity and frequency of praying.

*Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics*

	Range	Ave.	(Std.)
<b>Individual</b>			
Dependent			
Subjective Religiosity	0-10	4.596	(3.025)
Praying	1-7	3.2	(2.386)
Control			
Gender			
Male	0/1	3632	(46.1%)
Female	0/1	4255	(53.9%)
Age	14-97	43.14	(17.647)
Wave	0-3	1.458	(1.137)
Independent			
Working mother			
No	0/1	2943	(37.3%)
Yes	0/1	4944	(62.7%)
Educational level mother	1-5	2.464	(1.325)
Educational level father	1-5	2.69	(1.416)
Discrimination			
No	0/1	7391	(93.7%)
Yes	0/1	496	( 6.3%)
Years of full-time education	0-24	12.64	(3.636)
Media use	0-10.5	4.206	(1.857)
Religious minority			
Majority	0/1	4011	(50.9%)
Non-affiliated minority	0/1	1552	(19.7%)
Christian minority	0/1	1907	(24.2%)
Other minority	0/1	417	(5.3%)
<b>Contextual</b>			
Ethnic community			
Subjective religiosity	4.182-8.459	6.110	(0.788)
Praying	2.141-6.786	3.689	(0.699)
Natives			
Subjective religiosity	2.498-6.919	4.467	(1.058)
Praying	1.823-5.307	3.169	(1.034)

For each dependent variable we estimate four different models. Firstly, we estimate a null-model, containing only the intercept. In this way, we can decompose the variance between the



three respective levels. Secondly, in model 1, we include the control variables and the measure of religious fervor of the ethnic community at the origin level. Thirdly, in model 2, we add the main effects of all remaining independent variables to the model. In this way, we can calculate to what extent aspects of family socialization, social integration, discrimination, influence from social institutions in the destination country and the religious fervor among natives explain the influence of religious fervor in the community on second generation migrants. Fourthly, in the final full model, we include interaction effects between the effect of the religious fervor at the origin level and all independent variables. In this final model, we can test to what extent the influence of the religiosity of the first-generation co-ethnics is mediated by family socialization, discrimination, contact with social institutions in the destination country and the religious fervor among natives. Table 6.1 displays descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables. All metric variables have been centered in the analyses in order to make the main effects of the interactions meaningful.

## Results

The results of the cross-classified multilevel analyses for subjective religiosity and frequency of praying are depicted in respectively table 6.2 and table 6.3. Looking at the variance decomposition in the respective null-models allows us to determine to what extent religiosity is affected by either individual or contextual characteristics. The higher the proportion of variance at the higher levels, the higher the influence of contextual characteristics. For the null-models of both subjective religiosity and frequency of praying, we notice that there is considerable variance at the higher levels: 11.8% of the variance in subjective religiosity and 18.9% in frequency of praying is due to the origin and destination country. In other words, second generation migrants coming from the same origin country and living in the same country are 18.9% correlated in terms of how frequently they pray. These numbers are comparable to the variance decomposition of first generation migrants (Van Tubergen 2006) and underline the necessity to apply multilevel models, which take these contextual influences into account. In our first model, we notice a strong positive effect of the religiosity of first generation co-ethnics on the religiosity of second generation migrants: the subjective religiosity for two migrants from different origins, which have a difference of 1 in their mean score of subjective religiosity, is 0.367 higher. This strong influence of co-ethnics is attenuated when adding the main effects: the effects of the religiosity of co-ethnics declines with 83.7% for subjective religiosity and 63.5% for frequency of praying between model 1 and model 2, after adding the main independent effects. The effect of ethnic community religiosity on second generation migrants' subjective religiosity is no longer significant after adding the main independent effects. Apparently, family structures, discrimination, contact with social institutions and the religiosity of the context explain a substantial portion of the influence

of the religiosity of co-ethnics. These results indicate that the impact of this variable might differ according to the aforementioned characteristics and urge us to further explore the relationship between the religiosity of second generation migrants and the religiosity of co-ethnics. To test our hypotheses, we look at the main effects and at the interaction effects of the full models of subjective religiosity and praying.

Table 6. 2: Cross-classified multilevel models of subjective religiosity

	Reduced models						Full model			
	Model 0		Model 1		Model 2		Main effects		Interactions <sup>a</sup>	
	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)
Intercept	4.696 ***	(0.193)	3.543 ***	(0.209)	0.794	(0.658)	-1.514	(1.979)		
Female			0.891 ***	(0.064)	0.742 ***	(0.058)	0.739 ***	(0.058)		
Age			0.016 ***	(0.002)	0.011 ***	(0.002)	0.011 ***	(0.002)		
Wave			-0.047 *	(0.030)	-0.126 ***	(0.027)	-0.125 ***	(0.027)		
<b>Individual</b>										
Working mother					-0.122 +	(0.065)	0.358	(0.485)	-0.076	(0.078)
Educational level mother					-0.083 **	(0.030)	0.337	(0.218)	-0.069 *	(0.036)
Educational level father					0.008	(0.028)	-0.257	(0.204)	0.044	(0.033)
Discrimination					0.542 ***	(0.124)	0.774	(0.941)	-0.038	(0.143)
Years of education					-0.037 ***	(0.009)	0.134 *	(0.065)	-0.028 **	(0.010)
Media Use					-0.085 ***	(0.016)	-0.040	(0.125)	-0.007	(0.020)
Religious minority										
Majority					Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Non-Affiliated minority					-1.934 ***	(0.092)	-1.749 **	(0.668)	-0.033	(0.111)
Christian minority					1.939 ***	(0.079)	2.313 ***	(0.633)	-0.062	(0.104)
Other minority					2.746 ***	(0.156)	-0.826	(1.244)	0.503 **	(0.179)
<b>Contextual</b>										
Ethnic community subj. rel.			0.367 ***	(0.091)	0.060	(0.058)	0.427	(0.314)		
Native subj. rel.					0.828 ***	(0.107)	0.686 *	(0.345)	0.023	(0.054)
<b>Variance</b>										
Destination	0.777	(0.261)	0.688	(0.231)	0.287	(0.108)	0.313	(0.117)		
Origin	0.316	(0.093)	0.259	(0.088)	0.039	(0.031)	0.029	(0.025)		
Individual	8.203	(0.133)	7.938	(0.128)	6.347	(0.103)	6.313	(0.102)		
<b>DIC</b>	39047.012		38787.219		37010.651		36977.652			

<sup>a</sup> With Subjective religiosity at the origin-level

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; two-sided;  $N_{\text{individual}} = 8,123$ ;  $N_{\text{origin}} = 102$ ;  $N_{\text{destination}} = 26$ .

Our first hypothesis predicted higher levels of religiosity and a higher influence of co-ethnic religiosity on second generation migrants if socialization takes place in more traditional families. Looking at model two, we notice that second generation migrants who grew up in a family with

an economically inactive and lower-educated mother tend to feel more religious and pray more frequently. Moreover, from the interaction terms in the full model, we notice that the influence of levels of subjective religiosity among co-ethnics are higher for second generation migrants whose mothers are lower educated. Second generation migrants who grew up in a family with a mother who had the highest educational level are less influenced by the religiosity in the ethnic community than migrants with a lower educated mother. For each educational level higher, the impact of the ethnic community religiosity declines with 0.069 ( $p < 0.05$ ). When it concerns frequency of praying, we see a higher influence for second generation migrants with economically inactive mothers. Compared to stay-at-home mothers, respondents with employed mothers are less influenced by the ethnic community. The influence of the ethnic community is 0.172 ( $p < 0.05$ ) lower for respondents with employed mothers. Regarding the effect of the educational level of the father, we notice no significant main effect, nor an effect of the interaction with the community religiosity-variable. The results for the traditional family structure are in line with the findings among natives in the US, but contradict those for the resources of parents (Myers 1996) and previous studies which stressed the importance of fathers' resources for transferring human values among migrant families (Schönpflug 2001). Apparently, fathers' resources are less crucial for successfully transferring the religiosity of co-ethnics than for transferring human values within the family. Therefore, we can conclude that we have partial support for our first hypothesis: although second generation migrants growing up in a traditional family tend to be more religious and tend to be more influenced by religious fervor among co-ethnics, fathers' resources do not influence religiosity.

The second hypothesis predicted that migrants who feel discriminated would experience the influence of community religiosity more strongly. We find, however, only limited support for this hypothesis among our results. Although migrants who feel discriminated feel more religious and pray more frequently, they do not experience the influence of the community more than non-discriminated migrants. Therefore, we can conclude that this hypothesis is not supported by our results: although previous research has shown an increased ethnic identification (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007, 2010), this apparently does not lead to a stronger influence of the religiosity of co-ethnics among second generation migrants.

With our third hypothesis, we predicted a lower religiosity and a lower influence of community religiosity for second generation migrants who come more into contact with social institutions of the destination country. We test the effects of years spent in schools and the use of public media. The results confirm the effects of spending time in full-time education for subjective religiosity only: second generation migrants who spent more time in education are less religious and are less strongly influenced by the religiosity of co-ethnics when it comes to subjective religiosity. For each additional year of full-time education, the influence of ethnic community religiosity declines with 0.028 ( $p < 0.01$ ). For subjective religiosity, migrants' own

educational level therefore adds to the effect of their mothers' educational level. The effect of respondents' own educational level is higher than that of their mother, given the scale of both variables. The maximum difference in terms of the ethnic community effect is -0.276 for mothers' educational level and -0.672 for respondents' educational level. There is, however, no significant interaction effect on the frequency of praying. Media use is associated with a lower religiosity among second generation migrants, although it does not lead to a lower influence of community religiosity. Spending more time in full-time education might have an emancipatory effect on second generation migrants, making the impact of the religiosity of co-ethnics less stringent, comparable to the effect of aging for the influence of parental religiosity (Francis and Brown 1991).

The fourth hypothesis predicted a lower influence of community religiosity in destination countries where natives are more religious themselves. Subjective religiosity and the frequency of praying are positively associated with levels of religiosity in the destination countries: second generation migrants conform to the religiosity in the host society. Looking at the interaction effects in the full model, we notice that the influence of community religiosity is not associated with living in a destination country with a higher religiosity among natives. Therefore, we can conclude that we have found no support for our fourth hypothesis.

With our fifth and final hypothesis, we predicted that the influence of ethnic community religiosity will be higher for second generation migrants who are religious minorities in their destination country (H5). From the second model we notice that affiliated minorities tend to be more religious than migrants who adhere to the dominant religion in their destination country. As expected, non-affiliated minorities are less religious than adherents of the majority religion. Looking at the interaction effect between religious minority and the ethnic community religiosity, we see that other minorities, i.e. non-Christian adhering minorities tend to be more influenced by the ethnic community religiosity than migrants who adhere to the religious majority. Non-adhering and Christian minorities are not more influenced than migrants adhering to the majority denomination in the destination country. Effect sizes for both dependent variables are comparable, although there is a difference in scale between subjective religiosity (11-points) and frequency of praying (7 points). This means that the transfer of frequency of praying among non-Christian minority adherents is more successful than that of subjective religiosity. These results indicate support for previous research which found that transfer of values is stressed more in communities who have values which differ more from those of general societal values (Boehnke, Hadjar and Baier 2007). Therefore, we can conclude that we found support for this hypothesis.

Table 6. 3: Cross-classified multilevel models of praying

	Reduced models						Full model			
	Model 0		Model 1		Model 2		Main effects		Interactions <sup>a</sup>	
	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)
Intercept	3.383 ***	(0.202)	2.082 ***	(0.204)	-0.144	(0.412)	-1.843 *	(0.904)		
Female			0.807 ***	(0.049)	0.703 ***	(0.044)	0.701 ***	(0.045)		
Age			0.020 ***	(0.001)	0.016 ***	(0.002)	0.017 ***	(0.002)		
Wave			-0.025 *	(0.022)	-0.077 ***	(0.021)	-0.077 ***	(0.021)		
<b>Individual</b>										
Working mother					-0.116 *	(0.050)	0.536 *	(0.261)	-0.172 *	(0.068)
Educational level mother					-0.049 *	(0.023)	0.028	(0.112)	-0.021	(0.030)
Educational level father					-0.001	(0.021)	-0.025	(0.105)	0.008	(0.028)
Discrimination					0.432 ***	(0.096)	0.665	(0.444)	-0.062	(0.108)
Years of education					-0.026 ***	(0.007)	0.022	(0.034)	-0.013	(0.009)
Media Use					-0.068 ***	(0.012)	-0.007	(0.065)	-0.017	(0.017)
Religious minority										
Majority					Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Non-Affiliated minority					-1.404 ***	(0.071)	-1.863 ***	(0.366)	0.126	(0.101)
Christian minority					1.322 ***	(0.061)	1.271 ***	(0.326)	0.014	(0.088)
Other minority					1.641 ***	(0.118)	-0.481	(0.623)	0.473 ***	(0.141)
<b>Contextual</b>										
Ethnic community praying			0.307 ***	(0.071)	0.112 *	(0.046)	0.554 *	(0.226)		
Native praying					0.876 ***	(0.097)	1.045 ***	(0.212)	-0.044	(0.052)
<b>Variance</b>										
Destination	0.965	(0.309)	0.827	(0.265)	0.235	(0.084)	0.231	(0.082)		
Origin	0.147	(0.052)	0.130	(0.051)	0.014	(0.016)	0.013	(0.012)		
Individual	4.779	(0.078)	4.509	(0.073)	3.755	(0.061)	3.748	(0.061)		
DIC	34784.105		34325.469		32866.804		32858.526			

<sup>a</sup> With Praying at the origin-level<sup>+</sup> p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001; two-sided; N<sub>individual</sub> = 8,123; N<sub>origin</sub> = 102; N<sub>destination</sub> = 26.

Looking at the explained variance of the two dependent variables, we notice that our models are more successful in explaining differences in praying between second generation migrants than differences in subjective religiosity. The total explained variance in the full model is 32.2% for frequency of praying, while 28.4% for subjective religiosity. This indicates that the transfer of religiosity within the ethnic community, and the context of interactions in which it takes place, determine second generation migrants' frequency of praying for almost a quarter, while it is less determinant for their subjective religiosity. Moreover, the transfer of frequency of praying is less dependent upon interactions in general: we only found that frequency of praying is transferred

more successfully among traditional family structures and non-Christian minority groups. This could again indicate that the transfer of religiosity within the ethnic community is more successful for religious behavior than for religious beliefs. At the same time, we can conclude that our models are relatively successful in explaining levels of religiosity among second generation migrants: more than a quarter of subjective religiosity can be explained by the variables in our model, while almost one third of the variance in frequency of praying is explained.

## Conclusion and discussion

In this paper we analyzed religiosity among second generation migrants living in Europe, focusing on the influence of ethnic community religiosity. We looked at how the influence of the ethnic community differs according to interactions with various individuals and social institutions, by focusing on the family structure (vertical interaction), peer influence (horizontal interaction) and social institutions (oblique interaction). Moreover, we also assessed the influence of the religious context. Data from four waves of the European Social Survey were analyzed, applying cross-classified multilevel analyses on 7,887 second generation migrants from 106 different origin countries and living in 26 destination countries. The results lead to two interesting conclusions.

First, ethnic communities in European countries are quite successful in transferring religiosity to the second generation. Being part of ethnic communities in which the religious fervor is high, is associated with a higher religiosity among the second generation. At the same time, the strength of the relationship is influenced by the socialization context, contacts with social institutions and the religious context in which second generation migrants are raised. Religiosity transferring is more successful when second generation migrants are raised in traditional families and when they have spent less time in educational systems of the destination country. At the same time, in accordance with what Kelley and De Graaf (1997) found for the influence of parental religiosity, we notice that the influence of the religiosity of co-ethnics is tightened when the transfer takes place in a religious context which diverges from that of the ethnic community. This means that the influence is higher in contexts where there is a divergence between migrants' denomination and the majority denomination in the destination country. The transfer is hence most successful among non-Christian but adhering second generation migrants who are religious minorities in their destination country. These results are in line with previous research, which found that intergenerational transmission within families is dependent on interactions with different social agents (Myers 1996) and the quality of these interactions (Schönpflug 2001). The transfer of religiosity to the second generation after migration is clearly not a linear process, but a complex interactional negotiation between possibly conflicting influences within the family on the one hand and social institutions and the religious context of destination countries on the other hand.



Second, the results indicate interesting disparities in the transfer of subjective religiosity on the one hand and the frequency of praying on the other. Although both aspects of religiosity are successfully transferred to second generation migrants, the transfer of the latter appears to be more successful. Previous research already found high intergenerational stability in service attendance among Muslim migrants (van de Pol and Van Tubergen 2013; Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013), and our results indicate that the transfer of religious behavior after migration is more successful than less salient aspects of religiosity, like subjective religiosity. This could indicate a tendency towards active religious involvement and behavior while religious beliefs themselves are less internalized. In the long term this could mean that subsequent migrant generations hold on to certain behaviors and traditions, while the influence of religious beliefs is waning. This stands in sharp contrast with European trends of secularization as described by Dobbelaere (2002): a privatization of religiosity in that the influence of public forms of religiosity decreases in favor of more personal and private forms of religious beliefs. Future research would do well to explore this possible trend among second generation migrants in Europe further.

As with any research, this paper is subject to some limitations as well. First of all, the measures of the religiosity in the ethnic community have been aggregated at a relatively high level, meaning that they might not directly measure the religiosity in the local ethnic community. However, additional analyses aggregating first generation migrant religiosity at a lower level produce similar results and a comparable model fit. Other sensitivity analyses showed, on the other hand, that limiting the dataset to communities for which more than 25 first generation observations were at hand did not influence the results either. Therefore, we conclude that, given the data at hand, the indicator used in the analysis is probably the best possible approximation of the ethnic community religiosity. Second, given the divergence between subjective religiosity and the frequency of praying, analyzing other measures of religiosity could strengthen the finding of a possible privatization of religiosity. However, given that the measure of service attendance in the ESS is not reliable and no other measures are included, adding more dependent variables was not an option. Further research would do well, however, by analyzing other dependent variables as well. Third, the different interactions, horizontal, vertical and oblique, have been studied by using proxies due to data limitations. Although we do believe that we have selected variables which approximate the different interactions relatively close and in line with previous research (Myers 1996), further research could improve upon these studies by focusing more strongly on variables such as perceived parent-child relationships, social integration into the ethnic community and the host society and direct interactions with specific social institutions of the host society.

With this paper, we uncovered some aspects of how religiosity is perpetuated through time by transferring it within immigrant communities to younger generations. Interestingly, this process is quite successful, in particular with regards to religious behavior such as praying.

This means that, over the next generations, religious behavior of ethnic minorities in Europe might be prolonged, in particular among religious minority adherents, while there may be some indications for a waning influence of religious beliefs themselves. Further research could improve upon this study by examining how this trend contrasts with a European trend towards a privatization and more meaning-based experience of religion.



# Ethnic school segregation

## and adolescents' religious salience

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*Public concerns over the possible effects of school segregation on immigrant and ethnic majority religiosity have been on the rise over the last few years. In this paper we focus on (1) the association between ethnic school composition and religious salience, (2) intergenerational differences in religiosity and (3) the role of ethnic school composition for intergenerational differences in religiosity. We perform analyses on religious salience among 3,612 16-years old pupils in Belgian secondary schools. Ethnic minorities in schools with a higher share of ethnic minorities tend to be more religious. Ethnic school composition also moderates the relationship between migrant generation and religiosity: second generation migrants tend to be more religious in ethnic minority dominated schools. For ethnic Belgians the association is moderated by their religious affiliation: Catholics tend to be more religious while non-affiliated ethnic Belgians are less religious in schools with a higher share of ethnic minority pupils.*

## Introduction

Over the last few years we have witnessed increasing concerns in Europe about the religiosity of immigrants, focusing predominantly on Muslim immigrants. More recently, worries about the religious fervor of adolescents and the role of school segregation have been raised. After some highly debated cases in the public media of peer pressure by devoted fellow students, a prohibition on wearing a headscarf was installed in Flemish public schools (northern part of Belgium). A similar ban has been in effect in France since 2004. In the UK, the school inspection bureau has launched inquiries into some Muslim-majority school governing bodies and found that at least some of them try to promote Islam in schools and remove un-Islamic topics and activities from the school. Ethnic school segregation in Europe is clearly causing increasing concerns with regards to both ethnic minority pupils as the whole school population in general. Religiosity is now added to the list of possible correlates of ethnic school segregation, along with

worries about educational achievement and the social integration of ethnic minority students (Agirdag, Van Houtte and Van Avermaet 2011).

This growing public attention has not been paralleled in academic research, however. Only a handful of studies have examined the relationship between school context and adolescent religiosity (Regnerus, Smith and Smith 2004; Barrett et al. 2007; De Hoon and Van Tubergen 2014). In general, these studies found that pupils' religiosity is positively associated with the average religiosity of peers in the school they attend. The influence of schools is not surprising: adolescents spend most of their waking hours in schools, making schools the main stage for socialization and contact with peers. Schools are therefore one of the most important social institutions for shaping adolescents' values and beliefs. Given that adolescence can be a pivotal life phase in forming individuals' religiosity and spirituality (King and Boyatzis 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004), the influence of schools on religiosity cannot be overlooked.

One of the remaining questions concerning the role of schools on adolescents' religiosity is precisely the influence of school segregation. Since large-scale immigration to Europe took off after the second World War, most Western European countries have absorbed substantial ethnic minorities, often from majority Muslim countries in North Africa or the Middle East (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). The incorporation of these immigrants in the school system has been skewed, however, leading to large-scale ethnic school segregation (Agirdag, Van Houtte and Van Avermaet 2011). Most Western European countries have therefore schools on a continuum from no ethnic minority students to only ethnic minority students. Given that ethnic minority pupils in general, and Muslims in particular, are more religious than the ethnic majority in Western Europe (De Hoon and Van Tubergen 2014), the concentration of ethnic minorities might affect the religiosity of pupils in these schools. Ethnic school segregation can affect pupils' attitudes and behavior due to more salient religious prescriptions. In the Netherlands and Norway, for instance, pupils in schools with more Muslims consumed less alcohol, regardless of their own ethnic background (Amundsen, Rossow and Skurtveit 2005; Van Tubergen and Poortman 2009). Surprisingly, previous research has not examined how ethnic school segregation may affect religiosity in itself.

This ethnic school composition is one of the social contexts in which individuals interact. Differences in ethnic minority religion according to the context are often explained in terms of social integration effects (Durkheim 1986 [1897]): the more socially integrated individuals are in a certain social group, the more they conform to the values, norms and beliefs of that social group. Previous research has for instance shown that through contact with the ethnic majority, ethnic minorities conform to the general level of religiosity in the host society and the more they are socially integrated into the host society, the higher their level of conforming (Van Tubergen 2006). This social integration is also the explanation of intergenerational differences in religiosity: second generation ethnic minorities conform more to host society religiosity than

their first generation counterparts (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Although there has been an increase in academic attention towards intergenerational differences in ethnic minority religiosity, these differences have not been tested among adolescents. Given the pivotal role of adolescence in the development of religiosity, the question remains whether these intergenerational differences already occur during adolescence or whether they develop later. Moreover, ethnic school composition plays an important role in this respect. The opportunities for intergenerational conforming might depend upon the ethnic composition of the school. In ethnic minority-dominated schools, intergenerational differences in religiosity might be reduced due to a social integration into ethnic minority groups, rather than in ethnic majority social groups. For a better understanding of intergenerational differences in religiosity, the literature would benefit from an assessment of this topic among adolescents and the impact of the ethnic school composition upon them.

With this study, we examine the associations between (1) ethnic school segregation and adolescent religious salience, (2) intergenerational differences in ethnic minority religious salience and (3) the role of ethnic school composition for intergenerational differences in ethnic minority religious salience. We derive hypotheses from Durkheim's social integration theory (1986 [1897]), which states that social integration into certain groups leads to sharing the values and beliefs of that group and from Blau's (1977) structural opportunity theory, which states that group sizes and distributions shape the opportunities for inter-group contact. This leads to the central propositions of this paper. First, given the higher religiosity of ethnic minorities in Western European countries, pupils in schools with a higher proportion of ethnic minority peers will be more religious than pupils in schools with a lower proportion. Second, religiosity will be lower among second and third generation migrants than among their first generation counterparts. Third, these intergenerational differences will be smaller for adolescents in schools with a higher proportion of ethnic minority peers. To test these hypotheses, we apply cross-classified multilevel models on 3,612 16-years old adolescents from 48 different ethnic origins in 55 Flemish (northern part of Belgium) secondary schools.

## Theory and hypotheses

### Ethnic school segregation

In his seminal work *Le Suicide*, Durkheim (1986 [1897]) introduced social integration theory. The more frequent social contact is between individual members of a group, the more socially integrated that group is. Due to this contact, individuals become immersed in the values and ideas of the social group. These values guide each individuals' behavior and helps them to play their social role in their respective groups. This means that the integration of individuals within

social groups determines their values, ideas and beliefs. Differences in values, ideas and beliefs between individuals is in other words caused by integration into different social groups in society. This theory has been applied successfully to religious groups: people conform to the religiosity of the social group in which they are integrated (Need and De Graaf 1996). Among immigrants, previous studies have shown that immigrants also conform to levels of religiosity in the host society and that more integrated migrants conform even more to ethnic majority religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). The other way round, ethnic minorities with less ethnic majority friendships resemble the religious behavior of the own ethnic group more (Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013). Given the importance of schools in adolescents' lives, this means that pupils might be expected to conform to levels of religiosity in the school they attend. Previous research in the US has indeed found that pupils who attend schools with more religious peers tend to become more religious over time (Regnerus, Smith and Smith 2004).

Pupils' opportunities for social integration within schools depend on the social composition of their school, however. The sociological laws of contact within and across groups was stipulated by Blau's (1977) structural opportunities theory. According to this theory, heterogeneity in a society determines the opportunities for contact across social groups. Based on the assumption that people prefer in-group associations over out-group associations in the first place and prefer associating with out-group members over not associating at all, Blau (1974) deduces that group size governs the probability of intergroup relations. Members of small groups have more opportunities to associate with members of other groups than members of larger groups. In other words, minority group members have more contact with majority group members than the other way round. Indeed, previous research found that inter-ethnic friendships are more common in schools with higher ethnic heterogeneity (Johnson, Crosnoe and Elder 2001; Van Houtte and Stevens 2009). Hence, school composition might determine the opportunities for social integration: smaller groups within schools will have a higher propensity to integrate into larger school-groups than the other way round.

Given the repeated findings that religiosity among ethnic minorities is higher than among the ethnic majority in Western Europe (Voas and Fleischmann 2012; De Hoon and Van Tubergen 2014), the proportion of ethnic minorities in schools might determine the opportunities for social integration into either a more religious ethnic minority group or a lesser religious ethnic Belgian group. Therefore, we hypothesize that: *the higher the proportion of ethnic minorities in a school, the higher the religious salience among pupils (H1).*

## Intergenerational differences

Social integration theory has also been successfully applied to the intergenerational integration of immigrants in their respective host society. The primary socialization of second generation

migrants in the host society plays a vital role for their social integration into that society. Apart from socio-economic integration (Portes and Zhou 1993), the socio-cultural integration of second generation migrants is also more pronounced than that of their first generation counterparts. Second generation migrants tend to have more ethnic majority friends (Martinovic 2013), political attitudes more similar to those of the ethnic majority (Maxwell 2010) and identify more often with the host society (Fokkema et al. 2012) than first generation migrants. These results indicate a higher conformism to the ethnic majority through a better social integration for second than for first generation migrants. This effect has also been shown for religiosity. Although migrants in general conform to the general religiosity of the host society (Van Tubergen 2006), conforming is more pronounced among second generation migrants (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). As yet, no study has assessed whether these intergenerational differences manifest themselves during adolescence already. Moreover, most research has only focused on differences between first and second generation migrants. It is unclear how religion evolves in later migrant generations. Based on previous research on the differences among adults between first and second generation migrants we hypothesize that: *the religious salience among second and third generation migrant adolescents will be more similar to that of ethnic Belgians than that of first generation migrants (H2).*

### Intergenerational differences and ethnic school segregation

One of the reasons for studying intergenerational differences in religiosity among adolescents is the possible association with the ethnic school segregation in many Western European countries. Although social integration is expected to be associated with lower religiosity among later generation ethnic minority pupils, schools with a higher percentage of ethnic minorities might function as a buffer against this intergenerational waning of religiosity. The transmission of cultural traits from one generation to the next is, according to social psychologists, influenced by three different sources: vertical interactions, i.e. through parents, horizontal interactions, i.e. through peers, and oblique interactions, i.e. through other individuals and social institutions (Berry and Georgas 2008). Although parental transmission of religiosity is generally effective (Myers 1996), it is dependent upon the religious context in which it takes place (Kelley and De Graaf 1997). Moreover, interactions with ethnic majority peers and social institutions of the destination country might weaken the impact of parental transmission (Van der Bracht and Van de Putte 2015). The influence of schools in the host society has already been demonstrated: previous studies have repeatedly shown that higher education is associated with lower levels of religiosity among ethnic minorities (Van Tubergen 2006; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). The share of ethnic minorities in a school might determine the intergenerational transmission of religiosity however: in schools with a higher share of ethnic minorities, pupils are more isolated from host society influences and influenced more by the higher religiosity of

the ethnic community. Therefore, we hypothesize that: *in schools with a higher proportion of ethnic minority pupils, second and third generation migrants' religious salience will differ more from ethnic Belgians than in schools with less ethnic minority pupils (H3).*

## Context

The migration history of Belgium is comparable to that of most Western European countries. After the Second World War, Western European governments regulated the influx of labor migrants from first Southern Europe and subsequently Turkey and North Africa. Labor markets had high demands of unskilled labor, which could not be filled domestically, resulting in migration flows of lower educated labor migrants (Verhaeghe, Van der Bracht and Van de Putte 2012). Decades of follow-up migration through family formation and family reunion has transformed traditionally ethnic homogeneous nations into a multiethnic society.

However, while the migration history of Belgium is comparable to that of most Western European countries, the school segregation is not. School segregation is more pronounced in Belgium, which makes Flanders a very interesting case (Jacobs et al. 2009). An important reason for this more pronounced school segregation is the educational policy of free parental school selection. Since every parent can choose a school for their child and there are no regulations, parents can select or avoid a specific school because of the student composition. Especially for secondary education, the proximity of the school is not the first concern of the parents (Creten et al. 2000). They are more concerned with the 'reputation' of the school, the offered fields of study and the religious affiliation of the school. However, since middle class, mostly ethnic Belgian parents, have more resources to act upon their wish to send their children to a 'good white middle class school', the free parental choice resulted in socio-economic, ethnic and religious segregation. The latter is a consequence of the origin of most labor migrants, who came from more religious, often Muslim majority, countries. This religious diversification coincided with a period of secularization in Western Europe (Norris and Inglehart 2004). The ethnic segregation has therefore also created schools on a continuum of only Christian or non-affiliated ethnic Flemish pupils on the one hand and schools with only ethnic minority pupils who affiliate predominantly with Islam.

## Data and variables

We used data from RaDiSS (Racism and Discrimination in Secondary Schools) (D'hondt, Van Praag, Stevens and Van Houtte 2015), a survey conducted during the school year 2011-2012 among 4,322 third-grade students (i.e. Grade 9 in U.S. school system terms) in 55 secondary schools in Flanders, the Dutch-speaking, northern part of Belgium. Students were selected through multi-stage sampling. In the first stage, 104 schools were sampled according to the urbanization of the



school neighborhood and ethnic composition of the students. Secondary schools are regularly asked to participate in academic research in Flanders and therefore often apply the principle of ‘first come, first served’. A total of 55 secondary schools were willing to participate in the survey, resulting in a response rate at the school level of 53%. The non-response was not selective on the ethnic composition of schools. The ethnic composition of the participating schools ranges from 4.2% to 100% ethnic minority students. All third-grade students present were asked to complete a written questionnaire, in presence of a researcher and one or more teachers. Non-response at the level of students was due to students’ absence at school, for instance due to illness. This results in relatively high response rates at the student level, with 92.5%, and a non-response which is only selective insofar as the absence of students is selective, for instance due to students’ (chronic) ill health. After listwise deletion of individuals with missing values for the variables in the analysis we retain 3,612 pupils. The loss in information is mainly due to a lack of data on the socio-economic status of the parents. Additional analyses without including socio-economic status of the parents reveal similar results, however.

### Dependent variables

As dependent variable, we used *religious salience*. Students were asked “How important is religion to you”. Answers were recorded on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from “Not at all important” to “Very important”. A higher score on this variable indicates a higher religious salience.

### Independent variables

We distinguished between variables at the level of students and at the level of schools and between independent and control variables. We subsequently introduce the independent and control variables at the student and school level.

*Migrant background* is a categorical variable, indicating whether adolescents have a migrant background, and if so, to which migrant generation they belong. This variable has four categories: ‘ethnic Belgian’, ‘first generation’, ‘second generation’ and ‘third generation’. First generation migrants are adolescents who have been born outside of Belgium. Second generation migrants are adolescents who were born in Belgium but have at least one parent with a foreign nationality. Third generation migrants are adolescents who are born in Belgium, whose parents have the Belgian nationality but who have at least one grandmother with a foreign nationality. Ethnic Belgians are adolescents who are born in Belgium and who have parents and grandmothers with the Belgian nationality. Ethnic Belgian adolescents form the reference category in our analyses.

At the student level, we control for *age*, *sex*, *denomination*, *socioeconomic status*, *track* and *ethnic minority friendships*. *Age* is a metric variable in full years, based on the reported birth year of individuals in the questionnaire. *Sex* is a dichotomous variable with categories ‘Male’ (0) and ‘Female’ (1). *Denomination* is a categorical variable comprising four categories: ‘Catholic’, ‘Muslim’,

‘other affiliation’ and ‘no affiliation’. This variable has been constructed from respondents’ answers to the question ‘What is your religion?’. Given the small number of respondents who answered ‘Protestant’ or ‘Jewish’, we collapsed these categories with the answer category ‘other affiliation’. Answers to the category ‘liberal’ and ‘no affiliation’ were combined in the category ‘no affiliation’. Given that the ‘Catholic’ category contains the most respondents, this category will serve as reference category in our analyses. *Socioeconomic status* (SES) was measured using the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) (Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Treiman, 1992). This results in a metric variable with a range from 16 to 90. For each parent, the ISEI was derived from the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), and the highest score out of both parents was assigned as socioeconomic status to the students. As already indicated, SES was the variable with a considerable proportion of missing values. Imputing values for parents’ SES was considered unreliable, however, given that we dispose of very few information on parents’ characteristics. Imputing parental SES based on their children’s characteristics was considered unfeasible. *Track* is a categorical variable with three categories, distinguishing between an academic, technical and vocational track. *Ethnic minority friendships* is a metric variable, indicating how many friends with a non-Belgian ethnicity students had. Answers to the question “How many of your friends are from non-Belgian descent” were recorded on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘nobody’ to ‘all’.

At the school level, we introduce the independent variable *percentage ethnic minorities*, as well as the control variables *school size* and *school sector*.

*Percentage ethnic minorities* is a metric variable, indicating the percentage of ethnic minorities in respondents’ own grade year. This variable has been constructed by aggregating the percentage of respondents not in the category ‘ethnic Belgian’ of the migrant background variable at the school level. This variable thus measures the percentage of non-ethnic Belgians in the same grade as respondents.

*School size* is an indicator of the total number of students enrolled in a certain school. The data has been obtained from the Flemish Educational Department. *School sector* is a dichotomous variable, distinguishing between Catholic and Public schools. Although both are financially supported by the Flemish government, there is a difference in religious education. In public schools, religious education is provided for each student according to the denomination they adhere. In Catholic schools, only Catholic education is available for students, irrespective of students’ individual religious adherence. For Muslim students in the sample this means that Islamic religious education is available in public schools, while they have to attend Catholic classes in Catholic schools. Between 70% and 75% of Flemish students attend Catholic schools.



## Method

The students in the sample are nested in schools, which means that the most appropriate estimation technique for analyses of religious salience among adolescent Muslim ethnic minorities is multilevel modeling (Hox 2010). Given that previous studies demonstrated that migrant religiosity is to a large extent dependent upon variations in religiosity in their respective origin countries (Van Tubergen 2006, Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Van de Velde 2014), we also take the level of ethnic origins into account. For this level, we derived the ethnic origin based on respondents' place of birth, the nationality of their parents and the nationality of their grandmothers, in accordance with the migrant background variable. This means that first generation migrants received their country of birth as ethnic origin, second generation migrants the nationality of their mother, or father if only the father had a foreign nationality and for third generation migrants the nationality of their foreign born maternal grandmother, or their other grandmother if the maternal grandmother was foreign-born. In this way, we were able to assign 97.6% of respondents to an ethnic origin, with the Belgian group being the largest. Given that this also resulted in a considerable number of ethnic groups with very few members, often only 1, we limited the analyses to ethnic origin groups with at least 4 members. This reduced the number of ethnic origins from 108 to 48. This reduction and the listwise deletion of respondents for whom no ethnic origin could be assigned resulted in a drop of 240 respondents from the analyses. Given that the ethnic origin and the school level are not hierarchical, we apply cross-classified linear three-level models, with (1) 3,612 individuals nested in (2) 48 ethnic origins and (3) 55 secondary schools. All analyses have been performed in R, using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2014).

We present three different models. In the first model, we include all individual and contextual main effects. With this model, we can test the first two hypotheses, concerning respectively the association between ethnic school composition and religiosity and the intergenerational differences in religiosity. To test these hypotheses, we respectively examine the statistical effects of the percentage of ethnic minorities in school and the migrant background effects. In the second model, we include an interaction effect between migrant background and the percentage of ethnic minorities in schools. In the second model, we add an interaction effect between the percentage ethnic minorities of the school and the migrant background. This model enables us to test the third hypothesis, which stated that the intergenerational difference might differ according to the ethnic school composition of adolescents. To test this hypothesis, we look at the interaction terms estimating the differences in religiosity according to different levels of ethnic composition of the different schools (Figure 7.1). The third model is presented to highlight differences in the effect of ethnic segregation in schools for adolescents with different denominations, by adding an interaction between denomination and the percentage of ethnic

minority pupils in schools. For each model we present unstandardized coefficients, their standard errors, the variance components and the deviance as a measure of the fit of the four different models. All metric variables in the analyses have been grand-mean centered.

Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics

	Full sample			Ethnic Belgians			Ethnic minorities			Sig. Diff.
	Range	#/Ave.	(%)/ (Std.)	Range	#/Ave.	(%)/ (Std.)	Range	#/Ave.	(%)/ (Std.)	
<b>Dependent</b>										
Importance of religiosity	1-5	2.803	(1.443)	1-5	2.146	(1.012)	1-5	3.761	(1.442)	***
<b>Individual</b>										
Independent										
Migrant background										
Ethnic Belgian	0/1	2142	(59.3%)	0/1	2142	(100.0%)	0/1	0	(0.0%)	
First generation	0/1	399	(11.0%)	0/1	0	(0.0%)	0/1	399	(27.1%)	
Second generation	0/1	880	(24.4%)	0/1	0	(0.0%)	0/1	880	(59.9%)	
Third generation	0/1	191	(5.3%)	0/1	0	(0.0%)	0/1	191	(13.0%)	
Control										
Age	13-21	15.49	(0.756)	13-18	15.244	(0.53)	14-21	15.848	(0.883)	***
Sex										
Male	0/1	1876	(51.9%)	0/1	1114	(52.0%)	0/1	762	(51.8%)	
Female	0/1	1736	(48.1%)	0/1	1028	(48.0%)	0/1	708	(48.2%)	
Denomination										
Catholic	0/1	1538	(42.6%)	0/1	1201	(56.1%)	0/1	337	(22.9%)	
Muslim	0/1	813	(22.5%)	0/1	13	(0.6%)	0/1	800	(54.4%)	
Other affiliation	0/1	112	(3.1%)	0/1	35	(1.6%)	0/1	77	(5.2%)	
No affiliation	0/1	1149	(31.8%)	0/1	893	(41.7%)	0/1	256	(17.4%)	
Socio-economic status	16-90	50.096	(16.875)	16-90	54.937	(15.649)	16-90	43.041	(16.098)	***
Track										
Academic	0/1	1609	(44.5%)	0/1	1191	(55.6%)	0/1	418	(28.4%)	
Technical	0/1	943	(26.1%)	0/1	531	(24.8%)	0/1	412	(28.0%)	
Vocational	0/1	1060	(29.3%)	0/1	420	(19.6%)	0/1	640	(43.5%)	
Ethnic minority friends	1-5	2.454	(1.041)	1-5	2.016	(0.694)	1-5	3.092	(1.129)	***
<b>School</b>										
Independent										
Percentage Ethnic Min.	0.042-1	0.421	(0.278)	0.042-0.976	0.29	(0.197)	0.042-1	0.613	(0.267)	***
Control										
School size	82-1170	643.929	(275.461)	82-1170	683.44	(275.199)	82-1170	586.357	(265.607)	***
School sector										
Public	0/1	1539	(42.6%)	0/1	698	(32.6%)	0/1	841	(57.2%)	
Catholic	0/1	2073	(57.4%)	0/1	1444	(67.4%)	0/1	629	(42.8%)	

<sup>+</sup> p < 0,1; \* p < 0,05; \*\* p < 0,01; \*\*\* p < 0,001 (two-sided)

## Results

Table 7.1 displays the descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent and control variables, for the full sample and for ethnic Belgians and ethnic minorities separately. In the last column, the table shows the significance level of the difference in means between ethnic Belgians and ethnic minorities for all metric variables in the table. We notice from the table that, in line with previous research, ethnic minorities report significantly higher levels of religiosity than ethnic Belgians. The distribution of religious denominations is also fundamentally different between ethnic Belgians and ethnic minorities. Among ethnic Belgians, the Catholic form a majority, with 56.1%, and the remainder are mostly not affiliated. Among ethnic minorities, there is a slight majority of Muslims, with 51.2%, almost a quarter identify as Catholics and only 18.2% consider themselves not affiliated to a denomination. Ethnic minorities tend to have significantly more ethnic minority friends than ethnic Belgians. The table also shows the disadvantageous position of ethnic minorities compared to ethnic Belgians in Flemish schools. Ethnic minorities are significantly older, pointing to a higher proportion of students who have been retained at least a year among ethnic minorities. They are also underrepresented in the academic and overrepresented in the vocational track and have a significantly lower socio-economic status.

*Table 7. 2: Bivariate school variables correlation*

	% EM	% Muslims	Mean religiosity	Mean SES	School size	School sector
% EM	1					
% Muslims	0.934***	1				
Mean religiosity	0.908***	0.959***	1			
Mean SES	-0.791***	-0.748***	-0.717***	1		
School size	-0.200	-0.236	-0.190	0.126	1	
School sector	-0.406***	-0.371**	-0.284*	0.370**	0.111	1

<sup>+</sup> p < 0,1; \* p < 0,05; \*\* p < 0,01; \*\*\* p < 0,001 (two-sided); N = 55

The intertwined nature of school segregation is illustrated by table 7.2, which displays bivariate correlations between all school-level indicators. This table shows that ethnic and religious segregation is intensively associated: the percentage of ethnic minorities and the percentage of Muslims is 0.933 correlated. This segregation is also associated with differences in the mean level of religiosity in schools: the mean religiosity is 0.908 correlated with the percentage of ethnic minorities and 0.959 with the percentage of Muslims. Schools with a high proportion of ethnic minorities are therefore also schools with a high proportion of Muslim adolescents and a higher religiosity. Ethnic and religious segregation are further also associated with socio-economic segregation: the higher the percentage of ethnic minorities in a school, the lower the mean socio-economic status. The percentage of ethnic minorities and Muslims is also higher in public schools, which is in turn associated with a lower mean religiosity and a higher mean

socio-economic status in Catholic schools. In what follows we test the hypotheses by looking at the results of the cross-classified multilevel analyses in table 7.3.

*Table 7. 3: Cross-classified multilevel models of religious salience*

	<b>Model 1</b>		<b>Model 2</b>		<b>Model 3</b>	
	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>(S.E.)</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>(S.E.)</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>(S.E.)</b>
<b>Intercept</b>	2.650***	(0.269)	2.660***	(0.264)	2.726***	(0.253)
<b>Individual</b>						
Age	0.017	(0.023)	0.008	(0.023)	0.007	(0.023)
Female	0.036	(0.030)	0.038	(0.030)	0.042	(0.029)
Denomination						
Catholic	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Muslim	1.280***	(0.072)	1.210***	(0.072)	1.177***	(0.080)
Other affiliation	0.668***	(0.088)	0.617***	(0.088)	0.599***	(0.094)
No affiliation	-1.097***	(0.035)	-1.101***	(0.036)	-1.178***	(0.038)
Socio-economic status	0.001	(0.001)	0.002 <sup>+</sup>	(0.001)	0.002 <sup>+</sup>	(0.001)
Track						
Academic	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Technical	0.007	(0.047)	-0.023	(0.045)	-0.032	(0.045)
Vocational	0.034	(0.049)	0.002	(0.048)	-0.006	(0.048)
Migrant background						
Ethnic Belgian	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
First generation	0.495 <sup>+</sup>	(0.272)	0.456 <sup>+</sup>	(0.272)	0.426	(0.261)
Second generation	0.314	(0.270)	0.331	(0.267)	0.311	(0.255)
Third generation	0.102	(0.275)	0.154	(0.272)	0.130	(0.261)
Ethnic minority friends	0.085***	(0.017)	0.088***	(0.017)	0.085***	(0.017)
<b>Contextual</b>						
School size	-0.012	(0.008)	-0.011	(0.008)	-0.009	(0.008)
Catholic school	-0.067	(0.048)	-0.071	(0.047)	-0.074	(0.048)
Percentage Ethnic Minorities	0.322**	(0.102)	-0.020	(0.127)	0.436**	(0.154)
<b>Interaction</b>						
First generation * Percent EM			0.786***	(0.204)	0.712**	(0.230)
Second generation * Percent EM			0.662***	(0.161)	0.598**	(0.188)
Third generation * Percent EM			0.070	(0.276)	0.048	(0.276)
Muslim * Percent EM					-0.399 <sup>+</sup>	(0.218)
Other affiliation * Percent EM					-0.515	(0.316)
No affiliation * Percent EM					-0.821***	(0.157)
<b>Variance</b>						
School	0.012		0.011		0.011	
Origin	0.068		0.067		0.061	
Individual	0.681		0.677		0.672	
<b>Deviance</b>	8950.12		8926.383		8898.574	

<sup>+</sup> p < 0,1; \* p < 0,05; \*\* p < 0,01; \*\*\* p < 0,001 (two-sided); N<sub>individual</sub> = 3,612; N<sub>origin</sub> = 48; N<sub>school</sub> = 55


The first hypothesis, predicted that a higher percentage of ethnic minorities in schools would be associated with a higher level of adolescents' religiosity (H1). We find support for this hypothesis (first model Table 7.3): there is a significant positive effect of the percentage of ethnic minorities in schools on adolescents' religiosity. Adolescents in a school with the highest proportion ethnic minorities (100%) have a 0.309 higher predicted value of religious salience than adolescents in a school with the lowest proportion of ethnic minorities (4.2%). This is a considerable effect on a five-point scale, indicating that there is indeed an association between the percentage of ethnic minorities in a school and pupils' religiosity. Therefore, we conclude that this hypothesis is supported by the results.

The second hypothesis predicted that the difference in religiosity between ethnic Belgians and second and third generation migrants would be smaller than the difference between ethnic Belgians and first generation migrants (H2). To test this hypothesis, we look at the first model in table 7.3. Our findings somewhat support this hypothesis. Although first generation migrants in our sample are more religious than ethnic Belgians, this difference is only marginally significant ( $p = 0.069$ ). Second and third generation migrants on the other hand do not differ significantly from the ethnic majority in Belgium. This suggests that conforming to ethnic majority religiosity might also occur to a great extent among first generation migrants. This somewhat contradicts previous research, which found differences in religiosity across different migrant generations (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). This might mean that conforming to levels of religiosity among ethnic Belgians occurs equally among first as among later generation migrants. We therefore conclude that this hypothesis is not supported by our results.

The intergenerational differences might vary according to the ethnic composition of the schools which adolescents attend, however. The third hypothesis predicted that the difference between ethnic Belgians and second and third generation migrants would be higher for adolescents in schools with a higher proportion of ethnic minority pupils (H3). To test this hypothesis, we look at the interaction effects of the second model in table 7.3. The interaction effects are also displayed in figure 7.1. Figure 7.1 contains the predicted religiosity of first, second and third generation migrants compared to ethnic Belgian religiosity, in a school with the least ethnic minority pupils, a school with 50% minority pupils and a school with 95% ethnic minorities. For each migrant generation, the top of the bar indicates significant differences compared to ethnic Belgian religiosity. At first glance, it is obvious that migrant religiosity is to a large extent associated with the percentage of ethnic minorities in the school they attend. First generation migrants' religiosity differs only marginally significant ( $p = 0.058$ ) from ethnic Belgian religiosity in schools where ethnic Belgians do not form a majority, while it is significantly higher in schools with 95% ethnic minority pupils. Second generation migrants' religiosity only differs significantly from ethnic Belgian religiosity in schools with a very high proportion of ethnic minority pupils. In schools with very few ethnic Belgian pupils, first and

second generation migrants are significantly more religious than ethnic Belgians, while this is not the case in schools with few ethnic minority pupils. There is no significant difference between ethnic Belgian religiosity and third generation migrant religiosity, however. Therefore, we can conclude that we have found partial support for the third hypothesis: second generation migrants' conformism to ethnic Belgian religiosity is associated with ethnic school composition, while this is not the case for third generation migrants, who resemble ethnic Belgian religiosity regardless of ethnic school composition.

Figure 7.1: Predicted effect of ethnic school composition, by migrant background



The second model gives the impression that ethnic school composition is only associated with adolescent religiosity for pupils with a migrant background. The third model contradicts this interpretation, however. In this model, we added an interaction effect between denomination and ethnic school composition. This reveals that the association between ethnic school composition and religiosity was suppressed for ethnic Belgians due to denominational differences in the effect. The main effect of ethnic school composition in model 4 is the effect for Catholic ethnic Belgians, since these form the reference categories of migrant background and denomination. For Catholic ethnic Belgians, we notice a positive effect, meaning that Catholic ethnic Belgians tend to be more religious in schools with more ethnic minority pupils. Non-affiliated ethnic Belgians on the other hand, tend to be less religious in schools with a higher proportion of

ethnic minorities. Religious ethnic Belgians are thus more religious in schools where they are a minority. Non-religious ethnic Belgians are less religious in schools where they are a minority. This indicates that ethnic school composition is also associated with ethnic Belgians adolescents' religiosity, although this is mediated by whether or not they consider themselves affiliated to a religious denomination.

## Conclusion and discussion

With this study, we addressed (1) the association between ethnic segregation and religiosity among ethnic minorities and ethnic Belgians, (2) intergenerational differences in religiosity among ethnic minorities and (3) the role of ethnic segregation for intergenerational differences. We applied social integration theory and structural opportunities theory on adolescent religiosity of ethnic minorities and ethnic Belgians in Flemish schools by performing cross-classified linear three-level models on 3,612 adolescents from 48 different ethnic origins in 55 different secondary schools. From these analyses, we draw two important conclusions.

First, we found that adolescents in schools with a higher share of ethnic minorities tend to be more religious. This finding is comparable to previous research in the U.S. (Regnerus, Smith and Smith 2004; Barrett et al. 2007), in that the religious make-up of schools is associated with their pupils' religiosity. Previous research already reported that ethnic residential segregation is associated with higher religiosity among Muslims in Western Europe (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Next to residential segregation, ethnic school segregation might also create a bubble of higher religiosity and form an environment in which religiosity flourishes, in an otherwise relatively secularized society (Norris and Inglehart 2004). However, this association between ethnic school composition and religiosity is not limited to ethnic minorities. Ethnic school composition also affects ethnic Belgians' religiosity, although this association depends upon their religious affiliation. Among Catholic affiliated pupils, attending a school with a higher share of ethnic minorities is associated with a higher religiosity, while the opposite is true for non-affiliated ethnic Belgians. The ethnic school composition might create more salient religious fields within schools, which could affect the whole school, regardless of the specific denomination adolescents affiliate with. Confronted with a relatively religious school population, non-affiliated adolescents might avert themselves even more from religiosity.

Second, the intergenerational differences in religiosity among ethnic minority adolescents in secondary schools reveal more intricate patterns than previously reported. Among first and second generation migrant adolescents, levels of religiosity do differ from that of the ethnic majority, but only in schools in which ethnic minorities are the numerical majority. Previous studies found a conformism among immigrants to levels of ethnic majority religiosity and that this conformism was more pronounced among second generation migrants than among first



(Alanezi and Sherkat 2008; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). For third generation migrants, we found no difference in religiosity compared to ethnic Belgians, regardless of the ethnic school composition. This is in line with previous research in the US, where it was found that by the third generation, ethnic minorities showed no difference in religiosity compared to the ethnic majority (Stark 1997). The results for the second generation might indicate the importance of the ethnic school composition: although clear intergenerational differences have been found among adults, ethnic minority dominated schools might serve as a sort of microcosm in which religion flourishes. Previous research among Muslims in Western Europe reported that ethnic residential segregation is associated with higher religiosity (Voas and Fleischmann 2013). Apart from residential segregation, ethnic school segregation might therefore also reinforce ethnic minority religiosity by limiting contact with, generally less religious, ethnic majority peers. When these interactions increase at later age, this might lead to more conformism among ethnic minorities during adult life, as previously reported. Further research could examine this thesis by examining longitudinal data and examining how religiosity develops from adolescence into adult life.

One of the major limitations of this research are possible selection effects, meaning that schools might be selected by parents and students based on religious preferences. Given the free choice of schools in Belgium (Agirdag, Van Houtte and Van Avermaet 2011), adolescents and parents who attribute more importance to religiosity may therefore chose schools with a higher proportion of co-ethnics and co-religionists, as previous research in the Netherlands has shown (Maliepaard and Lubbers 2012). A Flemish study confirms that 60% of the parents take the religious affiliation of a secondary school into account (Creten et al. 2000). However, in Flanders this equates to a choice between Catholic versus public schools, where the first have a better reputation than the second. There is the idea that Catholic schools provide the best education, are strict and give your child the best chances to succeed in higher education. As a consequence, many parents do not choose a Catholic school based on religious preferences, but because of their quality perceptions. Moreover, it would be especially unlikely for more religious Catholic ethnic Belgian pupils to select ethnic minority-dominated schools, which are generally populated by Muslim pupils. Yet, we found that religious Catholic ethnic Belgian pupils in ethnic minority-dominated schools tend to be more religious. Previous research in the U.S. has indicated that attending schools with peers who are more religious has an effect on students' religiosity, after taking into account prior levels of religiosity (Barrett et al. 2007). Therefore, we can expect that, even if selection of schools on religious grounds happens among ethnic minorities, this is likely to ultimately reinforce religiosity among all adolescents in those schools, ethnic Belgian and minorities. Further research could test this prediction by using longitudinal data.

A second limitation to this research is that we were unable to fully disentangle religious school segregation from other forms of school segregation, such as ethnic and socio-economic

segregation. Given that religious, ethnic and socio-economic segregation are largely intertwined in Flemish schools, we were unable to distinguish between the influence of for instance ethnic and religious school segregation. However, this interwoven pattern of school segregation is the specific school context in which most of ethnic minority adolescents in Western Europe are socialized. As already indicated, it is exactly this pattern which possibly creates a bubble in which groups of ethnic minority adolescents grow up in Western European countries. Disentangling the different aspects of this environment may be more a theoretical discussion than an analysis of the sociological processes present in this environment.

Third, due to the nature of the dataset, we were unable to examine multiple dimensions of religiosity among ethnic minority adolescents. Most scholars agree that religiosity is a multi-dimensional concept, which entails among others religious affiliation, religious commitment and religious practice. In this paper, we only focused on religious commitment. Further research would do well to analyze other dimensions of religiosity as well, as previous research has indicated that religiosity might differ according to the dimension focused upon (Davie 1990).

In sum, this study gives a unique insight in how religious patterns differ according to the ethnic composition of the school. First, a higher percentage of ethnic minority students is not only associated with more religious fervor among ethnic minority students, but also among Catholic students of Belgian descent. Second, no differences can be found between first and second generation ethnic minority students and ethnic Belgian students in terms of religiosity in schools with few ethnic minority students, while in schools with almost exclusively minority students, significant differences can be found between these two groups of students. Hence, this study shows that religious fervor is an outcome worthwhile discussing in relation to ethnic segregation in school.



## Diverging contexts

### Intergenerational differences in migrant religiosity at both sides of the Atlantic

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*Despite growing attention, there is little knowledge of the intergenerational difference in religiosity among migrants living in different contexts. In this paper, we examine how contextual religiosity, immigrant receptivity and immigrant transnationalism affect the intergenerational gap in religiosity among migrants in Europe, the US and Canada. We analyzed religious affiliation and frequency of praying among 45,099 migrants. The results indicate that second generation migrants' religiosity aligns with native religiosity, while immigrant receptivity and the immigrant transnationalism framework are less successful in explaining intergenerational differences in religious affiliation. The transmission of praying is less dependent on the context than religious affiliation.*

## Introduction

With recent reports in the US, Canada and Europe on Muslim immigrants who join violent extremist groups in Syria and Iraq (Public Safety Canada 2014; Pew Research Center 2014), the religion of immigrants in the Western World has reached the top of the public agenda again. Europe has witnessed an increase in ethnic and religious diversity since the large-scale immigration from Muslim countries took off after the Second World War (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). In the US and Canada, on the other hand, the religious and ethnic diversity has also increased to new heights, due to the rise of Latin American and Asian immigration (Menjívar 1999; Ellison and McFarland 2013). This increasing ethnic and religious diversity at both sides of the Atlantic make research on migrant religiosity highly relevant for current public policy.

Over the last years, scholars have also devoted renewed attention to immigrant religiosity (Cadge and Ecklund 2007). Studies on the US, Canada and Europe have tackled such diverse issues as the influence of religion on migration decisions (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003), the influence of

migration on religiosity (Connor 2008; Massey and Higgins 2011; Van Tubergen 2013), religious integration processes among migrants (Van Tubergen 2006; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013) and the influence of religiosity on the socio-economic integration (Connor and Koenig 2013) or mental health (Connor 2010b). Findings show that religion plays an important role in migration decisions and adapting to live in a new society, in terms of overall integration and the mental well-being of individuals. Given these interrelations, the academic literature would certainly benefit from a better understanding of immigrant religiosity as well.

Little is known, however, about how religion evolves from one generation to the next among immigrant groups. Reviewing evidence on both sides of the Atlantic demonstrates that previous research is inconclusive when it comes to intergenerational differences in religiosity (Cadge and Ecklund 2007). In the US, second and third generation migrants report higher levels of religious participation than first generation migrants (Stark 1997; Alanezi and Sherkat 2008). Second generation Korean-Canadians also report higher levels of religiosity than their first generation counterparts (Cleveland and Chang 2009). In Europe on the other hand, both a religious decline (Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2010; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013) and religious stability have been reported (Jacob and Kalter 2013). The increased religious diversity which resulted from immigration to the West, is affected by the intergenerational transmission of religiosity. If immigrant communities are successful in transmitting religiosity from the first to subsequent generations, religious changes across generations will be limited. Second generation migrants often feel that they have to strike a balance, however, between parental and homeland religious identities on the one hand and host society religious identities on the other hand (Levitt 2009). This issue is more stringent for migrant communities that form religious minorities in the host society or that tend to deviate from general host society religious observance. The mixed findings of intergenerational differences across contexts might be a result of the religious climate in these contexts, which differs to a large extent between European countries, the US and Canada (Norris and Inglehart 2004). As yet, no study has conducted a cross-Atlantic comparative study to examine intergenerational differences in migrant religiosity, however.

Apart from the religious context, host societies' receptivity of immigrants might also determine to what degree immigrants strike a balance between home and host society religious cultures. The literature on transnationalism, however, argues that the role of individual nation states on immigrants' lives is declining and lives are lived to an increasing extent across borders (Levitt 2003). This literature stems from a globalist perspective on the waning role of the nation state (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999). In this view, immigrants' lives cannot be understood within the borders of either the sending or receiving countries. Immigrants' religious lives are enacted in both sending and receiving societies, through regular contacts with families, friends and religious institutions at both sides. Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) have criticized this approach, however, arguing that the transnationalist approach neglects the crucial impact nation

states may have on the transnational lives of immigrants. The authors argue that cross-border movements, as well as enduring connections between communities in both countries are subject to political constraints. Transnational activity and host society policy towards immigrants are therefore considered like two sides of the same medal. Hence, both sustained contacts with the sending society and receiving society immigrant receptivity might impact upon the religious observance of first and second generation immigrants. Although previous research has found an effect of immigrant receptivity on Muslim religiosity (Connor 2010a), no study has confronted this approach with a transnationalist framework.

In this paper, we want to contribute to the literature on immigrant religiosity by examining intergenerational differences in religiosity among first and second generations in the US, Canada and Europe. After determining whether these differences vary across national contexts, we assess whether these differences can be explained by (1) the religious context and (2) receiving societies' immigrant receptivity and (3) transnational social fields. The central proposition is that second generation migrants tend to integrate into the religious culture of the destination country more than first generation migrants, although this path may be moderated by the legal and social immigrant receptivity and the transnational social fields of migrant communities. We use data from US's General Social Survey (GSS), Canada's Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS) and Europe's European Social Survey (ESS) and examine the effects on religious affiliation and the frequency of praying.

## Theory and hypotheses

### Intergenerational differences and the religious context

As already indicated, previous findings on intergenerational differences in migrant religiosity have been mixed. Differences in migrant religiosity are often explained with Durkheim's (1986 [1897]) social integration theory, which states that people conform to the norms and values of the group in which they are socially integrated. Social integration theory predicts that migrants conform more to the dominant norms and values in that society if they are more integrated, i.e. have more interactions with host society natives. Previous studies indeed found that first and second generation migrants tend to conform to levels of religiosity among non-migrants in the host society: the higher the religiosity among natives, the higher the religiosity among migrants (Van Tubergen 2006; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Although integration or assimilation are not linear processes, scholars agree that they span different generations (Alba and Nee 1997). Due to primary socialization in the host society, later generations are expected to have higher rates of integration and thus higher levels of conforming to native religiosity. These

differences have been found in previous research: second generation immigrants are closer to non-migrant political attitudes than their first generation counterparts (Maxwell 2010).

Given that immigrants tend to conform to the norms and values of the host society, the religious context of that society might determine in which direction second generation migrant religiosity deviates from first generation religiosity. A cross-Atlantic comparison makes for an interesting case study to examine the impact of the religious context. It has repeatedly been demonstrated that both affiliation and rates of religious behavior are much higher in the US than in Europe (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Canada, on the other hand, is somewhere in between the US and Europe (Lindsay 2008). Although the debate whether this is the causal mechanism behind these differences is still open (Norris and Inglehart 2004), another major distinction between Europe and the US is the religious plurality. Whereas most European countries are characterized by one dominant, often state-regulated if not state-sponsored, denomination, the US is much more religiously plural, with several denominations and a focus on voluntary membership. Based on economic theory, the situation in the US has been compared to a competitive religious market, whereas most European countries resemble a religious monopoly (Iannaccone 1991). Immigrants at both sides of the Atlantic face either a vital religious market with strong competition and high levels of affiliation and religious observance, or countries with only one denomination, with mostly nominal members who rarely participate. According to social integration theory, migrants will conform to either of these diverging religious fields.

The divergent intergenerational trajectories at both sides of the Atlantic, might therefore be explained by these differences between the religious contexts. Stark (1997) already found that although German immigrants to the US had lower rates of religiosity than other Americans, by the third generation they had caught up and displayed levels comparable to the rest of the host society. The same logic can be applied to the European context, where immigrants often display higher levels of religiosity than the rest of the host society and where a lower religiosity among second generation migrants has been reported (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Although the thesis of religious integration towards the level of natives in the host society has been put forward in both contexts separately, it has not been put to the test. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

*The intergenerational difference in religiosity varies according to the destination context (H1). These differences can be explained by the religiosity of the context: the higher native religiosity, the lower the intergenerational difference (H2).*

## Immigrant receptivity

Since the nineties of the last century, the buzzword in the literature on migrant religiosity has been religious transnationalism (Levitt 2003). Scholars of immigrant transnationalism argue that the global capitalist system has given rise to a new phenomenon of migration: migrants



who live in several societies simultaneously (Glick-Schiller, Bash and Szanton-Blanc 1992; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999). These scholars examine how migrants “[make] a living through continuous regular contact across national borders” (Portes et al. 1999: 218). Improvements in international transport and communication have simplified the process and reduced the costs of travelling between origin and destination countries, as well as to maintain other forms of homeland ties on a day-to-day basis, for instance through telephone and internet or by sending financial and material remittances. Although these cross-border ties are as old as migration itself, transnationalist scholars argue that the intensity increased to such a degree that transnationalism can be described as a distinct social field (Portes et al. 1999). Transmigrants are migrants of a new era, for whom national borders are increasingly permeable (Glick-Schiller, Basch and Szanton-Blanc 1995). Religious transnationalism of immigrants can entail, for instance, long-distance memberships in home-country religious organizations and taking part in worshipping or other events when visiting the home country, or being a member of transnationally organized denominations (Levitt 2004). Although studies on transnational religiosity among migrants originate predominantly from the US, previous studies have found a similar phenomenon among second generation Muslim migrants in Europe, in that they tend to rally to a transnational Islamic identity, stripped from all local and cultural aspects (Voas and Fleischmann 2012).

This view has been criticized on a number of points (Mouw et al. 2014). Some studies demonstrated that transnational activities may be rather limited (Dahinden 2005, Waldinger 2008). Only a small proportion of the migrant population engages in regular transnational activity and it tends to decline with a better integration in the host society and across generations (Fokkema et al. 2012; Mouw et al. 2014). From a more theoretical point of view, Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) argue that transnationalist scholars assume what they try to explain: the construction of a social field across borders. Establishing this social field is, however, subject to state control: nation states constrain or enable cross-border movement and contact. In the first place, states regulate external borders, i.e. they decide who enters and who leaves. At later stages, states’ also determine internal borders, i.e. citizenship acquisition regulations. Citizenship regulations determine who can become a full member of the receiving society. Apart from limiting the opportunities for integration, these membership regulations might also incite feelings of rejection and disadvantage, thus increasing symbolic ethnic boundaries (Foner and Alba 2008). In order to attenuate the negative consequences of discrimination, immigrants have a tendency to reinforce their ethnic identity, a phenomenon which is called ‘reactive ethnicity’ (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Muslims in Europe indeed have this tendency to increase the identification with the own ethnic and religious group (Fleischmann, Phalet and Klein 2011). Hence, more welcoming policies towards immigrant incorporation will speed up the social and religious integration of immigrants.

The 'reactive ethnicity' phenomenon would mean that second generation migrants rally to the own ethnic group, resulting in conforming more to first generation migrants' religiosity, hence reducing the intergenerational difference. Previous research has shown that discrimination can have a stronger effect on second generation migrants and migrants who feel more integrated, leading to lower perceptions of acceptance in the destination society (ten Teije, Coenders and Verkuyten 2013). Second generation migrants often feel unaccepted in both origin and destination society and feel 'in-between' both cultures (Foner and Alba 2008). For them, religiosity can often transcend ethnic cultures and thus form a positive identity, detached from their contested ethnic backgrounds. This phenomenon has been found among second generation Muslims in Europe, who focus on a 'pure' form of Islam, stripped from all local and cultural influences (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Given this effect of perceived rejection by the host society, we predict that:

*The intergenerational difference in religiosity will be greater in countries with more receptive policy towards immigrants (H3).*

Social closure is not the exclusive terrain of nation states, however. Although nation states' regulations are probably the first gatekeeper for immigrants' incorporation into society, social closure is also enacted by regular contact with natives in the host society. Although in most cases exclusion and discrimination is restricted by legislation and policy, discrimination on racial and ethnic grounds is repeatedly reported at both sides of the Atlantic (Pew Research Center 2013; Eurobarometer 2008). Previous studies indeed found a 'reactive religiosity'-effect: first and second generation migrants in Europe tend to report higher levels of religious beliefs and participation if they perceive group discrimination (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Therefore, the social receptivity context might also exert an influence on the religious integration of individuals, over and above the influence of state receptivity. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

*The intergenerational difference in religiosity will be greater in countries with a more receptive social climate towards immigrants (H4).*

## Transnationalism

Transnationalism can also affect the intergenerational differences in religiosity, given its effect on the integration into the host society. Assimilation and transnationalism seem to be antithetic, given that the former presumes the disappearance of ethnic differences and the latter the maintaining of homeland associations. Host societies often doubt the loyalty of immigrants who live their lives both 'here' and 'there'. Assimilation into the host society is therefore often understood as a political reorientation to the receiving society, while discarding loyalties to the sending society (Waldinger 2008). Creating opportunities or constraints for migrant incorporation, is hence also a process of nation-state building in determining who is assimilated and thus a full member of the receiving society (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Although

transnational actions can sometimes foster integration in the host society (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003; Pantoja 2005; Waldinger 2012; Mouw et al. 2014), socio-cultural integration seems to be negatively related to transnationalism: the higher the integration, the less transnational activity among second generation immigrants in European and American cities (Fokkema et al. 2012). Sustained home-country contact might be caused by a lower socio-cultural integration, while at the same time preventing this form of integration. Therefore, it can be expected that the socio-cultural integration of immigrants living in communities that display higher levels of transnational activity will be lower. Although less common than among the first generation, transnational activity does play a role in the lives of the second generation (Fokkema et al. 2012). Second generation migrants often feel that they have to strike a balance between conforming to the competing sending society identities and receiving society identities (Levitt 2009). Higher levels of transnational activity can thus reduce the opportunities for integration into the host society. Therefore, it can be expected that in transnationally active communities, the difference in religiosity between first and second generation migrants will be lower. Hence, we hypothesize that:

*The intergenerational difference in religiosity will be greater for migrants living in communities with less transnational activity (H5).*

## Data and methods

We selected datasets for Europe, the United States and Canada based on two criteria. The data had to be gathered from the year 2000 onwards and the surveys had to contain representative data on first and second generation migrants. For Europe, we selected the European Social Survey (ESS). The European Social Survey is an ongoing biannual survey conducted in around 30 European countries each wave. At the moment of writing, data on six waves of the ESS are available since 2002 onwards. We selected waves 2-5 (2004-2010), given that the information on the origin of second generation migrants was not available at the national level in the first wave. In total, these four waves contain data on 170,485 individuals living in Europe. For the United States, we selected the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS is also a biannual survey, conducting representative surveys of the American population. At the moment of writing, data up until 2012 is available. Therefore, we selected seven waves of the GSS (2000-2012). These seven waves comprise information on 18,945 individuals. For Canada, we selected the Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS). This survey was designed to oversample ethnic minorities living in Canada in 2002. Although this means that the EDS has not sampled representative data, the survey contains data on ethnic Canadians and contain weights based on ethnicity which allow the data to be weighed representatively. The public version of the EDS contains data on 41,695 individuals. The total dataset thus comprises 231,125 individuals from Europe, the United States

and Canada. After listwise deletion of the missing cases on the variables in our analyses and the selection of first and second generation migrants, we retain 45,099 cases. Data in the analyses have been weighted at the individual level with the weights provided in the datasets to establish the representativity of the data.

In the ESS, questionnaires were available in the official language(s) of the countries in which they were administered. The GSS questionnaires were, apart from English, also available in Spanish and in the EDS, interviews have been administered in English, French, Mandarin, Cantonese, Italian, Punjabi, Portuguese, Vietnamese and Spanish. This means that ethnic minorities who did not master an official language or one of the additional questionnaire languages were not likely, or less likely interviewed, resulting in a sampling bias towards higher educated and better integrated migrants. The effects of this bias have been reduced in the analyses by controlling for educational level, employment status and origin, and additionally for a variable indicating whether the interview has been conducted in an official language or not. For intergenerational differences in religiosity, however, this implies that we compare the more integrated groups of both generations, meaning that we possibly underestimate the difference between first and second generation migrants. These effects are therefore tested conservatively.

## Dependent variables

We examine two dependent variables: religious affiliation and frequency of praying. Although religious service attendance is a dimension of religiosity which is often examined in the sociology of religion, the measurement of the service attendance indicator has, contrary to the other indicators, proven to be cross-nationally inequivalent (Meuleman and Billiet 2011). For Muslim women, for whom service attendance is less common, the measure of service attendance is not reliable to measure differences in religiosity. Given that the religiosity of Muslims is an important part of immigrant religiosity in the West, we decided to retain Muslims in the sample and focus on religious affiliation and frequency of praying.

*Religious affiliation* is a dichotomous variable which measures whether an individual feels he or she belongs to a certain religious belief or denomination. Respondents who indicated that they are affiliated to a certain religion or denomination received a score of 1, others a 0.

*Praying* is also a dichotomous variable. Respondents were asked to indicate how often they prayed. Responses were recorded on different scales in the three different surveys but were recoded to be comparable across surveys. In the EDS, this question was only asked to those respondents who indicated that they are affiliated to a denomination. Therefore, we restrict analyses on this dependent variables in all other datasets to respondents who indicated that they are affiliated as well. This means that the sample size for analyses of frequency of praying are somewhat lower. Respondents who indicated that they prayed at least once a week or more often received a score of 1, those who prayed less frequently a score of 0.

## Independent variables

At the individual level, our main variable of interest is migrant generation, as this measures the difference between migrant generations. The variable migrant generation has two categories, i.e. 'first generation' and 'second generation'. These variable was constructed based on the questions on the birth place of respondents and their parents' birthplace. Respondents who were born in the country of the survey with both parents born there as well, were considered natives. Respondents who were not born in the country of the survey were considered first generation migrants. Second generation migrants, are respondents who were born in the country of the survey but whom had at least one parent who was not. In the analyses, natives will form the reference category.

At the individual level, we control for *sex*, *age*, *education*, *employment status* and *questionnaire language*. *Sex* is a dichotomous variable, with a score of 1 for women and a score of 0 for men. *Age* is a metric variable, measuring the age in full years. *Education* is a metric variable, measuring the years of full-time education respondents have completed. For the EDS, which only contained information on the attained educational level, we assigned each individual the minimum number of years needed to attain their educational level, based on UNESCO data. After this process, the distribution of years of education was similar to that of the European and American sample. *Employment status* is again a dichotomous variable, indicating whether individuals were employed or not at the time of the interview. Individuals who had a full-time or part-time job received a score of 1, others a score of 0. *Questionnaire language* is a dichotomous variable which indicates whether the interview was taken in a non-official language of the country where it has been taken, i.e. Spanish in the GSS or Mandarin, Cantonese, Italian, Punjabi, Portuguese, Vietnamese or Spanish in the EDS. Respondents who did use a different language received a score of 1, those who took the interview in an official language a score of 0.

Given that certain denominations have different prescriptions on the frequency of praying, we control for religious *denomination* in the analysis of frequency of praying. *Denomination* is a categorical variable with six categories, i.e. Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Jewish, Islam and Other. This variable was based on self-identification by respondents who indicated that they are affiliated to a certain denomination. Categorization of respondents into these categories was based on the ESS, which had the least detailed answer categories of the three surveys under study.

At the contextual level, we discern destination-country variables on the one hand and one ethnic community variable on the other hand.

*Native affiliation* is a metric variable, measuring the percentage of natives who indicate that they are affiliated to a religious denomination. This variable was constructed by aggregating the dichotomous dependent variable of affiliation, for all natives in each destination country



separately. This means that the variable has a range of 0 to 1, with 0 indicating that none of the natives are affiliated to a religious denomination and a score of 1 indicating that all natives in that certain country are affiliated to a religious denomination. The actual percentages range from 15.6% (Estonia) to 98.9% (Cyprus).

*Native praying* is a metric variable, measuring the percentage of natives who indicate that they pray at least once a week or more often. This variable has been constructed in two steps. First, we calculated the percentage of natives who pray once a week or more often, based on the dependent variable praying, analogously to native affiliation. This percentage, however, indicates the percentage who prays frequently for each country, among those who indicated that they have an affiliation. This percentage is, hence, a somewhat distorted measure of native religiosity: in countries with very few affiliated natives who pray with high frequency, this measure would indicate that country as highly religious. Therefore, in the second step, we multiplied this percentage with the percentage affiliated in each country. This variable therefore measures the percentage of the total population of natives who pray once a week or more often. The actual percentages range from 5.8% (Estonia) to 74% (United States).

*Policy receptivity* is a metric variable measuring destination countries' policy towards immigrants, based on the MIPEX, or Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX 2010). This is an index measuring integration policies in all European Union Member states and some other Western European countries. It thus includes data on most European countries, Canada and the US. The index compares legal frameworks to promote migrant integration on seven policy areas: labour market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination. This results in an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating more welcoming policies towards immigrants. The actual scores range from 24 (Turkey) to 83 (Sweden). The index has been calculated two times, once in 2007 and once in 2010. Given that data on the US is only available for 2010, we used the 2010 index in our analyses.

*Social receptivity* is a metric variable measuring how welcoming natives are towards immigrants. This variable has been calculated by aggregating data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study (WVS/EVS). For the destination countries under study, we examined the data of the fifth wave of the WVS (2005-2006) and the fourth wave of the EVS (2008). For each country separately, we calculated the percentage of natives who indicated that they would not like to have an immigrant or a foreign worker as a neighbor. To be in line with the indicator of policy receptivity, we subsequently reverse-coded this variable, meaning that the variable now indicates the percentage of natives who did not dislike immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors. The actual scores range from 64.6% (Estonia) to 97% (Canada).

*Remittances* is a metric variable measuring the amount of financial remittances sent each year. This variable has been calculated at the ethnic community level, meaning that each ethnic group

in each destination country has a different value. Data on financial remittances were retrieved from the World Bank (Ratha and Shaw 2007). They calculated bilateral financial remittance flows, meaning an overview of ingoing and outgoing flows from and to each country, from 2010 onwards. We used the data on 2010 and linked the flows according to ethnic background, meaning that Vietnamese migrants in the US were given the figure of outflows from the US to Vietnam. The variable is expressed in millions of US dollars and they have a range from 0, for some small communities, to 21,693.4 million US dollars for the Mexican community in the US.

## Method


Based on the sampling methods and hypotheses, we discern four different levels. First of all, at the individual level, we have (1) first and second generation migrants. These are nested in (2) ethnic communities, (3) destination countries and (4) origin countries. The destination countries consist of the different countries where the surveys have been conducted. In total, we have information on 28 different destination countries. Origin countries on the other hand, are based on the information on ethnic origin in each survey. In the ESS, data at the national level was available. Therefore, we nested respondents in the ESS in their country of birth for first generation migrants, or the country of birth of their father for second generation migrants. If the father was born in the country of the survey, respondents were nested in their mother's birth country. In the GSS and EDS on the other hand, respondents were asked what their ethnic origin is. Answers were recorded in a mix of both individual countries, as well as broader geographical regions. Respondents were nested in these origins. For some individual countries, there is therefore an overlap between the ESS, GSS, and EDS, while broader ethnic groups were further harmonized between GSS and EDS. In total, we discern 187 different ethnic origins. Finally, we also have a level which combines the information on both origin and destination: the community level. Migrants are nested in these according to each combination of origin and destination countries, for instance Mexicans in the US or Italians in Canada. We discern 1,414 different ethnic communities in our data. Given this nesting, multilevel models are the most appropriate estimation methods to test our hypotheses. Figure 1 illustrates the different levels in our analyses. The range of cases and the mean per higher-level unit can be found at the bottom of table 8.1.

We present three different models for each dependent variable. In the first model, we include all individual and contextual variables, except for remittances, and a random slope of the intergenerational difference across destination countries. Given that we cannot assign remittance-values to larger ethnic groups in the GSS and EDS, we only add remittances in the last model, as this reduces the sample size drastically. In the second model, we test how the context affects the intergenerational difference in religiosity among immigrants. Therefore, we add interactions between the intergenerational difference and the contextual effects of native religiosity, policy



receptivity and social receptivity. In the third and final model, we include both a main effect of remittances and in interaction with the intergenerational difference in religiosity. Cases in the analyses have been weighted at the individual level and all metric variables have been grand-mean centered. The remittances-variable has been standardized to make the scale of the variable more comparable to the other variables in the analyses. The data have been processed using R and analyzed using the lme4 package (Bates et al. 2014). Given that the dependent variables in our analyses are dichotomous, we fitted logistic generalized linear models.

*Figure 8.1: Analyses strategy*



## Results

The descriptive statistics are depicted in table 8.1. We notice that first and second generation migrants resemble natives more on religious affiliation than on frequency of praying. With 70.8% and 71.2% affiliation among respectively natives and migrants, there is virtually no difference between natives and migrants in terms of religious affiliation. These general differences obfuscate cross-national divergences, however, as can be noticed from table 8.2, which contains the levels of religiosity for natives, first generation migrants, second generation migrants and the intergenerational difference by country. Canada and the US are indeed among the most religious countries, although some European countries tend to have relatively high levels of affiliation as well. Similar differences can be found for first and second generation migrants respectively. Consequently, there is considerable variation in the intergenerational difference in religiosity as well: in most countries, second generation migrants tend to be less religious than first generation migrants. Interestingly, we find that there is a strong positive correlation (0.798;

$t=6.761$ ;  $df=26$ ;  $p<0.001$ ) between native religiosity and the intergenerational gap: in countries where natives have high levels of religious affiliation, the negative difference between first and second generation migrants tends to be smaller. Indeed, in most countries, the percentages among natives are closer to those of second generation migrants than they are to first generation migrants. Similar levels of variation are found among natives and generations when it comes to praying once a week or more often. Among native respondents who indicated that they belong to a certain affiliation 24.5% pray at least weekly in Denmark, compared to 83.3% in the US. Again, we notice considerable variation in the intergenerational difference in religiosity among migrants across countries. The correlation between native frequency of praying and the intergenerational difference is insignificant, however ( $0.305$ ;  $t=1.633$ ;  $df=26$ ;  $p=0.115$ ). These findings underline the importance of studying the intergenerational gap in migrant religiosity from a cross-national perspective. We test our hypotheses based on the results of our cross-classified multilevel analyses displayed in tables 8.3 and 8.4. For each model we present the log odds, the standard errors, the variance components and the deviance.

With our first hypothesis, we predicted that the intergenerational difference in religiosity differs according to the destination context (H1). We test this hypothesis by looking at the random slope of second generation at the destination level in models 1 of table 8.3 and 8.4. We notice considerable variance at the random slope level for both affiliation and praying. Comparing these first models to the same model without a random slope and covariance indicates that adding a random slope to the model significantly improves the models of both affiliation ( $\chi^2=81.043$ ;  $df=2$ ;  $p<0.001$ ) and frequency of praying ( $\chi^2=33.828$ ;  $df=2$ ;  $p<0.001$ ). This means that there is a significant difference across countries in the difference between first and second generation migrants. Although model 1 indicates for both attendance and frequency of praying that second generation migrants tend to be less religious than first generation migrants, the random slope indicates that this difference is not universal across countries. We can therefore accept our first hypothesis. In what follows, we will assess how we can explain these cross-national divergence in intergenerational differences by looking at the interaction effects between the second generation and native religiosity, policy receptivity, social receptivity and remittances.

Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics

	Affiliation			Praying		
	Range	Ave./Freq.	SD/%	Range	Ave./Freq.	SD/%
Dependent						
No	0/1	12988	(28.8%)	0/1	13274	(42.5%)
Yes	0/1	32111	(71.2%)	0/1	17977	(57.5%)
Year	0-12	4.471	(3.077)	0-12	4.194	(3.041)
Seks						
Male	0/1	21048	(46.7%)	0/1	13965	(44.7%)
Female	0/1	24051	(53.3%)	0/1	17286	(55.3%)
Age	18-98	45.896	(18.243)	18-98	47.03	(18.729)
Education	0-40	13.599	(4.254)	0-40	13.493	(4.355)
Employed						
No	0/1	19894	(44.1%)	0/1	14310	(45.8%)
Yes	0/1	25205	(55.9%)	0/1	16941	(54.2%)
Questionnaire language						
Official	0/1	43767	(97.0%)	0/1	30270	(96.9%)
Minority	0/1	1332	( 3.0%)	0/1	981	( 3.1%)
Generation						
First	0/1	20991	(46.5%)	0/1	15149	(48.5%)
Second	0/1	24108	(53.5%)	0/1	16102	(51.5%)
Denomination						
Roman Catholic				0/1	13441	(43.0%)
Protestant				0/1	8618	(27.6%)
Eastern Orthodox				0/1	2694	( 8.6%)
Jewish				0/1	566	( 1.8%)
Islam				0/1	2237	( 7.2%)
Other				0/1	3695	(11.8%)
Native religiosity	0.156-0.989	0.708	(0.199)	0.058-0.74	0.392	(0.149)
Policy receptivity	35-83	63.722	(11.596)	35-83	64.666	(11.148)
Native receptivity	0.646-0.97	0.912	(0.088)	0.646-0.97	0.924	(0.077)
Remittances	0-21693.416	1107.012	(2944.337)	0-21693.416	1121.448	(3094.551)
N						
Destination	39-22462	28	(1610.679)	31-17923	28	(1116.107)
Origin	1-5875	187	(241.171)	1-4374	178	(175.567)
Community	1-5117	1414	(31.895)	1-3971	1188	(26.306)
Individual		45099			31251	

Table 8. 2: Mean religiosity for natives, first and second generation migrants and intergenerational difference by country

	Affiliation				Praying			
	Natives	1 <sup>st</sup> Gen.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Gen.	Intergen. gap	Natives	1 <sup>st</sup> Gen.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Gen.	Intergen. gap
Austria	71.8%	72.0%	67.2%	-4.8%	50.1%	61.6%	54.1%	-7.5%
Belgium	43.2%	62.0%	44.5%	-17.5%	46.6%	64.6%	48.9%	-15.7%
Bulgaria	79.7%	74.3%	82.2%	8.0%	25.1%	57.7%	32.1%	-25.6%
Canada	81.5%	81.9%	79.4%	-2.5%	48.2%	60.4%	51.9%	-8.5%
Croatia	80.1%	82.9%	76.4%	-6.5%	66.0%	78.8%	58.1%	-20.7%
Cyprus	98.9%	97.1%	100.0%	2.9%	67.1%	65.3%	64.5%	-0.8%
Czech Republic	25.8%	50.9%	23.3%	-27.6%	43.3%	55.2%	46.4%	-8.7%
Denmark	60.7%	65.6%	54.5%	-11.1%	24.5%	52.4%	37.3%	-15.0%
Estonia	15.6%	53.5%	30.0%	-23.5%	37.4%	36.1%	31.4%	-4.7%
Finland	64.7%	55.2%	57.5%	2.4%	43.9%	57.4%	57.1%	-0.3%
France	47.4%	64.1%	46.6%	-17.5%	35.6%	64.0%	38.3%	-25.7%
Germany	54.1%	70.8%	54.6%	-16.3%	42.3%	56.9%	45.0%	-11.9%
Greece	92.8%	84.9%	92.3%	7.4%	70.8%	70.5%	84.7%	14.1%
Hungary	60.3%	72.3%	60.9%	-11.4%	46.7%	44.7%	52.9%	8.2%
Ireland	83.6%	65.7%	73.7%	8.0%	77.9%	72.3%	70.9%	-1.4%
Italy	79.7%	82.4%	77.3%	-5.1%	61.3%	78.6%	41.2%	-37.4%
Luxembourg	74.6%	71.5%	65.3%	-6.2%	32.4%	46.8%	27.9%	-18.8%
Netherlands	41.6%	59.3%	37.3%	-21.9%	65.2%	70.4%	50.6%	-19.8%
Norway	53.5%	63.9%	46.2%	-17.7%	32.8%	49.3%	43.1%	-6.2%
Poland	92.0%	92.0%	86.9%	-5.1%	76.5%	87.0%	74.9%	-12.1%
Portugal	86.3%	83.7%	69.4%	-14.3%	67.9%	77.0%	63.9%	-13.1%
Slovakia	78.1%	61.6%	71.0%	9.4%	66.6%	60.4%	68.3%	8.0%
Slovenia	56.5%	50.2%	38.4%	-11.8%	43.6%	35.8%	40.5%	4.7%
Spain	72.1%	78.9%	61.3%	-17.6%	46.9%	65.0%	42.1%	-22.9%
Sweden	30.2%	42.1%	24.4%	-17.7%	34.5%	51.6%	28.8%	-22.8%
Switzerland	69.6%	68.5%	61.1%	-7.4%	57.7%	57.6%	51.8%	-5.8%
United Kingdom	45.8%	59.4%	35.7%	-23.7%	50.7%	77.1%	59.9%	-17.2%
United States	88.9%	85.3%	83.8%	-1.5%	83.3%	83.6%	82.3%	-1.3%
Total	70.8%	74.2%	68.6%	-5.6%	55.4%	62.0%	53.3%	-8.6%

Table 8. 3: Cross-classified multilevel models of affiliation

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)
Intercept	0.997***	(0.109)	0.962***	(0.104)	0.900***	(0.108)
<b>Individual</b>						
Year	0.013*	(0.007)	0.014*	(0.007)	0.014*	(0.007)
Female	0.355***	(0.027)	0.355***	(0.027)	0.381***	(0.029)
Age	0.016***	(0.001)	0.016***	(0.001)	0.016***	(0.001)
Education	-0.028***	(0.003)	-0.028***	(0.003)	-0.028***	(0.004)
Employed	-0.094***	(0.029)	-0.094**	(0.029)	-0.087**	(0.030)
Questionnaire language	-0.350***	(0.094)	-0.346***	(0.094)	-0.536***	(0.106)
Second generation	-0.303***	(0.089)	-0.248**	(0.076)	-0.196**	(0.073)
<b>Contextual</b>						
Native affiliation	3.851***	(0.357)	3.154***	(0.359)	3.145***	(0.347)
Policy receptivity	0.003	(0.006)	0.005	(0.007)	0.005	(0.007)
Social receptivity	-0.202	(0.864)	-0.107	(0.998)	-0.093	(0.966)
Remittances					0.018	(0.038)
<b>Interaction</b>						
Sec. Gen. * Native affiliation			1.211**	(0.376)	1.272***	(0.360)
Sec. Gen. * Policy receptivity			-0.005	(0.007)	-0.003	(0.007)
Sec. Gen. * Social receptivity			-0.212	(1.020)	-0.221	(0.970)
Sec. Gen. * Remittances					-0.068**	(0.021)
<b>Variance</b>						
Destination						
Intercept	0.117		0.085		0.072	
Second generation	0.158		0.089		0.074	
Covariance Intercept & Second generation	-0.095		-0.046		-0.039	
Origin	0.371		0.369		0.380	
Community	0.190		0.188		0.197	
Individual						
Deviance	35,610.5		35,599.4		31,578.7	

\* p &lt; 0,1; \* p &lt; 0,05; \*\* p &lt; 0,01; \*\*\* p &lt; 0,001 (two-sided)

Table 8. 4: Cross-classified multilevel models of praying

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)	Coef.	(S.E.)
Intercept	0.552 ***	(0.112)	0.561 ***	(0.109)	0.490 ***	(0.117)
<b>Individual</b>						
Year	-0.006	(0.009)	-0.007	(0.009)	-0.011	(0.009)
Female	0.664 ***	(0.030)	0.664 ***	(0.030)	0.707 ***	(0.033)
Age	0.017 ***	(0.001)	0.017 ***	(0.001)	0.017 ***	(0.001)
Education	-0.001	(0.004)	-0.001	(0.004)	-0.004	(0.004)
Employed	-0.138 ***	(0.032)	-0.138 ***	(0.032)	-0.123 ***	(0.035)
Questionnaire language	0.030	(0.093)	0.029	(0.093)	-0.221 *	(0.111)
Second generation	-0.267 **	(0.081)	-0.277 ***	(0.071)	-0.250 ***	(0.072)
Denomination						
Roman Catholic	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Protestant	-0.087 +	(0.046)	-0.081 +	(0.046)	-0.133 **	(0.049)
Eastern orthodox	-0.488 ***	(0.079)	-0.482 ***	(0.079)	-0.423 ***	(0.090)
Jewish	-0.990 ***	(0.141)	-0.987 ***	(0.141)	-1.092 ***	(0.164)
Islam	0.153 *	(0.077)	0.154 *	(0.077)	0.246 *	(0.101)
Other	0.326 ***	(0.059)	0.329 ***	(0.059)	0.423 ***	(0.068)
<b>Contextual</b>						
Native affiliation	3.047 ***	(0.255)	2.654 ***	(0.338)	2.760 ***	(0.354)
Policy receptivity	0.000	(0.004)	0.005	(0.006)	0.005	(0.006)
Social receptivity	-0.618	(0.663)	0.314	(0.902)	0.457	(0.942)
Remittances					0.038	(0.030)
<b>Interaction</b>						
Sec. Gen. * Native praying			0.590 +	(0.349)	0.490	(0.357)
Sec. Gen. * Policy receptivity			-0.008	(0.006)	-0.008	(0.006)
Sec. Gen. * Social receptivity			-1.320	(0.896)	-1.284	(0.894)
Sec. Gen. * Remittances					-0.024	(0.021)
<b>Variance</b>						
Destination						
Intercept	0.098		0.073		0.081	
Second generation	0.111		0.062		0.058	
Covariance Intercept & Second generation	-0.090		-0.056		-0.048	
Origin	0.289		0.288		0.257	
Community	0.065		0.065		0.036	
Individual						
Deviance	28,378.8		28,369.8		23,821.1	

+ p &lt; 0,1; \* p &lt; 0,05; \*\* p &lt; 0,01; \*\*\* p &lt; 0,001 (two-sided).

With our second hypothesis, we predicted that the intergenerational difference would be smaller in countries where religiosity would be higher (H2). We therefore look at the interaction effect between native religiosity and second generation. From the second model in table 8.3 we notice that we found a significant negative main effect and a significant positive interaction effect. We can compare the predicted intergenerational differences across countries by calculating the difference for the least and most religious country, respectively Estonia and Cyprus. When we fill in these countries' levels of native religiosity into the equation, we notice that the predicted intergenerational difference for Estonia is strongly negative with  $-0.874$ , and slightly positive for Cyprus, with  $0.135$ . This means that in the most religious countries, there tends to be a small increase in religious affiliation across generations, while there is a strong decrease across generations in the least religious countries. These results seem to support social integration theory. We find less support for the effect on frequency of praying, given that the interaction effect is only marginally significant. This means that the intergenerational gap is not related to natives' religiosity across countries. We can hence conclude that we have found only partial support for our second hypothesis.

With our third hypothesis, we predicted that the intergenerational gap across countries would be related to policy receptivity towards immigrants (H3). To test this hypothesis, we look at the interaction effects of the MIPEX-index of policy receptivity with the slope for second generation, in model 2 of tables 8.3 and 8.4. The interaction effects in both models are insignificant. This means that the intergenerational gap in religiosity cannot be explained by policy receptivity towards immigrants. We therefore reject our third hypothesis.

The fourth hypothesis predicted that the intergenerational difference would also be affected by the social receptivity of the context where migrants live (H4). This hypothesis can be tested by looking at the interaction effect between second generation and social receptivity. We notice from model 2 in tables 8.3 and 8.4 that this coefficient is also insignificant for both dependent variables, meaning that social receptivity does not affect the cross-national differences in the intergenerational gap. Therefore, we have to reject this hypothesis again.

With our fifth and final hypothesis, we predicted that the intergenerational gap would be smaller for migrants living in ethnic communities with more transnational activity (H5). We test this hypothesis by looking at the interaction effect between remittance flows and second generation in the third model of tables 8.3 and 8.4. We notice a significant negative interaction effect, and a significant negative main effect of second generation. When we solve the equation for communities with no remittance flows, and the community with the highest flow of remittances, i.e. Mexicans in the US, we notice that our hypothesis is not supported by the results. On the contrary, for migrants in communities with more remittance flows, the intergenerational gap is even larger than for those: for Mexicans in the US the predicted gap is  $-1.184$ , while it is only  $-0.185$  for migrants living in communities with no remittance flows. This contradicts our fifth



hypothesis. More counterevidence is found in the analysis of frequency of praying: we find an insignificant interaction effect of remittance flows. This means that we can therefore also reject our fifth and final hypothesis.

## Conclusion and discussion

With this paper we shed light on intergenerational differences in religiosity among immigrants and how these diverge in different contexts. We extended previous research in Europe by broadening the scope to the Canadian and American context. We examined if the fundamentally different religious context affects the intergenerational religiosity gap differently. We also assessed the influence of immigrant transnationalism on migrant religiosity, while integrating the criticisms on this perspective. These theories were tested on data of the European Social Survey, the Canadian Ethnic Diversity Survey and the American General Social Survey, containing 20,991 first and 24,108 second generation migrants in total. We applied cross-classified logistic multilevel models. The results of these analyses lead to two interesting conclusions.

First, we found substantial cross-national variation in the intergenerational gap in both rates of affiliation and frequency of praying. The place where immigrants live determines whether the second generation will be more, evenly or less religious than the first generation. Intergenerational differences in rates of affiliation can be explained to a certain extent by taking the religious context of the host society into account. Second generation migrants conform more to the religiosity of the host society than the first generation migrants. This means that disaffiliation across migrant generations occurs in less religious countries and that there is virtually no disaffiliation or even higher levels of affiliation than the first generation in highly religious countries. These findings not only support social integration theory, they also confirm the direction of intergenerational religious integration which had been hypothesized in previous research (Stark 1997; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Among those who are affiliated, the intergenerational gap in praying could not be explained by the religious climate where immigrants live, however. Previous research already indicated that the transmission of praying and service attendance from first to second generation migrants is more successful than the transmission of religious beliefs (van de Pol and Van Tubergen 2013; Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013). Those who remain affiliated also tend to remain religiously active in their denominations. Religious behavior among immigrants thus seems to be transmitted successfully, while religious beliefs and rates of affiliation are less shared across generations. The European pattern of low levels of affiliation seems to be replicated among second generation migrants. Whether this means that in the long term, migrants might be moving towards a situation of 'believing without belonging' (Davie 1990) in analogy with the rest of Europe, remains the subject of further research.

Second, although both the original theories of transnationalism and their critics have spurred new and exciting insights into migration scholarship, applying these theories to migrant religiosity research is less successful. Transnational activity, in the form of remittance sending does not decrease the intergenerational gap in religious affiliation, but rather increases it, and it has no effect on frequency of praying. Our results therefore contradict previous research which found that transnational activity had a negative effect on socio-cultural integration (Fokkema et al. 2012). The alternative perspective which argues for looking at the effect of nation states does not perform better, however. A more receptive context for immigrants does not increase intergenerational differences in religiosity. This also contradicts previous research, which found that Muslims in Europe are more religious in less welcoming contexts (Connor 2010a). The question whether transnationalism affects the immigrant community as a whole, and especially the second generation, could therefore be raised. This is a substantial question, related to previous findings that transnational activity is limited to a small subgroup of the migrant community (Waldinger 2008). At the same time, this is also a methodological question, pertaining to the measurement of transnational activity at either the group level or the individual level (Mouw et al. 2014). This might apply to the criticisms on the transnationalist literature as well: feelings of rejection might only matter for those who come into contact with state-enforced boundaries for immigrants or for those who perceive discrimination themselves. From our study, we remember that national-level receptivity and community-level transnational activity does not affect the intergenerational gap in religiosity.

As with any research, this paper is subject to limitations. First, as already mentioned, we had to rely on a group-measurement of transnational activity, meaning that we look at the level of transnational activity of a group as a whole, rather than measuring respondents' own transnational behavior (Mouw et al. 2014). Further research could therefore improve on this research by taking into account individual-level information on transnational behavior. Given the often limited scope of transnational activity, this might shed more light on the link between transnationalism and migrant religiosity. Second, due to data limitations, we had to restrict the analysis to rates of affiliation and frequency of praying. This means that religious beliefs, other types of religious behavior and other aspects of religiosity have been neglected. Moreover, as the field of sociology of religion suffers from 'Christocentrism' (Cadge, Levitt and Smilde 2011), it is not quite clear how well our current surveys measure various manifestations of religiosity. Therefore, adding more detailed questions to large-scale surveys could certainly improve our understanding of migrant religiosity.

Our findings present indications of convergence between migrant and native religiosity over successive migrant generations when it comes to affiliation. In light of the public concerns about religious radicalization of younger generation migrants, this study demonstrates that their religiosity is more likely to align to native religiosity. However, further research would do well

to focus more in-depth on which subgroups of the migrant population maintain strong ties to religiosity and which groups dissociate themselves from religiosity. Moreover, future studies need also to differentiate between different aspects of religiosity and apply different approaches to different dimensions. Our results show for instance a divergent explanation for rates of affiliation and frequency of praying. Finally, the research would also benefit from a more in-depth analyses, by looking for instance at even more migrant generations, as well as a more broader scope, by including even more different contexts into the analyses.



## General conclusions

In this dissertation, we provided a sociological analysis of religiosity among immigrants in Europe. Previous research into migrant religiosity has been dominated by a focus on Muslim groups and case studies of specific groups within countries. This has resulted in (1) a lack of attention to theories from the sociology of religion, (2) neglect of intergenerational processes among ethnic minorities and (3) a lack of understanding of the generalizability of findings from Muslim groups to other minority groups. Therefore, we wanted to fill three important gaps in the research literature. First, we wanted to test recent theories from the sociology of religion on ethnic minority religiosity. Second, we wanted to examine intergenerational differences in religiosity among ethnic minorities. Third, we wanted to test the effect of small-scale segregation. We tried to fill these gaps by testing hypotheses derived from (1) insecurity theory, (2) social integration theory and (3) structural opportunities theory. These hypotheses have been tested in five empirical chapters, using nationally comparative datasets which allow assessing the influence of characteristics at the macro, meso and micro level of analysis. In this general conclusion, we look back at how we have contributed to the literature, discuss some points for further research and describe the implications of our findings for scholars and public policy.

### Major findings

#### Insecurity theory

Our first objective was to test recent theoretical developments from within the sociology of religion to the research of ethnic minority religion. Norris and Inglehart's (2004) insecurity theory tries to provide an answer to the question why religion varies throughout the world, since previous efforts to answer this question by secularization and religious market theory have been contradicted by numerous empirical studies. The theory states that individuals who experience existential insecurities while growing up tend to be more religious in later life. Differences in religiosity throughout the world can be explained by differences in existential insecurities caused by economic inequality or a limited access to basic needs such as food and health care. In line with the approach of Norris and Inglehart, we tested the influence of contextual factors such as insecurity and the human development of a country, both for the origin and the destination country, and also examined individual causes of existential insecurity (Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2011). Our first empirical study in chapter 4 reveals that insecurity is indeed

a predictor of religiosity, albeit only in certain circumstances. As predicted by insecurity theory, first generation migrants who grew up in insecure conditions tend to be more religious than migrants who did not experience insecurities. Migrants from countries with a higher economic inequality or a lower human development level are more religious. When it comes to insecurities after migration in the destination country, however, we could not find a link with religiosity. We found no association between religiosity and economic inequality or human development. At the individual level, religiosity was only higher for individuals who perceive household budget problems. This finding contributes to the literature in two ways.

First, we found support for Norris and Inglehart's (2004) proposition that insecurities experienced throughout childhood are more important than insecurities in later life. This proposition was put forward in their seminal book in 2004, in analogy with post materialism theory (Inglehart 2008), but not formally tested. Our paper was the first to disentangle the influence of contexts during childhood and in later life by focusing on migrants who moved between contexts. Second, our finding that only origin country insecurities contribute to religiosity, and not insecurities in the destination country, contradicts findings from a previous study among the ethnic majority in Europe (Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2011). This study reports that individuals in Europe do tend to be more religious if they experience insecurity, both during the past and present and from individual and contextual causes. The fact that the relation between insecurities experienced in Europe and religiosity among immigrants is absent might mean that migrants evaluate their living conditions differently, when compared to the insecurities in their origin country. Moreover, as already pointed out by Norris and Inglehart (2004), social welfare systems might be an important factor in reducing existential insecurities in a relatively equal fashion. Given the development of the social welfare systems in Europe, variation in insecurity might be limited when compared to variation in insecurity in contexts outside of Europe.

We can conclude that applying insecurity theory to explain differences in migrant religiosity offers interesting prospects for the study of ethnic minority religiosity. First generation migrants who come from an origin country that produces more insecurity during socialization report higher levels of religiosity during adult life. Insecurity theory therefore seems to provide a promising alternative to classical secularization theory and religious market theory. Insecurity theory has shown to be successful in explaining differences in religiosity throughout the world and now also among migrants who live in Europe and who originate from all over the world. After several decades of academic debate about theories dating back to Weber and Durkheim, the new paradigm of insecurity might be best compared to Marx's thesis of opium of the people (1979), in that religion forms a buffer to existential insecurities for individuals. Although Marx pointed to the organisation of religion as a way of dazing the people, religion might actually increase the demand for religiosity as a way of alleviating the existential insecurities individuals

have. The following decades will show whether insecurity theory is indeed capable of explaining religiosity across different contexts and across time periods and hence performs better than the secularization and religious market theories.

### Intergenerational differences

Our second objective was to look at how religion among migrants evolves from the first to subsequent generations. To attain this objective, we applied social integration theory (Durkheim 1897) in our empirical studies in chapters 5 to 8. Social integration theory predicts that values, ideas and beliefs are disseminated through interactions with other groups and individuals. Based on this theory we hypothesized that (1) migrants with more interactions with host society members and institutions will adapt their religiosity to that of the host society, (2) this adaptation will be higher for second generation migrants, (3) perceptions of exclusions will be associated with a reduced adaptation to host society religiosity and (4) second generation migrants with more interactions with the ethnic community adapt their religiosity more to that of the host society. We discuss the conclusions we can infer from our findings regarding each of these hypotheses.

In accordance with previous research that applied social integration theory (Van Tubergen 2006), we found that migrants are influenced by the religiosity of the society in which they live. Migrants tend to conform to levels of religiosity in the host society: in countries with more religious inhabitants, migrants tend to be more religious themselves. Given the relatively low levels of religiosity in Europe, however, the relation between social integration and religiosity is often negative. This means that ethnic minorities for whom more social interaction can be expected with host society members, such as higher educated and employed migrants, have lower levels of religiosity. This means that there occurs some form of adaptation to the religious environment of the host society.

This adaptation brings us to our second finding: this process through social integration takes place in an intergenerational way. The religiosity of second generation migrants is influenced more by host society religiosity than the first generation. This means that, across generations, migrants adapt to the religiosity of the host society they live in. This can indeed explain why previous research found diverging intergenerational differences in different contexts. A rise in religiosity in the U.S. and a decline in Europe among second generation migrants can be explained by migrants conforming to the religiosity of the host society. This finding is in line with the traditional intergenerational paradigm in the socio-economic assimilation and integration literature, and confirms previous findings on for instance conforming to political attitudes in the host society (Maxwell 2010). This does not mean that immigrants assimilate religiously. We did not perform an analysis of shifting between denominations. We do know from previous research, however, that shifting between religions is relatively rare, even in a vital religious field such as the U.S. only up to one third of people switch religions (Loveland 2003), and switching



is very uncommon among Muslim migrants in Europe (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). In terms of overall religiosity, however, they tend to conform to the general religious environment in the place where they live.

With our third finding, we take into account relapses in the intergenerational conforming to host society religiosity, by focusing on the role exclusion plays for ethnic minorities. Previous research has shown that ethnic minorities tend to divert themselves from the host society when they experience discrimination and exclusion and that this process of distancing is even stronger among the second generation. We found that perceived discrimination had an increasing effect on religiosity. This runs contrary to the lowering effect the European religious environment has on ethnic minorities. The reactive ethnicity and related reactive religiosity hypotheses explain this effect of discrimination by pointing to an increased ethnic and religious identification. Ethnic minorities who perceive discrimination are expected to dissociate themselves from the host society and at the same time increase the interaction with the own ethnic community, especially the second generation. We found no support for this interaction, however: the influence of the ethnic community on second generation migrant religiosity is not stronger for individuals who perceive discrimination. This might be explained by the phenomenon of feeling ‘in-between’, which has previously been observed among Muslims (Foner and Alba 2008). Second generation migrants often feel not fully accepted as Europeans, nor as members of the sending society of their parents. Therefore, they often reinforce their religious identity to compensate for their threatened ethnic identity. This could mean that perceived discrimination is associated with increased religiosity, sometimes specifically external to the own ethnic community. Another point at which we could not confirm previous research is the role of context receptivity on religiosity. Although Connor (2010a) found that Muslims tend to have a higher religiosity if they live in European regions where natives are less welcoming towards ethnic minorities, we could not replicate this result and found no effect of context receptivity. Social receptivity, nor institutional receptivity in the destination country seem to be related to migrant religiosity. This discrepancy might be partially due to a difference in context, in that receptivity is more influential at a regional than at a contextual level (Connor 2010a), or to the fact that Muslims might be more sensitive to perceptions of exclusion due to the conflation of Muslims and migrants in public debates (Meer and Modood 2009).

Our fourth finding relates to the role of the ethnic community for ethnic minority religiosity. As ethnic minorities conform to the host society religiosity in an intergenerational process, the question is: how does the ethnic community affect this process? We found that the ethnic community indeed has an influence on migrant religiosity and that interactions with either the ethnic community or the host society tend to influence to what extent the ethnic community influences second generation migrants’ religiosity. Second generation migrants who were raised in more traditional households tend to be influenced more by ethnic community religiosity.

The influence of the community is the strongest for non-Christian religiously affiliated ethnic minorities. This confirms previous research in the social psychological literature which found that the transfer of values is stressed more in communities who have values which differ more from those of the rest of society (Boehnke, Hadjar and Baier 2007). Therefore, the preservation of religiosity might be more successful for religious minority groups, especially for individuals who live in more traditional household settings.

In sum, we found that second generation migrants therefore are somewhere in between the religiosity of the ethnic community and the religiosity of the host society. Whether they end up closer to either one of these influences depends on a number of factors. First of all, interactions with the host society and/or the ethnic community pull second generation migrants towards the dominant religious pattern of each group. In general, however, second generation migrants tend to be closer to host society religiosity than the first generation. This last conformism is, however, somewhat attenuated in the case of perceived discrimination. When second generation migrants perceive discrimination, they tend to experience a reduced influence of host society religiosity. At the same time, they are not more influenced by the ethnic community religiosity, however. They are influenced more by the ethnic community when they are raised in traditional households and belong to religious minority groups.

### Small-scale segregation

With our third objective, we wanted to look at how ethnic segregation in small-scale settings influences migrant religiosity. Previous research had found that among Muslims, ethnic residential segregation is associated with a stagnating level of religiosity (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). It was unclear, however, whether this association also holds among other groups and in other settings. Therefore, we applied Blau's (1974) structural opportunities theory and tested the influence of school segregation in chapter 7 of this dissertation. Structural opportunities theory predicts that group sizes and distributions predict the opportunities for interactions between individuals from different groups. Therefore, ethnic school composition governs the opportunities for interethnic and interreligious contact, thus leading to religious influences across groups. Given the lower level of religiosity among the ethnic majority, this means we expect higher religiosity for individuals in schools with a high proportion of ethnic minority pupils. We found that ethnic segregation in the school context is indeed associated with a higher religiosity among ethnic minorities. Moreover, the effect of ethnic school segregation on religiosity is not limited to ethnic minorities. Ethnic majority Catholic pupils also tend to have a higher religious commitment if they attend schools which have a majority of ethnic minority pupils.

This shows that findings from previous research among Muslim minorities might to a certain extent be applicable to other minority groups as well. Indeed, previous research among Muslims already demonstrated that ethnic residential segregation might create a protective bubble for

Muslim communities' religiosity (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Moreover, in combination with the finding that religious minority groups tend to transfer their religiosity more successfully, this shows that segregation might contribute to form a shield from influences of the host society, in which ethnic minority religiosity is transferred more successfully to later generations. This finding also furthers our understanding of how groups influence other groups' religiosity. Traditionally, previous research focused on how the ethnic majority influences ethnic minority religion. Our finding that ethnic and religious school segregation influences ethnic majority religion as well shows that the relation can also run in the opposite direction.

### Towards an integrated model

Combining our results, we are able to make general predictions of religiosity among migrants in Europe across generations. It seems that religiosity among migrants is becoming similar to that of the host society. Especially among the third generation, there are few differences in levels of religiosity among ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority. Although cultural and religious differences will probably persist for a longer time, the religious fervor seems to be adapting across generations. At the same time, this process is hampered for migrant groups with influential ethnic communities and in the case of perceived discrimination. As we have seen, ethnic communities are influential in the same way as the host society: the more interactions individuals have with the ethnic community, the more they are similar to the religiosity of their community. This influence of the ethnic community is also higher in the case of segregation, in schools and possibly other settings as well. When later generation migrants perceive discrimination and exclusion, religiosity tends to be higher as well. Therefore, the intergenerational adaptation to levels of religiosity in the host society is far from a linear and one-directional process.

One of the main goals of this dissertation was a plea to go from the analysis of the specific to the analysis of the more general. These have resulted in the processes we identified above and the predictions that are based on these processes. Our findings can give a new direction to the understanding of ethnic minority religiosity in Europe and to further analyses thereof. The question therefore is: can these general processes be applied to specific groups or cases? Going back to the most studied group in Europe, Muslims, previous research has documented intergenerational stability in religiosity among Muslim migrants in the Netherlands (Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2012). Muslim groups in the Netherlands, and other Western European countries, are known to be cohesive, sizable and segregated minority groups and report high levels of perceived discrimination (Bolt, Hooimeijer and Van Kempen 2002; Karsten et al. 2006; Andriessen, Fernee and Wittebrood 2014). Therefore, intergenerational stability in religiosity, might be due to a higher influence of the ethnic community, the ethnic segregation and the perceived discrimination. The benefit of our approach is therefore that the general processes we

identified might explain specific cases as well. The test of this proposition is therefore to go back in the opposite direction and test whether our general analysis can explain specific cases as well.

## Limitations and suggestions for further research

In this dissertation, we made an explicit choice for a quantitative and comparative study of ethnic minority religion in Europe, based on international comparative large scale survey data. Although this strategy has led us to some interesting general conclusions, it has also limited our scope. Overall, the downside of our approach has therefore been that we have discussed social processes concerning religiosity among ethnic minorities in general, thus losing grasp with the effects for specific groups or contexts. In the upcoming part, we will discuss the limitations of our approach and how these can be overcome in future research.

### Examine differences

This dissertation has revolved around the search of similarities in religiosity across groups. We wanted to go beyond previous research which was based on case studies of single ethnic minority groups, often in only one context. Therefore, we looked for a comparison of different ethnic groups, analyzed comparable indicators of religiosity and performed analyses on a comparable set of countries. These choices also mean neglecting various differences. Future research should therefore pay more attention to each of these differences.

First, we have devoted little attention to differences between ethnic and religious groups. In the few cases where we did take into account group differences, we found that the processes we identified indeed play out differently for different ethnic and religious groups. We found that second generation migrants from religious minority groups are more similar to the religiosity of their ethnic community than other groups. Moreover, we had to identify groups based on national origins, thus grouping together different ethnic and regional groups that might live together in the same nation state but nonetheless differ in terms of religiosity. Therefore, future research could improve upon our findings by testing whether the relationships we identified hold for all ethnic and religious groups and in different contexts. Our test of the role of small-scale segregation contexts for ethnic minority religiosity shows that findings from specific minority groups can be replicated among a broad collection of different minority groups. The question at hand for future research is whether the opposite direction can be pursued as well: can our findings be replicated among different specific groups in specific contexts? The marked religious stability among Muslims in the Western World is one indication that the general patterns we have uncovered might play out differently for different ethnic and religious groups (Voas and Fleischmann 2012).

Second, to ensure comparability across groups, we restricted the analyses to indicators of religiosity that can be considered typical aspects of religious lives, across different ethnic and religious groups. Therefore, we chose to examine religious affiliation, religious commitment and religious behavior. Concerning the latter, we were unable to include an indicator on service attendance, since that indicator in the European Social Survey (ESS) does not work for Muslims (Meuleman and Billiet 2011). This is an interesting example of the problematic nature of selecting indicators for the quantitative study of religiosity among ethnic minorities. To enable a comparative analysis, indicators run the risk of being too specific and linked to denominational aspects, such as prescriptions concerning the frequency of praying or service attendance. At the same time, the sociology of religion struggles with finding the right indicators for measuring religiosity in a wide spectrum of cultures and religious traditions, due to a focus on Christianity (Cadge, Levitt and Smilde 2011). This is especially important for the study of religion among ethnic minorities in Europe, whose religious lives do not necessarily fit in Christocentric frameworks. Future research could therefore improve upon this study in two ways. First, by looking at other indicators of religiosity. If possible, these indicators should entail both comparability across cultures while at the same time being specific enough to grasp the complexity of religious lives across contexts. Second, by uncovering different dynamics for different dimensions of religiosity. Our findings have indicated for instance that the transfer of religious behavior within the ethnic community to later generations is more successful than that of religious beliefs. The famous thesis of Grace Davie that Europe can be characterized as a place of 'believing without belonging' (1990) demonstrates that contrasting different dimensions of religiosity uncovers different dynamics for each dimension. Therefore, future research could improve upon this dissertation by examining whether there exists a similar pattern in religiosity due to conformism to the host society on some dimensions, while other dimensions are preserved within ethnic communities across generations.

Third, due to data limitations and to ensure comparability, we limited the data to European countries, supplemented with the United States and Canada in the last chapter. Europe was particularly suited to address the impact of the context, given the variance in religiosity across countries. At the same time, Europe is quite unique in that vast regions are characterized by widespread secularization. Although this has uncovered interesting insights into the conformism among ethnic minorities in terms of religion, the results could have been less pronounced when other world regions would have been examined. Moreover, Europe can also be characterized as a world with a relatively high level of freedom of religion, whereas this is less the case in other countries. In other world regions, religious conformism might not be a voluntary process and religious preservation within the ethnic community might be restrained. Therefore, future research could test whether these relations also hold in other world regions. Furthermore, although we assessed the impact of the religious environment in Europe, by testing the effect of



ethnic majority religion, we did not take institutional aspects of religion into account. Countries differ in terms of the institutionalization of different religions, for instance the presence of different denominations, state sponsorship of certain denominations and the presence of religions in the social security system. Therefore, future research could improve upon this study by examining other dimensions of the religious environments, beyond the level of religiosity of its inhabitants.

## Examine social integration

This dissertation fits in a long tradition of applying social integration theory to the influence of values, ideas and beliefs of one group on individuals or other groups. Taking off from Durkheim's work (1897), social integration theory has been applied to for instance the study of suicide (Stack 2000; Van Tubergen, te Grotenhuis and Ultee 2005), delinquency (Crutchfield, Geerken and Gove 2006), health (Seeman 1996; Ross, Reynolds and Geis 2000) and religion (Wuthnow and Christiano 1979; Welch and Baltzell 1984; Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001; Van Tubergen 2006). These studies stress the benefits of social integration and cohesion for social groups and individuals. Social integration is associated with a better physical and mental health, with lower rates of delinquency and as a binding factor reducing the risk of suicide for individuals. For religion, social integration has most often been studied as a means through which religious groups influence individuals or other groups. This application has been adopted by scholars of migrant religiosity, who have studied how the religious lives of ethnic minority students are influenced by the religiosity of the ethnic majority, through social integration (Van Tubergen 2006). This is also the approach we followed in this dissertation. As with any research, however, there are some limitations to this approach upon which future research could improve.

First, we were unable to directly examine the effect of social integration. We identified the influence of the host society on the religiosity of ethnic minorities, and identified subgroups which can be expected to have more frequent interactions with ethnic majority members. Due to data limitations, however, we were unable to measure intergroup interactions, hence to control for the actual level of social integration and the effect that has on ethnic minority religiosity. Although this is common in the sociological literature on religiosity, future research could improve upon this tradition by measuring the direct effect of social interactions for individuals religious lives. Our results in Chapter 7 show that having more ethnic majority friends is associated with higher levels of religious commitment among adolescents. The question is whether this influence extends beyond adolescence and the school context. There is a long tradition of research into the benefits of social capital within religious institutions, especially among ethnic minorities (Hirschman 2004). To establish the same tradition at the other side of the spectrum, social capital as a determinant of religiosity and not as a consequence, the association between social interactions and religiosity deserves a careful assessment.

Second, this careful assessment should not be limited to one direction, in this case from the ethnic majority to the ethnic minority. As already indicated, the measurement of distance between ethnic majority and ethnic minorities has in public discourse and academic research been approached too one-sidedly (Schinkel 2013). Therefore, the amount of inter-ethnic contact has often been problematized and studied as an aspect of ethnic minorities, and less so as an aspect of the ethnic majority, especially in Europe. The literature into inter-ethnic marriages is an interesting illustration: most studies in Europe examine the influences on inter-ethnic marriages among a sample of ethnic minorities, thus ignoring the influences on the propensity of the ethnic majority to intermarry (Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2006). This applies also to the literature on social integration and religion among ethnic minorities in Europe: virtually all studies examine how social integration into ethnic majority groups influences ethnic minority religiosity and not the other way round. Our results in Chapter 7 show that at least among adolescents in school contexts, there is an influence of ethnic minority religion on certain ethnic majority groups. Therefore, future research should also examine how ethnic minorities influence ethnic majority religiosity.

### Examine more generations

Apart from studying other contexts to assess whether the evolution we have outlined holds in different world regions as well, the question also is whether the processes we identified continue beyond the second generation. Second generation migrants differ in one important aspect from their first generation counterparts: their place of birth. First generation migrants are born in the home country, thus socialized in the religious environment of that country. Second generation migrants, on the other hand, are born and socialized in the destination country of their parents. They are confronted with the religious environment of the place in which they live and the religious lives of their parents, which might be out of touch with the environment. Therefore, we found the study of differences in religiosity between the first and the second generation particularly interesting. This specific context wanes across generations however. The question therefore is: how do the intergenerational differences proceed beyond the second generation? Although we were unable to examine this question in all empirical Chapters due to data limitations, Chapter 7 shows that the religious commitment of third generation adolescents can be compared to that of the ethnic majority.

Therefore, future research beyond the second generation should take into account different trends among different ethnic and religious minority groups and for different indicators. We have seen that religiosity can evolve in a specific way from the first to the second generation. From Chapter 6, we remember that ethnic communities transfer religious behavior more successfully than religious commitment and that religious minority groups are more successful as well. This implies that for later generations, the religious climate within ethnic communities



might differ between groups and for different characteristics. In some religious minority groups, religiosity might be relatively vital, given the successful transmission to the second generation, while it might be less so in ethnic minority groups that are not religious minorities. On the other hand, religious behavior such as praying might evolve into a cultural practice in some groups, less backed up by religious commitment. Therefore, the differentiation we outlined earlier is especially important for future research into later migrant generations.

### Examine time-sensitive evolutions

The analyses presented in this dissertation are relatively static. Except for Chapter 4, where we took into account the insecurities experienced during childhood in the country of origin, we assumed that religion is a static phenomenon, at the individual, the cohort and the period level. Therefore, future research would do well to integrate time as an important characteristic in the analysis of religiosity among ethnic minorities.

At the individual level, we know from previous research that age is an important factor in religious lives (Argue, Johnson and White 1999). Although the relationship between age and religiosity is often explained in terms of an increase in religiosity in later life due to an increase in existential fears because individuals reach their end of life, the picture is more complex. Different religious and ethnic groups tend to have different patterns of religiosity throughout the life-course (Argue, Johnson and White 1999; Peacock and Poloma 1998). Moreover, demographic transitions and family compositions influence religiosity over the life course as well (Ingersoll-Dayton, Krause and Morgan 2002). Our finding that traditional household settings influence the transfer of religiosity to later generations shows that the life course and family dynamics indeed influence ethnic minorities' religious lives. This means for instance that extending the research into ethnic minority religiosity to adolescents is an important endeavor, given the specific role of adolescence in the formation of religiosity (King and Boyatzis 2004). At the same time, it illustrates that our findings among adolescents are not necessarily generalizable to other life phases. Therefore, future research should more fully grasp how religion among ethnic minorities is shaped throughout the life course. This kind of research could for instance be pursued by gathering longitudinal data, which enables scholars to fully understand the impact of demographic transitions and life-course trajectories for religiosity. Moreover, longitudinal data have the advantage of giving more insight into the causality of the associations we have identified in this dissertation.

Above the individual level, time might also be at play at different levels. Although it has been demonstrated that religiosity fluctuates constantly throughout the world (Norris and Inglehart 2004), we have assumed that religiosity across ethnic groups and countries is stable over time. The evolution over the last few decades in religiosity among European populations (Davie 1990, 2003) shows that even at higher levels, time is an important concept in analyses of religiosity.

Given that we identified processes of conforming to religiosity in the host society, evolutions in religiosity over time might be an important factor in this process. Previous research has for instance demonstrated that first and second generation migrants tend to conform to a declining trend of homonegativity in the host society (Van der Bracht and Van de Putte 2014). This means that when ideas, values and beliefs change over time in the host society, migrants might conform to this trend as well. Moreover, ethnic minorities also originate from a place where religiosity is susceptible to time trends. This might also be replicated in ethnic communities, where religiosity might be changing due to conformism to time trends in the host society, changing demographic compositions or other trends. Although longitudinal data can overcome this gap in the research literature as well, the existing data of the ESS can be used in a way to account for time trends at both the cohort- and period-level (Van der Bracht and Van de Putte 2014).

## Implications

So what is the take-home message of this dissertation for sociologists and public policy? From a scientific perspective, we learned that the literature on migrant religiosity should be embedded more in the general literature on religiosity and ethnic minorities. The focus on Muslim migrants in Europe has not also narrowed the scope of the research, it has also led scholars away from the general literature from the two traditions that are best suited for answering the questions why individuals are religious and how migration and integration affects migrants. Religion is one among many characteristics that undergo a certain repositioning after arrival in the new host society, especially across generations. Therefore, we encourage scholars to focus more on intergenerational processes and how religion evolves across generations in the host society. Furthermore, most research into interactions between ethnic minority and ethnic majority religiosity has only examined the direction from majority to minority. We have shown that ethnic majority religiosity can be shaped by ethnic minority religiosity as well, at least in small-scale settings. We therefore encourage sociologists of religion to examine how ethnic minority religiosity has shaped European countries' religiosity.

We started this dissertation with referring to the public concerns surrounding the radicalization of Muslim minorities in the Western World. Although we did not focus on Muslims, we tackled some points which are of interest to policy makers in regards to this debate. Overall, our findings show that ethnic minority religiosity across generations aligns to that of the country in which they live. Therefore, if our findings are replicated for specific minority groups, such as Muslims, it can be expected that religiosity among Muslims will decline over subsequent generations. At the same time, we also identified some factors which might cause Muslims to deviate from this pattern, as we have already illustrated in the case of Muslims in the Netherlands. First of all, as a minority group in Europe, Muslims might stress the transfer of religiosity within the ethnic community.

Moreover, due to endogamy and the tendency to marry a partner from the origin country (Beck-Gernsheim 2007; Voas and Fleischmann 2012; Van Kerckem et al. 2013), Muslim groups also have the tendency to form traditional families, another aspect which promotes the transfer of religiosity. The main factor of interest for public policy is probably the effect of segregation. We have shown that the intergenerational decline of religiosity among ethnic minority adolescents can slow down in the case of ethnic and religious segregation. This also builds on previous research on the effect of segregation for adult Muslim groups (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Therefore, segregation might be a factor which contributes to renewed religious fervor among Muslim youths in the West, especially in the school context. Discrimination is another factor which might slow down the process of religious conforming to the host society among Muslims and other minority groups (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Especially later generations often feel unaccepted in Europe and therefore try to find solace in a religious identity, stripped from cultural influences. Previous research has indicated that especially these groups among later generation migrants in Europe are susceptible to fundamentalist interpretations of Islam (Roy 2004; Warner, Martel and Dugan 2012). Therefore, the processes we identified as influencing ethnic minority religion in general also have a specific consequence for specific groups. Public policy might therefore be interested in the processes described in this dissertation since they might specifically contribute to radicalisation of some subgroups of larger ethnic and religious minority groups.

Although most democratic states do not intervene with the religiosity of its inhabitants, public policy in the West has recently focused on how the radicalization of Muslim minorities can be stopped. One of the ways of reducing the risks of radicalization might be focusing upon reducing boundaries between ethnic minorities and the host society. These boundaries might on the one hand be symbolic ethnic boundaries, creating strong in-group cohesion and out-group prejudice, which might lead to a reduction in contact between two groups. In this case, public policy could focus on reducing prejudice and discrimination towards ethnic minority groups. At the same time, policy should also devote attention to reducing structural boundaries, again through reducing prejudice and discrimination, but also through reducing segregation, both in small-scale settings such as schools, as in larger settings, such as residential segregation. Our results show that interactions between individuals promote the dissemination of religious ideas, values and beliefs. Therefore, a policy focusing on reducing symbolic and structural ethnic boundaries will probably have two consequences for religiosity among ethnic minorities in Europe. First, religiosity will be more similar between ethnic minority and ethnic majority religiosity. As a perceived discrepancy in religiosity between ethnic minority and majority religiosity might also increase perceptions of ethnic boundaries, this will result in reduced perceptions of ethnic boundaries, thus reinforcing the trend towards reducing boundaries. Second, given the association between the processes under study and the radicalization of specific subgroups, these policies

are also likely to reduce the risk of radicalization, especially among later generation ethnic minorities. Both effects are dependent upon each other, as a reduction in boundaries will lead to higher rates of perceived acceptance in the host society, while less public concerns about the religious fervor among ethnic minority groups might lead to reduced ethnic boundaries. Although this dissertation was not an analysis of radicalization and our policy implications are not directed to radicalization specifically, we believe that our results might contribute to the debate on religiosity among first and second generation migrants in Europe.

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